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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the issue of presidential failure – any instance in which
a president fails to complete his/her term in office without a break in the democratic
regime. South America stands as an anomaly for having faced an uncommonly high rate
of presidential failure, as eleven elected presidents have failed to complete their terms in
office since the third wave of democratization. This phenomenon presents an interesting
puzzle for scholars because it allows for inquiries into governmental stability as well as
executive accountability. I evaluate the causes of presidential failure in South America
through a multi-method approach that looks at the phenomenon from three different
levels of analysis.
First, I examine the cross-national trends that explain why presidents are removed
from office in South America. Various scholars have analyzed the reasons that presidents
fail in Latin America. This assessment builds on those past arguments in order to
perform a comprehensive analysis of South American presidential failure. I focus on
variables that have not consistently been utilized in the past. More than that, this analysis
uses a new technique, survival modeling, to identify those factors that increase or
decrease the likelihood that a president will complete his or her term in office. Through
this analysis, I identify the importance of minority legislative support, inflation,
prolonged recession, executive wrongdoing, and protest in increasing the likelihood that a
president will fall.
Second, I perform two national assessments of repeated presidential failure. The
cross-national statistical analysis shows that certain factors put presidents at risk. The
qualitative analyses of Argentina and Ecuador, two countries with repeated failure, allow
for process-tracing in order to identify how presidents are removed. I draw from the
importance of protest and legislative opposition, which are found significant in the
survival model, to explain presidential failure in these two countries. I show that political
actors with poder de convocatoria (power to convoke/rallying power) can use that power
iv

to challenge a president when he/she faces other performance-related issues, like scandal
or economic problems. The study of Argentina highlights how the Peronist Party
maintains this power through a variety of connections to its organized base. This
relationship to base support changes over time and is visible in each instance of
presidential failure. On the other hand, Ecuador demonstrates the importance of the
indigenous movement in explaining mobilization against presidents. The Argentine story
shows how presidential failure flows from an actor with power, a top-down process.
Ecuadorian presidential failure shows the bottom-up path of failure that occurs when
actors who have lacked traditional access to politics oppose presidents.
Third, I analyze survey responses from Argentine and Ecuadorian citizens in
order to identify why individuals in these countries choose to protest. I assess what
demographic, organizational, and attitudinal factors influence the likelihood of failure.
As protest is instrumental to the process of failure, this final assessment demonstrates the
importance of civil society organizations and unions in pushing individuals into the
street, supporting the findings of the previous two sections. Thus, the causal mechanisms
of failure can be witnessed at cross-national, national, and individual levels of analysis.
In conclusion, I discuss the important implications of this research for Latin
American politics. I provide predictions for the future of presidential stability in the
region, and I assess how recent protests differ from those of the past.

v

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………1
Chapter 2: Unifying Models of Presidential Failure…………………………………30
Chapter 3: Un Tropezón No Es Caída – A Stumble is not a Fall….…………………55
Chapter 4: Ecuadorian Presidential Instability………………………………………92
Chapter 5: Individual Determinants of Protest Participation…….…….………….117
Chapter 6: Conclusion……………..……………………………………….…………143
References………………….……………………………………….…………….……156
Appendix………………….…………………………………………………..………..164

vi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Democratization and democratic stability are perennial issues in the study of Latin
American governance. The rise of military dictatorships in the 1960’s and 1970’s in the
region provided a central topic for political science inquiry. Military dictatorships
emerged in many countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay,
marking a period of conflict and undemocratic governance. The horrors of these regimes,
matched with a global call for democracy, created a pressing need for solutions to regime
instability. At the heart of this was an effort to prevent authoritarian tendencies, increase
democratic stability, and improve the lives of citizens in South America. These
dictatorships eventually fell in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, and the rise of newly
democratic regimes, the so-called third wave of democratization, brought hope of more
positive outcomes. With democracy, the horrors of the past hopefully would not be
repeated. These transitions to democracy may have occurred across the region, but
different governing issues have emerged for the new democracies. Instead of facing the
previous dread of persistent military coups and democratic breakdown, Latin American
countries have begun to experience a new type of presidential instability – presidential
failure.
This issue of presidential failure emerged over the past few decades, as various
presidents from different countries failed to complete their terms in office. These
examples of failure cross the continent. For instance, Ecuadorian President Abdalá
Bucaram faced political pressure from the legislature and mass protests from citizens in
1997. The Ecuadorian Congress eventually charged him with mental incapacity, and he
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was removed from office following a majority vote in the legislature (Pérez-Liñán, 2007).
In the Southern Cone, Argentina faced similar issues in 2001 when President Fernando de
la Rúa resigned amid large-scale civil protest and financial crisis. Protesters dramatically
chanted “Que se vayan todos,” as they called for all politicians to step down (Hochstetler,
2006). Repeating instability, Bolivia experienced its second presidential resignation in
two years when Carlos Mesa Gisbert stepped down under social protest and political
pressure in the summer of 2005. Mesa had replaced Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Goni),
who resigned in 2003 after only one year in office. The events leading up to both
resignations proved dramatic on an international scale because widespread protest and
demonstrations were key features in Goni’s and Mesa’s falls (Barr, 2005; Salman, 2006).
Each of the previously mentioned examples falls under the theoretical concept of
“presidential failure.” Presidential failure is defined as any instance in which a president
does not complete his/her fixed term in office, without a breakdown in the democratic
regime. What distinguishes presidential failure from presidential instability of earlier
time periods is that the democratic regimes survived. Only the presidents fell, and even
in contexts in which democratic norms were temporarily suppressed during crises, they
were quickly reinstated. That is, these are not garden-variety coups d’état, but something
else. Even in instances in which the military was involved in the failure, there was
generally democratic adherence to order of succession. For example, in the case of Jamil
Mahuad in Ecuador, a portion of the military led by Lucio Gutiérrez was a key actor in
the failure by supporting protesters and working with indigenous groups (Zamosc, 2007).
However, after congressional occupation and military intervention, power eventually
passed to the elected vice-president, Gustavo Noboa (Zamosc, 2007). Although
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legislatures and mass publics used different means across the cases to actually remove the
presidents, there is sufficient conceptual common ground to justify viewing presidential
failure as a general phenomenon worthy of further inquiry.1 Presidents are removed in a
variety of ways, but these resignations, impeachments, and other forms of removal are all
variations of the same phenomenon occurring in the region.
Presidential failure has been called a variety of terms in the literature, including
interrupted presidencies, presidential falls, and presidential breakdowns. However, each
term deals with the same type of event – the failure of a president to complete a fixed
term in office while the democratic regime continues – and addresses its consequences
for these regimes. South America is an interesting region for studying this phenomenon
as presidential failure has occurred at anomalously high rates when compared to the rest
of the world (Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009, p. 34). One quarter of South American
presidents have not completed their terms in office between 1978 and 2005 (Hochstetler
and Edwards, 2009, p. 34). The following table lists these most recent failures, and this
project investigates the 11 elected South American presidents who have failed to
complete their terms in office between 1978 and 2007.2 This phenomenon is a central
concern for scholars interested in Latin American countries because it is key to issues of
democratic governability. Although citizens seemed to have found immediate redress for
their grievances in these instances, some scholars question if this newfound flexibility is,
in fact, a new form of instability that may challenge democratic principles.

1

Marsteintredet and Berntzen (2008) address each type of removal and discuss the manner in which
resignations, impeachments, etc. are distinct phenomena.
2
This project does not address the most recent failure of Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo in 2012.
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Table 1.
Presidential Failure (Elected)
President
Lucio Gutiérrez
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada
Fernando de la Rúa
Jamil Mahuad
Raúl Cubas
Abdalá Bucaram
Alberto Fujimori
Fernando Collor de Mello
Carlos Andrés Pérez
Raúl Alfonsín
Siles Zuazo

Country
Ecuador
Bolivia
Argentina
Ecuador
Paraguay
Ecuador
Peru
Brazil
Venezuela
Argentina
Bolivia

Dates Held Office
2003 – 2005
2002 – 2003
1999 – 2001
1998 – 2000
1998 – 1999
1996 – 1997
1990 – 2000
1990 – 1992
1989 – 1993
1983 – 1989
1982 – 1985

I examine this phenomenon in South American democracies because this region
has experienced disproportionately high levels of presidential failure. Previous
investigations of presidential failure have analyzed Latin America as a whole, while two
studies address global presidential regimes (Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009; Kim and
Bahry, 2008). Instead, I focus only on South America in order to identify the reasons that
presidents fail in high risk countries in a high risk region. My goal for this dissertation is
to identify the causal mechanisms behind presidential failure. Investigating those
countries in which presidential failure is occurring most frequently in the world allows
me to trace the path of this phenomenon and isolate the causal mechanisms behind
failure. I utilize a multi-method approach with three distinct levels of analysis to isolate
the causal factors that explain presidential failure. I draw upon cross-national, national,
and individual studies of presidential failure because this allows me to compare processes
at different levels of analysis and identify what factors result in failure. Over the course
of this dissertation I address a variety of questions. What factors generally increase the
likelihood that presidents across the South American region will not complete their
4

terms? What features explain repeated presidential failure in two specific cases? Why do
individuals rise up in protest against presidents?
The dissertation consists of three distinct sections to address these questions.
First, I perform cross-national, statistical analysis to identify what factors increase a
president’s risk of failure. Second, I examine two countries with repeated presidential
failure – Ecuador and Argentina – in order to identify how the nature of certain
organizing structures, political parties and civil society organizations, influence
presidential failure. Third, I analyze citizens’ participation in popular mobilizations in
these two countries. I identify that a driving causal factor in presidential failure is the
mobilizing capacity of key political actors, and this mobilizing capacity is visible at all
levels of analysis. Each chapter will demonstrate how actors’ mobilizing capacity drove
presidential failure in these cases.

Cross-National Explanations of Failure
The first portion of this dissertation, a cross-national statistical analysis, uses a
survival model to investigate presidential failure in South American countries from 1978
to 2007. I build upon a broad literature to explain presidential instability, and I draw
from earlier arguments about democratic breakdown, and then ones about presidential
failure, to develop theoretical expectations. The model then identifies the factors that
increase presidential risk of failure in the present day and provides a comprehensive
model of this phenomenon.
The presidential failure literature has theoretical roots in investigations of Latin
American democratic instability and breakdown in the form of military coups and
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authoritarian rule in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Various authors advanced theories that
focused on economic and structural explanations for democratic breakdown, examining
internal and external conditions that affect governmental stability (Cotler, 1978;
O’Donnell, 1973; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Eventually, a heated debate emerged
as other authors began to focus on the impact of institutional variables. They identified
the benefits and weaknesses of different political institutions and showed how each
institutional feature proved more or less likely to support the consolidation and
continuance of democracy (Cheibub, 2002, 2007; Linz, 1978, 1990; Mainwaring, 1990).
This institutional approach differed from the economic arguments of earlier studies and
eventually continued throughout the study of democratic transition, especially as scholars
sought to explain democratic recomposition as well as breakdown.
In the first writings on the topic of presidential breakdown, scholars linked the
study of failed presidencies in democracies to studies of democratic breakdown by
preserving this second theoretical focus on issues of political representation and
institutional stability (Negretto, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2005; Valenzuela 2004). These
institutional explanations largely addressed how features of the presidential regime create
certain inherent tensions in various political relationships. Linz’s claim that
presidentialism was a zero-sum game where losing candidates and parties knew they
were locked out of executive power for a rigid term was soon applied to the issues of
presidential breakdown (Valenzuela, 2004, p. 14). In addition, presidentialism’s focus on
the figure of the president made it so that presidents who did not receive a strong
electoral mandate were especially vulnerable to challenges. For a variety of reasons, the
nature of the presidential system is seen as less cooperative than parliamentary ones,
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prone to deadlock and conflict that increased the likelihood of problems with presidential
instability (Valenzuela, 2004, p. 16). These vulnerabilities have not proved as
problematic as expected for regime stability in later studies (Cheibub, 2007), but they
may still be important for explaining the instability of presidents.
Since virtually all of Latin America’s democratic regimes are presidential, they
would share a set of general stressors. In addition, most institutional arguments also
include the electoral/party system, which varies more and can magnify or dampen the
impact of presidentialism’s hazards. In particular, presidentialism may become much
more problematic when joined with the proportional representation electoral systems and
resulting multiple parties that are common in Latin America (Mainwaring, 1993). For
example, Linz famously pointed to the problem of dual legitimacy that exists within the
presidential system because both the executive and legislative branches are independently
elected (Linz, 1978). Especially if support for the president’s party in the congress dips
lower and makes him/her a minority president, the un-reconciled dual legitimacy
becomes much more problematic.
The role of legislative minorities has also been used to explain the occurrence of
legislative-executive conflict and interrupted presidencies through examination of
coalition conditions and presidential party control over the median and veto legislator
(Negretto, 2006, p. 87). When comparing executive and legislative government
dissolutions, presidential removal had been occurring more frequently in recent years
than congressional dissolution, instances in which the president suspends congress to
change its makeup (Pérez-Liñán, 2005, p. 56). Recent demilitarization, “institutional
imbalances” that provided simpler legal paths for presidential removal, and constitutional
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stability have created a situation of congressional supremacy that strengthened the
legislature and allowed for presidential removal (Pérez-Liñán, 2005, p. 57). The
institutional mechanisms of these presidential regimes, matched with their electoral
systems, create weak arrangements that result in instability.
These institutional weaknesses are compounded by other factors that help drive
presidential failure. Pérez-Liñán conducted a comprehensive assessment in his book
Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America, which
examines presidential impeachment as a new form of instability that results from several
factors that have changed due the democratization process and the absence of military
intervention (2007). He contended that when media exposed executive corruption and
the president lacked congressional control, social mobilization with legislative support
could drive presidential impeachment (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). Similarly, presidents were
more likely to not complete their terms when they had been linked to scandal, had a
perceived neoliberal policy bias, and had minority legislative support (Hochstetler, 2006,
p. 409). Aside from these contributing factors, the interactions of street protest and
legislatures explain how presidential failure occurs (Hochstetler, 2006). Kim and Bahry
have assessed the influence of institutional, economic, and social factors on presidential
stability around the globe with logit analysis (Kim and Bahry, 2008). Lastly, Álvarez
and Marsteintredet perform a multinomial logit analysis, taking into account numerous
variables, and identifying various factors that influence the likelihood of presidential
failure, including prolonged recession, antigovernment demonstrations, and the number
of political parties, among other factors (2010).
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Initial institutional arguments provide a basic theoretical foundation for
explaining the region’s propensity for presidential failure. Institutional arrangements
serve as fault lines in Latin American governments. On top of these lines, performancerelated factors such as scandal and protest, as well as economic variables, influence the
likelihood of presidential failure. These other factors are the seismic waves that disrupt
the weakened systems. As Przeworski and Limongi state, “What destabilizes regimes are
economic crises, and democracies, particularly poor democracies, are extremely
vulnerable to bad economic performance” (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997, p. 169). A
country may possess underlying institutional weaknesses, but performance-related events
trigger breakdown (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997, p. 169). Presidential failure is similar
to democratic breakdown because the characteristics of presidential systems create
fragility and the non-institutional features increase the risk that a president will fail.
In Chapter Two, I draw together this theory regarding institutional weaknesses
and event-related problems to identify what factors influence presidential failure. First, I
evaluate institutional claims regarding the inherent weaknesses of the presidential system
by assessing if minority legislative support and initial popular vote results increase the
risk of failure. Second, I assess how economic factors, in the form of neoliberal policy
implementation, inflation, and prolonged recession, influence presidential failure.
Finally, I examine how performance-related variables, like social unrest and executive
wrongdoing, matter. In this process, I identify how social protest and minority legislative
support, as well as other variables, increase the likelihood that a president will leave
before the end of his/her term.
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I use survival (duration) modeling to determine how the risk of failure changes
over a president’s term. Differing from simple logit models, the survival analysis
develops a baseline survivor function for presidents, and then I can identify how other
variables influence the time until presidents fall. This model is a time-until-event
analysis and allows us to see how different factors influence the likelihood that a
president will fail to complete his/her term in office. In sum, this analysis provides the
base, statistical assessment of why presidents fail across South America, which in turn
drives the investigations of other sections of the dissertation.

Country-Specific Presidential Failure
The statistical analysis lays the foundation for understanding countries with
repeated presidential failure. I identify quantitatively what factors place presidents at
risk, but I use qualitative analysis to show how presidents fall. The importance of
legislative opposition and social protest emerges from the survival model. There is no
simple measurable interaction between a president’s legislative support and protest
levels. Instead, I look to the repeated nature of presidential failure in certain countries in
an attempt to identify the impact that legislative support and protest have. I examine
presidential failure in Ecuador and Argentina, in order to understand how political actors
push for the removal of unpopular presidents.
To state the obvious, it makes the most sense to trace the process of presidential
failure in places where presidents have failed. Ecuador and Argentina are critical cases
for this analysis because each country has faced repeated presidential failure. More than
that, they are very different countries within this high-risk region. Perhaps not “most
different” cases, Ecuador and Argentina still possess important distinctions that allow for
10

case study comparison. Historically, the two countries have uniquely different colonial
experiences. Argentina avoided much of Spanish colonizers’ direct control, while
Ecuador played a more instrumental role in the colonial system and witnessed many of
the revolutionary efforts that ultimately resulted in independence. As a growing
democracy, Argentina saw the influx of a large number of European immigrants, which
created a distinctive culture and an organized working class. Ecuador grew with a
different social structure, as a large indigenous population has fought for increased
political inclusion. Over the past century, Argentina has emerged economically as a
regional leader, despite periodic economic crises, whereas Ecuador has been less
economically successful in the region and has dollarized its economy. All of these
differences do not make the two countries true opposites, but they do mark extremes on
the South American continent. I will be analyzing why these dissimilar nations have had
the same problem of presidential instability by isolating important factors that they do
both possess.
Two key similarities do exist between these countries – the declining role of the
military in the public sphere and the growing adherence to democratic norms. Since the
return to democracy, both countries, like many others in South America, have seen
diminishing power in the hands of the military. Oppressive tendencies of the last
dictatorships combined with new international norms that support democracy have all
weakened the ability of the military to step into office in instances of legislative gridlock
or social unrest. Changes occurred as to how democracy was perceived, especially by the
military and other rightist groups (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 1995, p. 46). The
military’s declining importance as an actor, along with greater global respect for
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democracy, makes military intervention in the form of a coup less desirable in moments
of gridlock or instability. Instead, leadership instability has been channeled through
constitutional paths, like resignation and impeachment, leading to the recent trends in
presidential failure. Whereas conflict in the past might have been dealt with by military
intervention, the military is simply not as committed to overt acts that disrupt democratic
stability. National, regional, and international pressures all oppose these types of actions.
The new wave of democratization has experienced far more failure than breakdown.
The importance of both legislative minorities and social protest highlighted by
quantitative analysis led me to assess how political actors influence presidential failure in
these countries. A potentially key factor that exists in both countries is the presence of
parties and organizations that have the capacity to mobilize support – in Spanish, poder
de convocatoria (power to convoke/rallying power). Both of these groups have the
capacity to rally their constituents or members against a president. In Argentina, this
actor is a political party; in Ecuador it is a social movement. Despite these differences,
both actors have a capacity to mobilize against presidents. Through their relationships
with their base support, they are able to activate sustained opposition to presidents whose
performance is lacking, either because of scandal or poor economic outcomes.
Presidential systems have fault lines created by institutional arrangements, and specific
events can activate these faults, weakening government. The mobilizing actors can
amplify those shock waves at times, leading to presidential failure. Drawing from classic
social movement theory, these actors can be viewed as “mobilizing structures,” which are
those organizations that resolve the inherent collective action problems in social
mobilization (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow, 1997). Although this is not the traditional use
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of this term, this analysis will show that those actors, the Peronist Party (PJ - Partido
Justicialista) and CONAIE (an Ecuadorian indigenous organization), possessed the
mobilizing capacity to rally supporters against presidents, which allowed for the repeated
failure of executives in these two countries.
In addition, the distinct nature of these political actors as well as the differences
between the two countries provides additional insight into the process of presidential
failure. Argentina, with a stable party structure and economic success, demonstrates a
process of presidential failure that moved from the elites to the masses. In Ecuador, with
a less stable democracy and a weaker economy, presidential failure moved from the
grassroots up to political party elites, who ultimately removed multiple presidents.

Argentine Presidential Failure
Two elected presidents of Argentina, Alfonsín in 1989 and De la Rúa in 2001,
were forced out of office before the end of their terms during the current democratic
period. Both Alfonsín and De la Rúa3 were from the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), and
faced similar problems with faltering legislative support, street protests, and economic
policy implementation. In addition, after De la Rúa’s fall, presidential succession
consisted of the entrance and exit of several presidents in a matter of weeks. I look at one
of these failures in order to show how the Peronist Party mobilized against one of its
own. The repeated occurrence of presidential failure in Argentina allows us to see the
Peronist Party’s organizing capacity in these distinct instances, find similarities in
presidents’ failures, and identify the processes of Argentine presidential failure. We can

3

President De la Rúa was from the UCR party. However, he was elected president as part of a coalition
between the UCR and the Frente País Solidario (FREPASO) known as the Alianza (Alliance).
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see how this organizational capacity was instrumental in the decision making of
presidential succession.
Argentina has ranked high on measures of democracy when compared to the rest
of South America. It is a large country with an expansive economy, despite periodic
economic crises, and has retained its standing as one of the economic leaders in the
region. In addition, it has maintained a relatively stable party system with strong
connections between certain parties and labor unions that transformed into clientelist
linkages (Levitsky, 2003a). Argentina shares none of these characteristics with Ecuador,
which is comparatively economically unsuccessful, has never had an institutionalized
party system, and has had generally low levels of democracy (see Chapter Four). Despite
the differences, Argentina and Ecuador share the dubious distinction of having
exceptionally large numbers of presidents removed from office. The following analysis
of the Argentine case shows how an opposition political party with the capacity to secure
mass opposition can, through a combination of legislative challenges and popular protest,
drive legitimately elected presidents from office. Later, through an examination of the
Ecuadoran case, I will show that the same combination of legislative maneuver and mass
protest can occur through a contrasting dynamic in which mass organizations catalyze
party action rather than the other way around. Aside from its comparative value,
Argentina allows me to examine variations in the Peronists’ mobilizing capacity over
time, increasing since the return to democracy, and diminishing only recently during the
presidency of Cristina Kirchner.
My survival analysis and the quantitative studies of other scholars support my
focus on political actors’ capacity to utilize minority legislative support and popular
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protest to challenge presidents. Corruption, minority legislative support, and neoliberal
policy have all been found significant in explaining presidential failure, but social protest,
specifically violent protest, is also an essential element in presidential failure (Hochstetler
2006). In addition, presidential scandal and popular unrest, when mixed with the absence
of a “legislative shield,” creates the possibility for presidential impeachment (PerézLiñan, 2007).
These arguments, along with my own statistical analysis, lead me to consider that
factors not previously assessed in the Argentine cases of presidential failure may be
important. I theorize that the ability of political parties and civil society organizations to
mobilize opposition to presidents, represented in the statistical analysis as minority
legislative support and protest, is at the heart of this issue. Whereas inflation rates and
personal corruption may engender opposition to a president, I argue that some actor with
both legislative and mobilizing capacity is essential for a presidential failure to occur.
Ongoing patterns of such dual capacity explain when countries become susceptible to
repeated failure. I am unable to quantitatively evaluate this capacity, as the informal links
and actions of this political actor are difficult to see consistently, much less across time
and over a variety of countries. Instead, I look to qualitative analysis to map this
mechanism.
This theoretical perspective is also informed by the case literature on Argentine
presidential failures. Much of this literature points to singular, idiosyncratic features to
explain specific instances of presidential failure, thereby ignoring the consistent noninstitutional cause that exists in Argentine politics – the relationship between the Peronist
Party and its base. In these instances of presidential failure, the Peronist Party wields that
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power to call its base into action. The literature can be broken down into institutionalist
and agency-centered approaches to Argentine presidential failure. These approaches
miss the importance of the Peronists’ mobilizing capacity, even though the agencycentered approaches provide support for my larger argument.
On the institutionalist side, the “quasi-parliamentary” nature of Argentine
presidential succession contributed to De la Rúa’s failure, while preventing it from
leading to outright democratic breakdown (Schamis, 2002). Problems within the Alianza
coalition, from which De la Rúa was elected, contributed to his presidential failure as
well (Schamis, 2002, p. 87). Schamis notes that changes in the Argentine constitution,
which he sees occurring in 1994 with an agreement between Alfonsín and Menem, placed
greater power in the legislative branch by allowing Congress to choose the chief
executive officer in the wake of resignation or impeachment and in the absence of a vice
president (Schamis, 2002, p. 90). On another side of this debate, Mustapic (2005)
contends that De la Rúa’s failure resulted from the problems of divided government and
unilateral executive decision-making. De la Rúa faced problems in his administration,
which were exacerbated when Vice President Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez resigned his
position due to a coalition corruption scandal. Mustapic argues that the divided
government, the absence of a vice president, and the presence of a 1975 presidential
succession law (ley de acefalía) provided the Peronists with the legislative power to
choose the presidential successor (2005).
Although Mustapic and Schamis disagree on the source of this constitutional
element, with Mustapic correctly locating it in the 1975 (not the 1994) law, and how it
affects presidentialism, the institutional change made it both attractive and safe for PJ
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legislators to challenge a president because they could do so without risking a democratic
breakdown, and because their legislative strength meant that they would choose the fallen
president's successors in the case of De la Rúa. Lastly, Llanos argues that minority
legislative support helps explain presidential failure (2010). Midterm elections
accentuate presidential weakness because an opposition-controlled legislature creates an
additional threat for the president (Llanos, 2010). She moves toward an agency-centered
approached by acknowledging the role of presidents as well (Llanos, 2010).
The Schamis and Mustapic explanations show how institutional features increased
the instability faced by the De la Rúa government. However, the Peronists did not use
this avenue under the Alfonsín failure, when they were capable of achieving their goals in
a different manner. Instead, they were able to push for a transition to the soon-to-be
inaugurated President Menem. In all of these arguments, the institutional mechanisms
are simply avenues that permit the Peronist challenge; they are tools rather than causes.
As one local Socialist Party leader noted, “This [presidential failure] is the Argentine
problem. No presidents complete their office unless it is permitted by Justicialismo
[Justicialism – the ideology of Peronism]” (G. Traba, personal interview, 2010). Chapter
Three will show that the Peronist Party acted against non-Peronist presidents to achieve
party dominance, using its position of power as an opposition party and taking advantage
of whatever institutional mechanisms existed. After events emerged that threatened UCR
presidents, Peronists were recalcitrant in solving problems and persistent in pursuing
opposition to these presidents. Moreover, they utilized their ability to foster social
movement and legislative opposition to push out these presidents.
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Other scholars have examined the role of specific agents in bringing De la Rúa
down. For instance, Malamud argues that key mayors promoted popular unrest and
provincial governors sought De la Rúa’s ousting (Malamud, Forthcoming). Additionally,
provincial governments made the ultimate decision-making in the presidential succession
game (Malamud, Forthcoming). My analysis supports much of Malamud’s argument, but
relates the events of De la Rúa’s failure back to how the Peronist Party is able to
repeatedly rally its base support. In contrast, other agency-centered approaches make De
la Rúa the protagonist of his own failure, pointing to his distinctive political style as a key
component of presidential crisis in 2001 (Llanos and Margheritis, 2006). They argue that
De la Rúa’s weak leadership made coalition support low, while he isolated himself by
making unilateral decisions (Llanos and Margheritis, 2006). In both of these accounts,
the role of agency is highlighted in the decisions of key political figures, but the greater
role of opposition party agency seems important as well, given the repeated challenges
from the Peronist Party. For instance, Malamud (Forthcoming) shows that the Peronist
Party, specifically its governors, met and strategically identified the path to Peronist
power. Similarly, Llanos and Margheritis (2006) identify De la Rúa’s distinctive style,
much like Mustapic, but they do not acknowledge the contrary position of the Peronist
Party, refusing to assist in resolving emerging problems. All of these arguments,
although different in nature, play into the theoretical argument of this dissertation by
showing how the nature of the Peronist Party, as well as its ability to mobilize civil
society, is the common factor that stands behind Argentine presidential failure.
The importance of the party’s role in challenging presidents will be further
discussed in the country analysis. However, looking to Linz provides some insight into
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this phenomenon. Using his language, the role of the Peronists is as a “disloyal
opposition” (Linz, 1978). They stand as a consistent opposition party that prevents
presidents from other parties from completing their terms. Other scholars, like PerézLiñan, describe the very manner in which Peronists impede opposition presidents. In his
book, Peréz-Liñan acknowledges the importance of the riots and protest in creating
opposition for De la Rúa, and he notes that the Peronist bloc played an obstructionist role
(Peréz-Liñan, 2007). For example, Radicals worked with Peronists trying to form a
coalition during the final stages of the de la Rúa’s failure. After these negotiations fell
apart and civil unrest continued, the Peronists signaled that they were to begin
impeachment processes against the president, prompting De la Rúa’s resignation (2007,
pp. 179-180). In addition, the obstructionist nature of the Peronists is glimpsed by their
congressional might as well. During every UCR presidency since the return to
democracy in 1983, state governorships and senate seats were held by a Peronist plurality
or, more often, majority (Treisman, 2004, p. 405). Even though the UCR held a plurality
of the Chamber of Deputies during De la Ruá’s and Alfonsín’s presidency, they only held
an absolute majority of the seats during the first four years of Alfonsín’s term (Treisman,
2004, p. 405). In other words, UCR, and its later coalition – the Alianza, did not hold a
majority from 1987-1989 or from 1999-2001, the years in which Radical presidents were
removed (Treisman, 2004, p. 405). The goal of Chapter Three is not to paint the
Peronists negatively, but instead demonstrate how the nature of the party and its
mobilizing capacity allows for social mobilization matched with legislative obstruction,
which was wielded against presidents.
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Ecuadorian Presidential Failure
More than any country in South America, Ecuador provides a compelling case for
study of the repeated instances of presidential failure. Ecuador has experienced the most
persistent pattern of presidential failures in the region, with the three most recently
elected presidents, excluding current President Correa, failing to complete their terms in
office. Whereas Argentina is exemplary in regards to party stability and economic
success, Ecuador has not shown itself to be a regional leader. Ecuador features a weak
party system with high volatility. Historically, the small country, largely depending on
petroleum for much of its exports, has not been a regional achiever. Ecuador has
experienced persistent economic uncertainty, with a severe banking crisis in 1999-2000.
Whereas Argentina stands as a leader in South America, Ecuador has experienced
governmental instability and lack of economic success. This comparison also allows for
us to see the grassroots-based nature of presidential failure in Ecuador.
Aside from its comparative value when matched with Argentina, this study looks
at presidential failure in Ecuador due to the extensive nature of the phenomenon. To be
precise, Ecuador is interesting, in itself, for its presidential instability. In 1997, Ecuador
faced its first instance of presidential failure in the early removal of President Abdalá
Bucaram, as he was charged with being unfit to govern due to mental incapacity. The
next election resulted in the presidency of Jamil Mahuad, who also failed to complete his
term in office when he was forced to resign in the face of military and social movement
opposition. Finally, the 2005 removal of President Lucio Gutiérrez was the third instance
of failure for an elected president in Ecuador. Congress determined that he “abandoned
his post” when he was forced from the presidential palace by mobs of angry protesters.
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With these three instances of presidential failure, Ecuador is a critical case in the study of
presidential failure due to its persistent and repeated nature. The most recent president,
Correa, has successfully completed terms in office and achieved reelection. Despite
achieving what the previous three presidents could not, Correa has still faced challenges.
This investigation intends to trace the events leading up to the failures of Bucaram,
Mahuad, and Gutiérrez, identifying the critical structural capacity of indigenous
organizations. Then, I provide analysis of the most important challenge to President
Correa in order to show how these social groups have reacted differently, preventing his
early removal or resignation.
Unlike scholars of Argentine presidential failure, relatively few scholars have
focused on Ecuadorian presidential instability in itself. In general, those scholars that
have been interested in Ecuadorian political instability viewed it as a consequence of
social mobilization and as a precursor to constitutional change. In the more general
literature on presidential failure, scholars have used Ecuador to support their larger
arguments about presidential failure in the region. These past examinations of
Ecuadorian presidential instability provide insight into the various problems that have led
to repeated failure. I will briefly discuss the findings of these scholars in an attempt to
identify what factors have been shown to be significant in previous studies of Ecuadorian
presidential failure.
Of the scholars that look at specific instances of presidential failure in Ecuador,
most take a normative stance in regards to Ecuador’s political future. Shifter discusses
Ecuadorian political instability and contends that Ecuador faces severe problems in
regards to future stability, stemming from inherent political, geographic, and social
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divisions (Shifter, 2004). Lucero (2001) expresses greater approval as he describes the
importance of economic conditions and the push by indigenous organizations in the
removal of President Mahuad. He notes that, despite the presence of military personnel in
this removal, the indigenous organizations provide an opportunity for the deepening of
democracy in Ecuador and hope for future executive leadership (Lucero, 2001). Bridging
the optimism and pessimism of these earlier scholars, Zamosc makes a more nuanced
argument regarding the impact of indigenous organizations’ influence on democracy.
Noting their presence in the overthrow of Mahuad, Zamosc cites the negative
contributions made by the movement, while acknowledging their other more positive
effects (Zamosc, 2007). These scholars describe and note the importance of many actors
in the failure of Ecuadorian presidents, but few make causal arguments, aside from
speculation. In general, these pieces look at the larger issue of democracy, crises, and the
future of Ecuadorian politics.
Whereas the previous scholars note the importance of key actors and historical
elements, cross-national analysis tends to overlook the specific details of Ecuadorian
cases. Scholars analyze a variety of institutional, economic, and event-related variables,
from the same theoretical bases as in other countries. Despite this, they pay little
attention to the conditions specific to the Ecuadorian cases. Uniquely, legislative
coalition durability, impacted by institutional reforms, is identified as the factor driving
presidential instability in one study (Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, 2010, p. 74). This
piece coincides with much of the cross-national analysis on this topic, pointing to the
importance of institutional factors, specifically coalitions, in supporting presidential
stability (Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, 2010). Likewise, Pérez-Liñán discusses the
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specific case of Bucaram’s failure, acknowledging the slight difference due to the
declaration of incapacity (2007). This instance of failure is used, like other cases, to
discuss Pérez-Liñán’s larger claims about impeachment in Latin America, specifically
dealing with scandal, economic problems, and lack of a legislative shield (2007).
This background information shows how previous researchers have analyzed
presidential failure in Ecuador. This country has been largely overlooked in the study of
failure. When researched by itself, Ecuadorian presidential failure has been depicted as a
perfect storm, with a variety of actors and social, economic, and political concerns
creating problems for presidential stability. On the other hand, Acosta and PolgaHecimovich (2010) support the argument of Llanos and Marsteintredet, claiming that
legislative issues are paramount, while social movements are additional elements in the
events of presidential breakdown (Llanos and Marsteintredet, 2010a, 2010b).
Meanwhile, Pérez-Liñán uses one case of Ecuadorian presidential failure to support his
arguments as well (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). Ecuadorian presidential failure still provides an
avenue for investigation into this phenomenon because I contend that the likely
mechanism, mobilizing capacity, is different than previously argued.

Individual Protest Participation in Presidential Failure
The final step will be a quantitative analysis of individual views and participation
in contentious politics as measured by popular opinion surveys in Ecuador and Argentina.
The qualitative case studies demonstrate the importance of mass mobilization in
determining whether presidents fall; the assessment of survey data allows me to identify
why citizens choose to participate in such mobilizations. Furthermore, I assess how
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individuals’ participation in social protest is connected to their views of parties and
presidents. If the process of presidential failure is about mobilizing capacity, is it visible
from all levels of analysis? As individual acts of social protest are the foundation of the
mass protests that are essential to understanding presidential failure, this component of
the research will seek to identify how individuals pursue participation and how that
participation drives presidential failure.
The analysis of cross-national, individual survey data is possible through recent
Latinobarómetro and World Values Survey datasets. By looking at studies that occurred
in the year after presidential failure in each of these countries, I assess how political
actors with the capacity to serve as a rallying point (poder de convocatoria) contribute to
protest participation. From Ecuadorian civil society organizations to Argentine unions,
individual participation with these connections demonstrates that mobilizing structures
contribute to social protest at the individual level. Moreover, I examine the potential
opposition that indigenous groups in Ecuador may present to governments by evaluating
if indigenous individuals display distinct patterns of participation in contentious political
acts.
Although some scholars have presented arguments that rest largely on
institutional explanations (Negretto, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2005; Valenzuela, 2004), almost
all acknowledge that social protest plays a role in presidential failure (Álvarez and
Marsteintredet, 2010; Hochstetler, 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009; Kim and Bahry,
2008; Pérez-Liñán, 2005, 2007; Valenzuela, 2004). Social protest is present in most, if
not all, instances of presidential failure, and violent protest has an additional influence in
presidential failure (Hochstetler, 2006, p. 403). Social protest contributes to the
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likelihood of presidential failure for Latin American countries, but not globally (Kim and
Bahry, 2008). Again, my second chapter’s survival analysis mirrors these results,
showing that social protest is a significant factor in decreasing the likelihood that South
American presidents will complete their terms. Along with this focus in the political
science literature, common wisdom points to the importance of social protest in
presidential failure, and these protests serve as a central component in the collective
remembrance of presidential failure. From blocking highways in Bolivia to crowding
into the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, protesters have been a repeated component of this
new political phenomenon.
Protest is theoretically important in understanding presidential failure due to a
variety of reasons. Public outrage creates a unique dilemma for presidential regimes:
Protests can face a president with a quandary. Unchecked demonstrations may
rage beyond bounds, but the use of force against them can backfire. The
personalization of authority in the figure of the president adds a particularly
vexing dimension. Failures of government are viewed not as failures of a party or
movement, but as failures of the chief executive himself (Valenzuela, 2004, p.
12).
When citizens focus on the president, social protest can unite with congressional pressure
to incite presidential failure (Valenzuela, 2004). The president is easily targeted for
failures of the administration (Valenzuela, 2004). More than that, social protest can
weaken presidential support because it expresses and deepens public outrage over
scandals and economic problems (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). In other words, the presidential
system highlights the role of the president, and corruption or economic woes provide easy
fodder for presidential street opposition. If this mobilization involves a group with
organizational capacity, an even more treacherous threat emerges. Pérez-Liñán touches
on this idea, noting, “Public outrage can be the product of unpopular policies or watchdog
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politics, but mobilization, irrespective of its origins, is most lethal when it translates into
broad social movements involving the participation of multiple political sectors” (PérezLiñán, 2007, p. 188).
Providing one of the few opposing perspectives on this topic, Llanos and
Marsteintredet argue that protest mobilizations that challenge presidents from the streets
generally occur in the final stage of presidential failure, and presidential problems with
the legislature actually drive breakdown (Llanos and Marsteintredet, 2010a, p. 216).
Llanos and Marsteintredet acknowledge, “Additionally, it is an open question how the
extent to which street demonstrations are spontaneous or orchestrated from above, and
the degree of involvement of opposition forces…makes a difference” (Llanos and
Marsteintredet, 2010a, p. 216). My investigation into the causes of individual protest
participation in countries with repeated presidential failure contributes to this effort
because it deals with all of this literature explicitly. I assess how social protest, generated
by mobilizing actors like parties, unions, and existing social movement organizations, is
the key element in explaining presidential failure, which addresses the concerns of protest
orchestration at the same time. From this perspective, inquiries into why citizens are
protesting in countries of repeated presidential failure address the concerns of Llanos and
Marsteintredet, even if they do not view street challenges as instrumental in explaining
presidential failure.
Past research shows a consistent focus on the role of social protest in presidential
failure. Some case studies argue for the possible relationship between economic policy
or scandal with public unrest while statistical examinations show a significant
relationship between protest and failure. Each of these scholars argues, in his/her own
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way, that contentious politics has played a role in most, if not all, cases of presidential
failure. Almost all authors focus on the consequences of protest without acknowledging
the reasons for protest activity despite this general consensus that protest influences the
likelihood of presidential failure. From the work of Kim and Bahry (2008) to that of
Hochstetler (2006), scholars evaluate the influence of mass mobilizations on presidential
stability without examining why citizens take to the streets. My study uses individuallevel data to examine what factors predict whether a given individual took to the streets
rather than assuming the triggers for citizen protest mobilization.
Although all of the previous literature has built on the question of presidential
failure, the final portion of this dissertation asks a different question: why do individuals
protest in countries with repeated histories of presidential failure? I assess the individual
determinants of protest participation by looking at surveys from two countries with
repeated presidential failure. Do individuals in Argentina and Ecuador possess the same
attitudes and social connections? Are protest participants in these countries from similar
demographic or cleavage groups? Overall, this analysis combines the presidential failure
literature, which shows that protest is a key explanatory component, with the vast topic of
protest participation. Then, it uses individual citizen responses from two very different
cases to see if mobilizing actors are visible in protest participation.
In order to explain this phenomenon, I draw from a completely different body of
literature on this topic. Providing an early comprehensive discussion of protest
participation, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady created a “civic voluntarism model,” which
described three categories of variables that affect the likelihood of participation:
resources, recruitment networks, and political engagement (Verba, Schlozman, and

27

Brady, 1995, p. 471). This categorization is repeated throughout other participation
literature. Various other scholars use these same general three categories, but with
different titles for them (Klesner, 2007; Norris, 2002; Schussman and Soule, 2005).
“Resources” generate participation because individuals with greater time and resource
accessibility – measured by variables like age, education, and income – will be more
likely to participate (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). “Recruitment networks” are
those linkages that assist in citizen participation by providing support, knowledge, and
civic skill-building (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). “Political engagement”
factors are those variables that account for an individual’s knowledge and attitudes
towards politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). My analysis builds on this work
by using the variables from previous studies and applying them to specific cases –
countries with repeated presidential failure.
Based on this literature, the individual-level assessment of survey responses
questions how individual demographics, organizational participation, and attitudes may
explain why citizens participated in social protests. To address the issue of personal
demographics, I evaluate if individual characteristics will make a person more or less
likely to participate in acts of social contention. Next, I look at how organizations
influence the likelihood of participation. Finally, I assess how attitudes affect
participation. Presidential failure is occurring because individuals are protesting, so I
examine what factors bring them into the streets.

Dissertation Summary
This dissertation project addresses the causes of presidential failure in a unique
manner by developing a multi-level approach to understand this new phenomenon in
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South America. Chapter Two presents a cross-national survival analysis of what factors
foreshorten presidencies. In pursuing the national-level explanations of repeated
presidential failure, Chapter Three tracks the processes behind two Argentine presidential
failures, stressing the importance of the Peronist Party’s ability to both mobilize
legislative and street opposition. In comparison, Chapter Four looks at the bottom-up
process of repeated presidential failure in Ecuador, highlighting the role of indigenous
organizations in executive removal. Chapter Five presents logit analyses of individual
participation in these two countries, identifying why citizens protest in countries with
repeated failure and comparing them with each other and global explanations of protest
participation. Finally, Chapter Six concludes by questioning the implications presidential
failure has for South American countries.
This project examines presidential failure from a unique perspective, through
multiple methods and levels of analysis. One important lesson of this project is that
political party and civil society organizations are a central factor in presidential failure.
Moreover, these components stand out at all levels of analysis in this project. Citizens
take to the streets of their own volition, but the mobilizing capacity of parties/groups and
individuals contribute to the likelihood of this happening. The presence of organizations
with this mobilizing capacity has created countries with a high likelihood of repeated
failure, which is visible in qualitative comparative assessments as well as in crossnational statistical analyses.
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CHAPTER TWO: UNIFYING MODELS OF PRESIDENTIAL FAILURE

Between 1978 and 2007, 11 elected presidents left office before the end of their
terms in the 10 Spanish and Portuguese-speaking South American countries (see Table
1). Various scholars have examined the causes of presidential failure, but this chapter
intends to resolve several methodological issues in these investigations. In addition, I
plan to lay the foundation for the project in general by identifying the cross-national
trends of presidential instability. This chapter examines presidential failure in South
America, where the phenomenon appears to be occurring at a higher rate than in
presidential regimes in other parts of the globe (Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009).
Hochstetler and Edwards (2009) find that South American presidents exhibit more of the
risk factors for presidential challenge and failure than their global counterparts, and this
anomaly drives my investigation here to further understanding of presidential instability
in the region. Aside from narrowing my focus to the South American region, I perform a
comprehensive analysis of presidential failure that builds upon this literature theoretically
and methodologically. First, this analysis focuses on the importance of economic
variables in explaining presidential failure. Second, it uses a more appropriate method of
analysis for looking at this issue: duration analysis.
In many case studies and popular explanations of these failed presidencies, the
role of the economy is central: scholars argue that presidents become threatened due to
their neoliberal policies or their inability to control inflation or generate growth (Sanín,
2005; Silva, 2009). Explanations of democratic regime breakdown, such as Guillermo
O’Donnell’s iconic work on the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, pointed to the
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importance of economic models and exigencies for that earlier generation of military-led
presidential failures as well (O’Donnell, 1973; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Finally,
large literatures on economic voting and the importance of economic performance in
popular evaluations of political leaders (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Weyland, 1998)
also support the idea that the early removal of presidents may also be due to economic
factors. Yet economic factors appear only occasionally in existing studies of presidential
failure and are inconsistently measured – sometimes as policy orientations, sometimes as
various economic outcomes.
As noted in the previous literature review, the first wave of scholars to look at this
research on presidential failure began by investigating the literature regarding democratic
breakdown. They assessed various features of politics that arise from the presidential
regime itself, as well as accompanying institutional choices. Among the most important
is the choice of electoral systems, which tend to produce party systems that in turn affect
a president’s level of support in the legislature. Their arguments build on previous
literature, specifically the work of Juan Linz (1978, 1990), which argues that the
presidential regime itself is the cause of regime instability in presidential systems
(Negretto, 2006: Pérez-Liñán, 2005; Valenzuela, 2004). Despite this focus on the
institutions of presidentialism, many of these scholars acknowledged various other
factors that influenced presidential failure. Later scholars furthered these investigations
by studying the possible importance of non-institutional variables, such as executive
wrongdoing and protest, in explaining presidential failure (Hochstetler, 2006; PérezLiñán, 2003, 2007). A more recent book that examines a full range of presidential
breakdowns is oriented around this debate from a more holistic perspective, drawing
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together these previous studies to argue that legislative action is the key explanation for
breakdown and street protests are merely last-stage events (Llanos and Marsteintredet,
2010b).
Potential economic causes have been considered in these past studies, including
Hochstetler (2006), who includes a measure of economic policy orientation, and PérezLiñán (2007), who examines several economic performance variables. Finally, Álvarez
and Marsteintredet evaluate economic causes in their logit model, showing that prolonged
recession influences the likelihood of presidential breakdown, while inflation does not
(2010). However, looking at both economic policies, specifically neoliberalism, as well
as economic conditions, is not common. This chapter attempts to extend the literature
and examine the crucial role of economic factors in explaining recent presidential fates in
Latin America by comprehensively including these variables in a survival model. I
evaluate if both 1) neoliberalism (economic liberalization) and 2) economic conditions
significantly affect presidential survival in South America. By examining neoliberalism
and actual economic conditions, this chapter demonstrates how these economic factors
can independently prove detrimental to presidents, while still assessing complementary
institutional and performance-related factors. When looking at a unified approach to this
model, do economic variables matter? I intend to analyze the importance of these factors
to elucidate the causes of presidential failure.
Besides examining these issues from a new explanatory framework, this chapter
argues for the use of a more appropriate method of analysis for the study of presidential
failure. I use a Cox proportional hazards model to examine presidencies from 1978 until
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2007 in 10 South American countries.4 Survival (duration) modeling takes into account
time-based phenomena by assessing how multiple variables affect the time elapsed before
an event occurs. The models I use do not assume a specific baseline hazard, allowing this
to vary. Survival modeling has gained acceptance in the study of cabinet survival in
parliamentarism and resolves some of the problems of earlier investigations into
presidential failure, which used logit models. Logit models are not fully appropriate for
studying this topic because they do not take into account the importance of time-based
phenomena (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2002). In effect, survival modeling will
enhance understanding of how these covariates influence the risk of failure, which cannot
be seen with simple logistic regression.
This chapter’s analysis incorporates previously untested economic and neoliberal
policy variables into a statistical model that more correctly specifies the dependent
variable as the risk of failure in any one year of a president’s term. The goal is to identify
what institutional factors create a weakened institutional setting and what events create
risk factors for failure. In performing this testing, the importance of some variables
becomes clear, as civil protest, executive wrongdoing, and specific measures of economic
hardship – inflation and prolonged recession – appear to be influential risk factors for
presidential failure. In addition, majority legislative support remains significant,
supporting early arguments regarding the influence of presidential institutions. In sum,
this investigation provides a unique perspective on presidential survival, while evaluating
the importance of previously excluded variables in a comprehensive manner.
4

Countries enter the dataset in 1978 if democratic. However, if undemocratic, they enter in the year of their
return to democracy. Thus, countries enter as: Argentina (1983), Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1990), Chile
(1990), Columbia (1978), Ecuador (1979), Paraguay (1993), Peru (1980), Uruguay (1985), Venezuela
(1979). In addition, countries drop out in specific years after a presidential failure, until another elected
president comes into office.
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The Need for Several Economic Variables
Other scholars have examined the importance of economic factors on democratic
breakdowns (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) as well as presidential failure (Hochstetler,
2006; Kim and Bahry, 2008; Pérez-Liñán, 2007), and this chapter continues in this
evaluation of how these factors influence when presidents may be kicked out of office.
In general, scholars of presidential failure have looked at economic factors in two distinct
forms: 1) economic liberalization and 2) economic conditions. When looking at the role
of policy, Hochstetler shows that street-based challenges emerged against ten neoliberal
presidents, but only one non-neoliberal one (Hochstetler, 2006, p. 406). Moreover,
scholars looking at social movements have shown how neoliberal policy implementation,
in itself, may mobilize masses or create movements, contributing to failure in specific
cases (Lucero, 2009; Sanín, 2005). On the other hand, Kim and Bahry argue that a
declining economy places presidents at risk to not complete their terms in office (Kim
and Bahry, 2008). For them, policy, in itself, is less important than actual economic
conditions within a country. When applied to presidential failure, economic conditions
and neoliberal policy have each been argued to independently drive citizens to participate
in mass protests and oppose presidents and it seems appropriate to test their respective
contributions in a single model.
Aside from the fact that they may independently drive protest, this chapter
performs an assessment of both economic policy and conditions for a number of other
reasons. First, the actual relationship between neoliberal policy reform and resulting
economic conditions is debated within the field. For example, Brian Crisp and Michael
Kelly demonstrate that the depth of market reform mildly correlates with GDP growth
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and inflation control while showing some improvements in income inequality and
poverty (Crisp and Kelly, 1999, p. 541). Other analyses support this argument, showing
that trade liberalization can increase countries’ growth rates (Krueger, 1998). In contrast,
some scholars (Huber and Solt, 2004; Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2000, Walton, 2004)
have demonstrated the problems of inequality and instability created by neoliberal
reform. Given this debate, a causal argument about the relationship between neoliberal
policy and economic hardship cannot be taken a priori. Second, neoliberal reform may
impose burdensome costs on one particular sector, and simply looking at overall poor
economic performance will be unable to identify whether individuals are in opposition to
the poor conditions or the policies. Third, societies may oppose neoliberal policy
implementation, in itself, for fear of possible economic hardship without harsh conditions
manifesting. As all of these arguments have theoretical and empirical support and initial
analysis found no correlation among the variables, this investigation examines each of
these variables separately rather than assuming that economic outcomes relate closely to
policy choices.

Arguments and Hypotheses
This section builds on the general arguments about presidential failure to develop
specific hypotheses about the causes of presidential failures. It also shows how I
operationalize the variables and where I find data for the 10 Spanish and Portuguesespeaking South American countries.
First, poor economic performance obviously has material effects on citizens, and
may therefore destabilize presidencies, either by triggering hostile legislative action or
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mass protest activity. Linkage between economic performance and presidential survival
may be particularly strong in Latin America, where the perception of a strong executive
places the blame for policy outcomes on the president. In this manner, economic
hardship could be a risk factor that increases the likelihood of presidential failure.
This model operationalizes economic hardship in two ways. The data for these
variables are from the World Bank’s Database. The first economic variable is the
inflation rate (GDP deflator). There are two ways in which inflation rates may impact the
likelihood of presidential failure. First, inflation rates present an explicit hardship felt by
a citizenry, as wages often do not keep up with prices and unindexed savings are wiped
out. Inflation rates may create a daily reminder of economic hardship that is different
from other types of economic issues. Second, inflation may have a stronger effect on
poor citizens who reside on the outskirts of the formal economy, relying on a cash
economy that is constantly devalued. This may drive these individuals to oppose current
presidents in street-based and other informal ways. This overall disappointment, matched
with targeted hardship, may lead to opposition. For these reasons, inflation presents a
direct measure of a specific kind of economic hardship.
H1a: Higher levels of inflation will be associated with higher risks of presidential
failure.
Using the World Bank’s data again, economic hardship is also conceptualized as
prolonged recession, stemming from the work of Álvarez and Marsteintredet5 (2010).
This measure is a dummy variable that is coded as a 1 if, for the two previous years, the
country had negative GDP per capita growth rates (Álvarez and Marsteintredet, 2010).
5

Several other measures of GDP per capita (including GDP growth rates) were tested in this model. No
other measures of GDP were ever found to be significant. This model includes this variable due to its
significance in the literature on presidential failure.
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As a country’s overall economic success can be assessed by change in GDP per capita,
this analysis measures economic hardship by looking at prolonged decreased growth. It
can be assumed that if citizens are facing poor economic conditions for several years,
they may be more likely to oppose their current president.
H2a: The presence of a prolonged recession will be associated with greater risk of
presidential failure.
Similarly, presidents’ policies may be another economic variable that affects the
risk of an interrupted presidency. In general, a government’s implementation of
neoliberal reform may result in popular expectation of hardship. Some scholars have
noted that citizens oppose such reform due to its potentially harmful consequences
(Hochstetler, 2006; Silva 2009; Stokes, 2001). The hardship may be imposed on specific
sectors, which is difficult to identify in national economic indicators. As neither the
popular expectation, nor sector-specific hardship, is easily measured, this analysis
attempts to measure economic policy orientation by the openness of the economy. As
mentioned previously, a causal relationship between policy and hardship may not
necessarily exist, yet social and political opposition to neoliberal policy may occur
anyway and drive presidents out of office for their unpopular choices. For the purposes
of this model, this chapter assumes, like numerous other theorists, that citizens oppose
neoliberal reform, and that this opposition creates a greater risk for presidential failure.
An index of globalization, measured by the KOF Index of Globalization’s
Economic Globalization Index, is used to assess the issue of neoliberalism6 (Dreher,

6

Various other indicators were tested in this study, and each had the same result. Analysis was also
performed with the KAOPEN Index (Chinn and Ito, 2006) and the index of Morley, Machado, and
Pettinato (1999), and the results are consistent between all three measures. The KOF index was included in
the final analysis because it provided the greatest availability of data across time.
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2006). The index looks at actual economic flows and restrictions and creates a score for
each country year, with the higher the score the greater the degree of globalization. The
index permits comparison of governments across the region and operationalizes levels of
economic liberalization. We should expect to see that globalization has a positive impact
on the risk of presidential failure.
H3a: The higher the globalization index, the greater the risk of presidential failure.
Citizen protest is an obvious indicator of lack of government support, and protests
often accompany presidential failure. Protest will be included as a variable by itself
despite apparent relationships with some of the other explanatory variables. Scandal and
economic hardship, for example, may help to trigger protest, but the social movements
literature is clear that protest does not emerge automatically from such triggers. Instead,
mass citizen protests of the kind that challenge presidents also depend on causal
mechanisms specific to the movements themselves, such as potential protesters’
resources, organizing capacity and history, and ability to frame events in a way that
resonates with individuals who might join them in the streets (McAdam, McCarthy and
Zald, 1996). Thus many problematic events or outcomes that might seem to be objective
triggers do not result in protest. Conversely, well-organized pre-existing oppositional
networks may be able to mobilize large numbers of people to the streets in ways that
make presidents seem unable to govern, even when the objective triggers are slight. For
this reason, each variable will be examined independently in this analysis. Moreover,
protest is not highly correlated with any other variables in this model, which supports its
theoretical independence.
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In order to assess the impact of social protest, a count variable, tallied by
Hochstetler and Palma, presents the number of reported protest events within a country
per year (Hochstetler and Palma, 2007, p. 5). This event count is based on protests
reported in Latin American Weekly Report, and so includes only major national-level
protest events. The actual content of protests covers a wide range of complaints,
including policing and human rights demands, anti-privatization and wage claims, anticorruption drives, among many others. This measure captures overall civilian unrest over
the course of a year, and need not be expressly directed at the president. Assuming these
protests are not in support of the president, and few are, they should create pressure for
the president or the legislature. Any pro-president protest would lead to measurement
error, which reduces the efficiency of the resulting estimates. Therefore, if the protest
variable remains significant given this possible error, I can safely claim that protest is a
factor in driving presidents from office. They may push the president to resign early, or
encourage the legislature to try to impeach the president. Theoretically, the pressure of
protest should positively affect the likelihood of an interrupted presidency, as a president
appears unable to manage or control citizen outrage.
H4a: The higher the number of civil protests, the greater the risk of presidential
failure.
Presidential involvement in corruption scandals has been used to explain the
recent occurrence of interrupted presidencies in Latin America (Hochstetler, 2006; PérezLiñán, 2007). Scandals may motivate public outrage and protest or formal legislative
impeachment, which can force presidents from power. Even presidential allies may
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pressure the president to resign quickly to avoid being removed, when faced with
evidence of his/her involvement in unlawful activities or other corrupt wrongdoing.
Executive wrongdoing has been operationalized as a dummy variable, either 0 or
1, that marks the presence of executive wrongdoing during each year of a president’s
term. However, once a president has been identified as “corrupt” the coding carries
through the rest of his/her term. Full-text searches in Lexis-Nexis of each president’s
name were conducted to identify the presence of presidential scandal. Any incident that
shows evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the president or his/her assistance or
sheltering of others’ wrongdoing has been labeled a 1. Formal legal prosecution, removal
or resignation is not required to show presidential wrongdoing. Instead, the variable
depicts some report of concrete evidence of presidential corruption during his/her term in
office, which could have been the basis for efforts to remove him/her. By using reports
of wrongdoing while in presidential office, this variable evaluates the knowledge of the
public and the legislature of a president’s alleged corrupt practices.
H5a: Where public information about executive wrongdoing in office is present,
the risk of presidential failure is greater.
The remaining hypotheses all involve political variables that have been identified
in the institutional literature as factors making executives vulnerable to premature
departure from office in presidential systems. Valenzuela argues that a president needs to
gain a popular mandate in the election process to possess executive authority
(Valenzuela, 2004). If citizens do not perceive that a president was elected through a
process that showed true national support, they are more likely to oppose the president in
rough times. This lack of popular mandate is likely in Latin America because the
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presidential system, mixed with proportional representation electoral system, creates a
fractionalized party system in which presidents rarely receive an absolute majority in the
initial popular election (Mainwaring, 1993; Valenzuela, 2004). To address this
institutional feature, various countries have implemented a runoff election or second
round, thereby creating the perception of a popular mandate. However, this hypothesis
identifies whether the need for a ballotage exists by testing if a popular mandate is
necessary to ensure completion of a president’s term in office. If fractionalized party
systems lead to low initial votes, the more fractionalized a system, the greater the
likelihood of failure. Thus Hypothesis Six states that the lower the percentage of the
initial popular vote a president receives, the more likely that presidency is to fail. To
analyze popular support, the raw vote percentages from each election have been collected
from Europa World Year Book, the organization Observatorio Electoral, and Adam
Carr’s website Psephos (Europa World Year Book 1975 – 2009;
http://www.observatorioelectoral.org; http://psephos.adam-carr.net).
H6a: The lower a president’s initial popular vote, the greater the risk of
presidential failure.
A second institutional hypothesis addresses another manner in which Latin
American nations are more susceptible to the problem of presidential failure. Drawing on
Mainwaring (1993) and Valenzuela’s (2004) arguments again, this chapter hypothesizes
that fractionalized party systems have additional effects on the likelihood of presidential
failure by leading to minority legislative support. Previous work suggests that this
problem results in deadlocked executive-legislative interactions that boost a president’s
chance of falling (Mainwaring, 1990). The absence of majority party support in the
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legislative branch should create greater likelihood of failure when the president faces
governing problems. Clearly, the absence of majority legislative support provides a way
for legislatures to push presidents out of office. The model captures president’s party or
electoral coalition majority support (the latter only in the cases of official party
coalitions), as taken from the Europa World Year Book, Observatorio Electoral, and
Adam Carr’s website Psephos (Europa World Year Book 1975 – 2009;
http://www.observatorioelectoral.org; http://psephos.adam-carr.net). This variable uses a
dummy coding to describe whether the president holds a majority of seats within the
legislature.
H7a: If the president lacks majority support, the risk of presidential failure is
greater.
From a theoretical perspective it may appear that some of these variables are
endogenous. Surely presidential wrongdoing or poor economic conditions result in
protest. Despite this possible relationship, these relationships are more complex than that.
First, Appendix A presents a correlation matrix of the independent variables, showing
that they are not highly related. The relationship between executive wrongdoing and
protest may seem theoretically related, but does not empirically exist. Executive
wrongdoing is measured by media reports, and this may actually be showing an elite
opposition to a president, that is, an elite form of protest. Second, lags of GDP per capita
and inflation rates were used in other models and did not have any different results.
Lagging the economic variables should distort any possible correlations that they have
with protest levels. Third, I have included two models in this chapter, alternately
dropping economic factors due to multicollinearity concerns. Fourth, other scholars have
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included these variables in similar models, and this analysis dialogues explicitly with
those other scholars. Hochstetler and Edwards (2009) completed a two-stage model of
presidential failure, identifying the factors that lead to challenges and then failures. They
showed that corruption and deaths during protest impacted all presidential failures, and
partisan support also influenced failures that sprung from street challenges (Hochstetler
and Edwards, 2009, p. 49). A two-stage model is not possible using survival analysis,
and it does not take into account the time-based elements of presidential failure.
Including these variables in a survival model allows us to understand this phenomenon in
a new way, by looking at the risk of failure. The bivariate correlations demonstrate a lack
of correlation between the independent variables, which is also supported in the literature
on this topic. The survival model allows us to assess presidential failure without making
unsound assumptions about the risk of failure, and we begin to see how institutions,
economic factors, corruption, and protest influence presidential failure.
The survival model used here differs from previous investigations that use logit or
rare-events logit in their prediction of breakdowns (Hochstetler, 2006; Kim and Bahry,
2008; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2005). Those earlier studies use country-years as
their unit of analysis, aggregating years across presidents and across presidential terms,
implicitly claiming that all years are theoretically homogenous. Interestingly, Kim and
Bahry look at the issue of failure with event history analysis as well, and they do not
identify any differences between the logit or event history models when examining this
phenomenon across the globe (2008). The only difference that was noted stemmed from
increased significance of variables that exist in countries with multi-party, fragmented
systems (2008). Multi-party, fragmented systems are frequent in Latin America, and
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their findings give support to the notion that survival analysis may show different
outcomes for this region.
The survival model allows us to more directly test how time-based phenomena
affect presidential failure (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2002, p. 24) The survival model
accurately reflects how covariates affect the risk of failure (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez,
2002). With president-year as the unit of analysis, survival analysis calculates a baseline
survivor function for each presidency. From this baseline, the hazard will shift in
response to changes in other variables, like protest or corruption. This approach accounts
better for time-based features of presidential terms than ford simple logit analysis.7 It
should be noted that a re-elected president is seen as a new president at the start of his/her
next term. Presidents in South America do have different term lengths, but they generally
have between four and six years. This approach does not take into account trends that
cross one presidential term into the next, but it does account for the renewed support and
legitimacy provided with a second election. Despite the limitations of the model used, it
provides a new perspective on presidential survival and a more appropriate statistical
model to identify risk of presidential failure over the course of his/her term.
Collectively, these theoretical hypotheses present a multi-faceted explanation for
presidential failure, as economic, institutional, and performance-related variables place
pressure on different governmental bodies to enact change, through resignation or
impeachment. Obviously, presidents come into power with the expectation of
completing their terms, but economic conditions may create hostile environments that

7

Other variations of this dependent variable could be used, but none allow for the analysis of risk of
failure. One variation not analyzed in previous studies is percentage of term served, but this
operationalization of the dependent variable does not allow us to look at annual changes in protest,
economic conditions, and other variables. Instead, it presents a cumulative analysis of failure.
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necessitate change. Similarly, economic liberalization may ignite the opposition of a
country’s citizenry or legislature. Institutional features can affect presidential stability
when presidents lack majority support or a popular mandate. Other performance-related
events, like corruption and protest, may prove influential in presidential failure as they
incite civil unrest, push legislatures to act against presidents, or drive presidents to resign.
The combination of these variables in a survival model will identify what increases the
risk to presidential failure.

Empirical Results
The following tables present the results of two Cox proportional hazard models.
Each model, as a whole, is consistent with the assumptions of proportional hazards, as
tested with Stata 11.8 The strength of the hazard ratio for each variable is evaluated by its
distance from 1, and the level of significance is presented in each variable’s p-value,
which depict the confidence in the results. If a ratio is significantly higher than 1, then
the variable has a positive relationship with presidential failure. Similarly, a ratio that is
significantly lower than 1 shows a negative relationship. This positive/negative
relationship can also be witnessed in the direction of the variable’s z-score as well. It
should be noted that dummy variables (prolonged recession, presidential scandal, and
majority legislative support) may have inflated hazard ratios due to their restricted value
range. These findings are robust and different specification present similar results.9

8

Despite this, one variable, majority support, does violate the assumption of proportional hazards. It has
been included in the results, and its exclusion does not change any variables’ significance in the model.
However, there are obvious limitations in using this variable in the model.
9
A log likelihood test was performed to ensure that the model was consistent when excluding insignificant
variables. The test showed that the model was the same, even when dropping all insignificant variables.
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Table 2.
Presidential Failure Model: Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis
Independent Variables
Hazard Ratio
(Standard Error)
Neoliberal Reform
0.9952
(0.0481)
Inflation Rate (%, GDP Deflator)
1.0004***
(0.0001)
Prolonged Recession
------------Civil Protest
1.1420*
(0.0785)
Executive Wrongdoing
14.7320***
(13.2724)
Initial Popular Vote
0.9710
(0.0302)
Majority Legislative Support
0.0963*
(0.1262)
N
263

Z-score
-0.10
3.02
------1.93
2.99
-0.66
-1.79

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Table 3.
Presidential Failure Model: Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis
Independent Variables
Hazard Ratio
(Standard Error)
Neoliberal Reform
0.9989
(0.0451)
Inflation Rate (%, GDP Deflator)
------------Prolonged Recession
6.4058**
(5.0073)
Civil Protest
1.1601**
(0.0781)
Executive Wrongdoing
10.8695***
(8.7637)
Initial Popular Vote
0.9731
(0.0322)
Presidential Legislative Support
0.0678*
(0.0984)
N
263
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Z-score
-0.02
------2.38
2.21
2.96
-0.82
-1.85

Among the economic variables, the inflation rate is associated with greater risk of
presidential failure, at the p<0.01 level. The rate of inflation is significant, with
interpretation of the results as a one-point increase in the inflation rate results in a 0.04%
increase in the hazard of failure. Thus, fluctuations in inflation rates may provide risk for
presidents. In the second model, prolonged recession is significant in explaining
presidential failure, and two years of negative growth increases the likelihood that a
president will fail. The level of economic liberalization is not statistically associated with
the likelihood of a president to leave office.
Civil protest levels present a highly significant and influential impact on the
likelihood of presidential failures with a significance of p<0.10 or p<0.05, in the first and
second models, respectively. This supports earlier arguments and historical accounts that
argue for the importance of major civil protests, and it advances the literature by showing
that protest is important whether or not it is specifically directed at the president. As
mentioned earlier, this finding can be understood to say that a unit increase in protest
(one additional reported large protest event) creates a 14% rise in the hazard of failure for
a president (a 16% increase in the second model).
Executive wrongdoing is also associated with greater risk of presidential failure,
as predicted. Providing the most extreme hazard ratio, this finding shows that the
occurrence of presidential corruption dramatically boosts the risk of failure, more than
any other variable. Although plenty of corrupt presidents do not fall, the nearly
unanimous presence of corruption amongst fallen presidents may explain the
extraordinarily high hazard ratio. If we assume that these media reports represent elite
opinions, these findings may also show high-level opposition to executives. Due to this
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measure being a dummy variable, the very presence of corruption radically amplifies the
hazard of presidential failure occurring. Despite earlier focus on institutional arguments
for presidential failure, both of these events – protest and scandal – are important in
explaining interrupted presidencies.
Minority legislative support increases the likelihood of presidential failure, with a
significance value of p<0.10. This finding reinforces Mainwaring’s (1993) arguments
about the problems of Latin American multiparty presidentialism. As past models have
also shown, a lack of party support in the legislature presents a key problem for
presidents completing their terms. In this instance, lacking majority support significantly
enhances the likelihood of failure.
Finally the results suggest that the other institutional factor of initial popular vote
is unimportant. Absence of a popular mandate does not affect a president’s risk for
failure. Many countries have taken up the institution of ballotage to remedy problems of
presidential failure, but these empirical results dispel much of the illusion that initial
mandates affect presidential ability to maintain office. Fractionalized party systems do
not necessarily prevent an elected president from completing his term in office by
creating a greater likelihood of a low presidential vote, even if they do affect the
legislature. Second round voting may have other positive effects on politics, but it does
not seem to resolve problems of presidential failure. Unlike many proponents of
ballotage, Pérez-Liñán finds that the system is not conducive to democratic governability
(2006), and this investigation finds no support, one way or another. With this variable,
the popular votes from the last round of voting, either first or second round percentages,
were used in the model. Another variable, which was a dummy for the presence of a

48

second round process occurring, was used as well.10 The results of this variable were also
insignificant.

Discussion
The empirical results support the general findings of the literature on presidential
failure, particularly those studies that have argued for the importance of presidential
wrongdoing, civil protest, and legislative support. Also, this model shows the importance
of the economic variables of inflation and prolonged recession.
The statistical findings here with respect to neoliberal policies call into question
how neoliberalism is linked to presidential failure (Pérez-Liñán, 2003; Silva, 2009).
While social protest is indeed associated with presidential failure, its occurrence is
independent of neoliberal policy implementation, and economic liberalization asserts no
apparent independent effect on the risk of presidential failure. This counters a common
assumption about the effect of neoliberal policy implementation in South America, but
the message seems to be that neoliberalism has no immediate effect on presidential
stability.11
Although understanding why the variable is insignificant would require additional
investigation, a few potential explanations for its unimportance may shed some light on
the issue. First, economic liberalization may simply be too common among Latin
American countries to covary with presidential failure. Scholars have focused on the fact
that many failed presidents followed neoliberal policies without noting that many other

10

The inclusion or exclusion of various ballotage variables has little effect on the model and does not affect
the significance or direction of any findings. In general, concerns about second round voting’s impact on
presidential failure are not supported.
11
In addition, lagged neoliberalism measures were not significant.
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presidents with similar policies completed their terms. This selection bias, created by
selecting on the dependent variable, illustrates the methodological concerns of Geddes
(1990). Second, neoliberal reform may not be linked to cross-sector opposition within a
country, and, by targeting only specific sectors, it does not gain enough resistance to
threaten presidential stability. Third, the effects of neoliberal policy implementation may
drive the failure of presidents in the future, possibly after the policy has created harmful
economic conditions while having no specific impact on the president at the time of
implementation. For instance, the neoliberal reforms of the Menem administration did
not lead to any presidential instability during his term, but may have been a contributing
factor of the De la Rúa failure. Regardless of the reasons, neoliberalism, in itself, does
not appear to provide any substantial risk to presidential failure.
On the other hand, higher rates of inflation are associated with presidential failure.
Why is this measure of economic hardship significant in the model? First, high rates of
inflation may create concrete, daily problems for citizens, as they are unable to purchase
products. In this manner, inflation rates may be a more tangible measure of economic
hardship for a population, thereby creating greater risk for a president. Second, inflation
may target the poorest citizens most, which may permit specific opposition to presidents.
Third, instances of hyperinflation may create a particular climate of popular insecurity
and constitute prima facie evidence of bad governance, even if some presidents have little
to no say over central bank monetary policies. The importance of inflation in explaining
presidential failure may lie in the historic economic problems of the region, which
frequently involved reckless monetary policies by regimes that were already in crisis.
Even though citizens may assume that presidents have the quick ability to resolve
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inflation, this may not be the case. As previously noted, presidents may be unduly
blamed due to their positions as figure heads of governance, a weakness of the
presidential systems (Valenzuela, 2004). Therefore, citizens may oppose inflation
whether or not it is within a president’s control. For all these reasons, presidents’ risk
dramatically increases when bouts of hyperinflation occur, as the citizenry is faced with
daily buying concerns and tangible hardship.
Surprisingly, changes in levels of income as measured by GDP per capita do not,
in themselves, drive citizens or legislatures to oppose presidents. Instead, prolonged
recession, as discussed by Álvarez and Marsteintredet (2010), impacts presidential
survival. Likewise, lagged GDP per capita growth also proved significant in other
specifications of the model. In sum, current GDP shifts do not influence presidential
success, but the climate preceding the instance of failure is important.
Turning from contextual factors to agency, the empirical results show that the
increased risk to a presidency associated with just one large protest is phenomenal.
Moreover, citizen unrest need not be necessarily directed at the president as shown by the
measure used in this model, which does not specify protest against the president but
includes protest events focused on other issues. Presumably, even presidents that are not
the specific target of protest come under greater pressure, and lose legitimacy, in the face
of mass protest. Whereas some previous studies have focused on the top-down nature of
presidential failure, this chapter reasserts the importance of mass demonstrations against
presidents.
The presence of executive wrongdoing also boosts failure risk for presidents to an
extraordinary extent. The magnitude of this result may stem from the use of a dummy
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variable. Despite this, the consistent, considerable effect of scandal is present within the
model and demonstrates a measure that presidents can proactively take to diminish their
risk of failure. This finding differs from that of Kim and Bahry (2008) and Morgenstern,
Negri, and Pérez-Liñán (2008). Compared to the Kim and Bahry measure, this chapter
uses a more discriminating coding for presidential wrongdoing by requiring some
evidence to be present in the news reports of the president’s personal involvement in
scandal12. In other words, there must be some foundation for the press’s story of the
president’s involvement. In these instances, polities take notice and the risk of
presidential failure increases. Despite this variable’s importance, additional qualitative
studies should be performed to identify how scandals explicitly relate to presidential
failure. Although some presidents left power in the midst of a large corruption scandal,
some presidents did not fall with scandals looming. Instead, the corruption was simply
one of several contentious issues with an unpopular president. The wrongdoing may
show how elites use the media to oppose presidents in some cases, and this may simply
be another tool of mobilizing actors to drive presidents from office.
The identified unimportance of popular mandates discounts conventional wisdom
about presidential failure. The ballotage system, utilized to assuage fears of executive
instability, has no significant impact on it, and this common institutional change may
have been misguided. This finding provides important information for practical efforts to
prevent future presidential failure. Simple institutional tinkering cannot eliminate the
future possibility of presidential failures for a country, and the focus on non-institutional
causes of presidential failure should continue.
12

Kim and Bahry(2008) identify accusations of presidential wrongdoing, and Morgenstern, Negri, and
Pérez-Liñán explain their coding, “LAWR reported that exposés about corruption or abuse of power had
involved the president personally” (2008, p. 184).
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The role of legislative minorities in driving presidential failure is clearly apparent
and supports the literature on this topic. The problem of minority party support in the
legislative branch persists as a risk factor in determining presidential failure. More than
that, the relationship between legislative minorities and protest cannot be easily
discerned. Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán (2008) acknowledge the significance of
protest and legislative opposition, explaining, “This finding suggests that extraparliamentary mobilisation and parliamentary opposition acting together constitute a
serious threat for the president” (185). Further, in-depth analyses are necessary to answer
these types of questions regarding presidential failure. The ability to simply interact
these variables does not seem to get at the causal mechanism behind the problem, as an
interaction would assume that opposition is related to protest. More than that, the
interaction would be difficult in an already complex survival analysis. The following
chapters attempt to get at these causal mechanisms by assessing if and how key political
actors mobilize opposition.

Conclusion
The original use of survival model stems from health-related studies. This
statistical analysis might be used to show how the high blood pressure and diabetes of a
patient contributed to his early demise. This survival analysis shows executive
wrongdoing, social protest, minority legislative support, and other factors contribute to
presidential failure. Presidents enter office, but face different threats to their term
stability. This chapter has clarified which of the threats are statistically significant.
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Despite these findings, we cannot draw conclusions about a causal mechanism
from this study. These presidents face risks, but we have little understanding of how and
why the risk factors contribute to presidential demise. This cross-national analysis serves
as the base for the following case study analyses and individual-level survey assessment.
This survival analysis shows the variables that influence cross-national presidential
failure. However, various questions persist as to how presidents are actually removed.
The next two chapters build on this analysis, identifying how political actors contribute to
social protest and legislative opposition. The qualitative analysis of the next two chapters
seeks to develop the theory regarding this phenomenon. Having identified what factors
are statistically significant in the South American region, I now turn my focus to
understanding the tools used by actors to drive repeated failure.
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CHAPTER THREE: UN TROPEZÓN NO ES CAÍDA A STUMBLE IS NOT A FALL13

In mid-December 2001, Argentina erupted in protest against President de la Rúa,
with citizens marching in Buenos Aires and several other cities. People took to the
streets and chanted “Que se vayan todos” or “Kick them all out,” in opposition to a
government that was unable to address citizen demands. Supermarket looting and rioting
also occurred in various cities throughout the country. In the months prior to these
activities, the country had faced harsh economic conditions, which De la Rúa had failed
to resolve. De la Rúa’s governing alliance (the Alianza) between his party -- the UCR
(Unión Cívica Radical - Radical Civic Union) and Frente País Solidario (FREPASO)
was crumbling, while Peronist opposition against him hardened. Protesters congregated
in the Plaza de Mayo, the main square in front of the presidential palace, over the course
of several days. On December 20, President de la Rúa called for a dialogue with
opposition parties and other groups. Political maneuvering behind the scenes left De la
Rúa with few options as the Peronist bloc of the lower house declared intentions to
impeach him (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). The president’s call for cooperation failed, and he
announced his resignation. De la Rúa’s escape by helicopter from the presidential
mansion is a central image of these manifestations, as the president resigned and fled
while teeming protesters demanded governmental change. Although the protests had
been matched with high levels of police repression (Pérez-Liñán, 2007), the deaths of
protesters had only exacerbated the situation. These protest efforts and governmental
instability were a shock for Argentina, as well as the world, as one of South America’s
13

Research for this chapter was made possible through a Fulbright Student Award Grant for Argentina.
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strongest countries faced unprecedented government upheaval and transitioned through
several presidents in a few short weeks.
This specific instance of failure in Argentina, with its protest-ridden, defeated
president escaping, is an archetypal image of the fallen South American president. A few
of the presidential failure studies specifically address De la Rúa’s fall, but other questions
surface regarding the factors that allow for presidential failure to repeatedly occur in
Argentina. De la Rúa came to power through the Alianza, but, as mentioned, his political
party affiliation was UCR. The Radicals are one of the oldest parties in Argentine
politics, and they have been in opposition to the Peronist Party historically. Since the
return to democracy, only two UCR presidents have been elected, and neither has
completed a term in office. Alfonsín, the first president after the military government,
faced large-scale protest activities and Peronist opposition. This opposition eventually
led to Alfonsín handing over power to the Peronist president-elect before the end of his
term. The similarities in these two failures raise questions about what factors allowed for
repeated presidential failure in Argentina. How do presidents fall in this country? Why
have UCR presidents failed to complete their terms in office? This chapter analyzes the
conditions that have led to presidential failure in Argentina and describes why
presidential failure has repeatedly occurred.
As the failure of Argentine presidents has largely been characterized by the
inability of UCR presidents to complete their terms in office, I will show how the Partido
Justicialista (the Peronist Party – PJ) has developed the ability to mobilize broad-based
opposition that, in turn, drives the dynamics of presidential challenges and failures in
Argentina. More than that, I argue that changes in the party itself have transformed the
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exact nature of this mobilizing capacity over time, which explains the differences
between each of the presidents’ falls. The capacity of the Peronist Party to mobilize its
support has become far more top-down over the past decades. The Peronist Party of the
1980’s had a bottom-up, union-based system for mobilization of society, but the party of
the 1990’s and 2000’s controlled a more diverse set of civil society actors from the top
down. These shifts help account for the differences between the failures of Alfonsín and
De la Rúa. The inability of other parties, specifically the UCR, to replicate this
mobilizing capacity accounts for the partisan bias of presidential failure, as Peronist
presidents have been insulated from challenges initiated by other parties. The following
analysis of the Peronist Party’s role in challenging presidents shows how the presence of
an actor with mobilizing power explains repeated presidential failure.
I conducted research in Argentina, looking at Peronist mobilization and structure,
and this chapter integrates others’ research with my own experiences. I trace the
processes of failure in the Alfonsín and De la Rúa presidencies in order to analyze the
conditions that lead to failure. In addition, I discuss the failure of Peronist Rodríguez Saá,
who was thrown out in the aftermath of the De la Rúa failure. I draw from published
accounts of Argentine presidential failures as well as my own interview and primary
document research. Much of this information comes from news reports of the time,
specifically tracing Clarín articles from 2000 – 2001 and La Capital from 2000 – 2001
and 1989. Secondary sources support these news-based investigations, along with
publically available memoirs and interviews. Finally, I use personal interviews and field
work observation to describe the mechanisms for Argentine presidential failure. This
chapter shows two key features of the Peronist Party. First, I demonstrate the presence of
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its mobilizing capacity across time, with linkages to labor unions and/or clientelist
networks that allow for challenges to opposition presidents. Second, I show how this
capacity has been transformed, explaining the differences in the instances of presidential
failure.

The Nature of Peronism
The political success of General Juan Domingo Perón ultimately led to the birth of
a mass-based, populist political party, the PJ, which was linked to working class identity
(Levitsky, 2003b, p. 37-38). Despite this end result, the relationship between Perón and
the working class emerged over time, and the relationship between the ensuing Peronist
Party and its social base has continued to evolve up until the present day. The nature of
the Peronist Party, including its structure, stems from the party’s historical roots and
various transformations that have occurred over the past 70 years. The following
discussion of the Peronist Party maps the changing nature of the party and identifies its
linkages to labor organizations and social groups.
In 1943, the military coup that overthrew President Ramón Castillo placed Perón
in a position of power when he was named labor secretary in the new government
(Levitsky, 2003b, p. 38). At that time, Argentina boasted the most solidified, organized
working class in South America, which provided a unique opportunity for Perón
(Levitsky, 2003b, p. 38). The military government had disbanded the Confederación
General de Trabajadores (General Confederation of Labor – CGT), but they were still
pushing simultaneously for greater labor organization and hoped to control labor through
Perón’s position (Torre, 1998, p. 127). Looking to this group, Perón expanded worker
benefit and utilized deep cultural messaging to build a relationship (Levitsky, 2003b, p.
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38). Workers had become frustrated by their lack of voice in political issues, and Perón
proved to be an effective leader in pursuing their demands (Smith, 1969, p. 46-49). As an
end result, Perón found himself in league with working class support when he was unable
to resolve issues with fellow military officers (Torre, 1998, p. 126).
In October of 1945, Perón was arrested by military officers. Protests famously led
to Perón’s release on the 17th of October (Smith, 1969, p. 45-46). The protest was
coordinated by traditional union leadership and involved the mass mobilization of
workers that Perón had helped in earlier negotiations (Smith, 1969, p. 46). Labor leaders
were attracted to the opportunity to pursue their own goals with Perón’s aid, but working
class citizens participated due to their cultural identification with a charismatic, massfocused leader (Torre, 1998, p. 128). Immediately after this large-scale protest event,
Perón declared his intent to run for president. The labor unions, which had coordinated
Peron’s protest efforts, created a Labor Party that provided the initial support to help him
win the presidency (Torre, 1998; Levitsky, 2003b). Upon election, the victorious
President Perón forcibly replaced the Labor Party with what would become the Peronist
Party, overriding the wishes of labor organizers who could not oppose his mass-based
influence (Levitsky, 2003b, p. 38-39).
These events show how the roots of the Peronist movement emerged, and the
subsequent Peronist Party was grounded in various aspects of Perón’s support. Perón had
developed mass-based appeal by giving a voice to previously unimportant workers, as
well as women. More than that, he drew upon the strength of these masses to achieve his
political ends. The mass-based Peronist Party that resulted from these activities built
upon the identity of working class struggle, with the image of Perón and his wife Eva
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linked to this group. To foster this mass appeal, Perón developed a diffuse party structure
with responsibility in the hands of the citizens. Perón maintained a vision for diffuse
unidades básicas (basic units/local branches) that recruited and organized rank-and-file
Peronist supporters (Little, 1973, p. 656). Little describes these, saying, “In particular the
unidades básicas (local branches) were not to be used merely as electoral committees but,
more importantly, for the recruitment of local leaders, the spread of propaganda, the
inculcation of doctrine, and the elevation of the culture of the people” (1973, p. 656).
The populist nature of Peronism also created a personalistic air to the party, which
focused on the benevolent image of Perón in power.
In addition, Perón established his dominance over the labor unions through the
creation of his own political party and establishment of specific party rules that
maintained his power. Structural changes for the creation of a larger Peronist
“movement” occurred in 1954 and created three distinct branches: political, labor, and
women’s groups, which became known as the tercio (one-third) system (Levitsky, 2003b,
p. 40). This split established the CGT as the labor branch, but it also guaranteed Peron’s
control as the rules for dividing power were never institutionalized (Levitsky, 2003b, p.
40). Epstein notes that, “By 1955, labor was a highly disciplined part of the Peronist
movement” (1979, p. 449). Perón’s relationship with the working class created a link for
the Peronist Party that has never been dissolved. Through diffuse base structures, it
fostered a mass-based appeal that was built around working class identity. It formed
solid relationships with organized labor, over which it maintained dominance and a topdown authority structure. These key features of the early Peronist Party have influenced
its development throughout the subsequent decades.
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In 1955, Argentina had a break with democracy when Perón was overthrown
through a coup and fled the country in exile (Torre, 1998, p. 129 – 130). Despite various
shifts in power as well as Perón’s short-lived return in 1973, democracy was largely
suspended until 1983. This time period spelled a new era for Peronism. First, the link
between Peronism and the working class become more solidified, while its relationship to
union leadership became more conflicted. The unions that had been empowered under
Perón were still left to pursue worker’s rights under the military government (Torre,
1998, p. 128-130). As a result, trade unions became the most visible arm of the Peronist
movement during Perón’s exile (Torre, 1998, p. 130). Torre describes this relationship,
noting, “Perón’s exile and the absence of a legal party created a situation in which union
organizations, in addition to their professional functions, were transformed into the
natural spokesman of the Peronist masses” (1998, p. 131). At the same time, the union
leadership became more distant from their exiled leader, and different factions emerged
from the syndicates (Torre, 1998, p. 131).
Second, an already diffuse party structure became even more irregular when the
military government banned the Peronist Party in 1955. As a result, the Peronists
developed a “semi-anarchic” nature, in which the party lost its vertical linkages
(Levitsky, 2001b, p. 35-36). The connections between local groups were unsystematic,
and sub-groups emerged in neighborhoods, without hierarchical oversight and without
contact amongst themselves (Levitsky, 2001b, p. 36). Whereas the organization had been
top-down before the exile, the new structure that resulted was more anarchic and fluid
(Levitsky, 2003b, p. 42-44). In addition, the returning military dictatorship led to the
Argentine Dirty War, which arguably began in 1974 and lasted until 1983 and was
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characterized by extreme oppression of dissidents. During the last years of this military
rule between 9,000-15,000 people were killed or disappeared, and thousands more were
imprisoned or driven into exile (Pion-Berlin, 1994, p. 108). This forced Peronist activists
to focus on organizations, including unions, non-governmental organizations,
neighborhood associations, and church groups, as their havens (Levitsky, 2001b, p. 37).
Peronism would remain in these secret organizations until the democratic transition.
This description of the history of Peronism points to several key features.
Peronism, in itself, has been culturally linked to the working class, with a charismatic
leader who built mass-based appeal. Early on, Perón exerted control over labor unions,
but maintained close ties with a working class that identified with him. He established a
party structure that was hierarchical, with diffuse, widespread base units. The
combination of personalistic leadership and base support fostered the development of a
fluid party built around an iconic historical figure. Upon Perón’s exile, the party
persisted despite being made illegal. The ties with unions gave voice to working masses
while union leaders sought greater power. Under the Dirty War, repression of unions and
leftists created an even more diffuse structure for the party. These key components to the
Peronist Party are instrumental to understanding its reappearance with democracy’s
return.
Peronism after 1983
The fall of the military dictatorship was met with the reemergence of a quickly
evolving Peronist Party (Levitsky, 2001b, p. 37-38). The organization re-emerged in an
anarchic manner, as base units had been created without any party oversight. Moreover,
the various organizations, which had been born under the military dictatorship or had
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sprung forth in the moment after the democratic transition, did not become part of the
formal party structure because they maintained their own operations as base units
(Levitsky, 2001b, p. 38). The party had persisted due to its diffuse, clandestine networks
with little hierarchy, and this left clashing labor leaders in charge. For these reasons, the
party found itself unready for electoral efforts. Leaders from trade unions handled
campaigning for the 1983 election, with many Peronists later calling them “marshals of
defeat” (Munck, 1985, p. 89). Alfonsín, a respected human rights activist of the UCR,
was able to capitalize on the idea of democracy and beat the Peronists in the election. The
weakened political arm of the Peronists needed much of the time period of the Alfonsín
presidency to subjugate labor interests and bring them in line politically.
At the time of the 1983 election, the CGT had been split into two Peronist camps.
The PJ electoral defeat only furthered divisiveness within the trade unions, with a
struggle for power that benefited the PJ in the long run. Four distinct groups of Peronist
union leaders clashed during the Alfonsín administration: the Group of 25 (the 25), the 62
Organizations (the 62), the Group of 15, and the Ubaldinistas. The 62 Organizations and
the Group of 25 continued to influence Peronist party politics in a more traditional
manner by openly struggling for party seats and leadership positions throughout the
1980s (McGuire, 1992, p. 37-38). Lorenzo Miguel and his 62 labor organizations were
the oldest, orthodox faction of union power (McGuire, 1992, p. 37-39). The antiauthoritarian, reform-minded Group of 25 merged with Peronist dissidents, including half
of the Peronist deputies (diputados) and all Peronist governors and senators (Munck,
1985, p. 89). The divisiveness amongst these labor leaders provided an opportunity for
the Peronist Party as an institution to exert power over the groups, while simultaneously
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demonstrating the residual Peronist support within the working class itself – all sides still
identified as Peronists.
Torre notes that the election of the Radical President Alfonsín was, in fact, a
“godsend” for Peronist labor leaders because they were able to, once again, gain power
and control by developing a bureaucratic relationship between labor and Peronism (1998,
p. 134). The working class took up the Peronist banner, while struggling against the
Radical government (Torre, 1998, p. 134). Whereas labor unions initially gained power
against a Radical president, the Peronist Party was able to begin a renovation process,
gaining control over the unions due to the divisions among the union leadership. The
traditional seat of power for labor within the Peronist movement had been the 62
Organizations in the 1960’s and 1970’s, as previously noted. Due to the informal nature
of the Peronist Party, this group never received formal designation in the party structure
(Levitsky, 2001a, p. 42). By the mid-1980’s, the Peronist Party began to take away
power from this old guard group and place that power in the reform-minded 25 (Levitsky,
2001a, p. 43). Levitsky describes how this worked, noting, “Thus, in the 1985 and 1987
midterm elections, Renovation-led party branches granted the ‘25,’ rather than the ‘62,’
the right to nominate unionists for PJ legislative lists” (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 43-44). The
62 was effectively eliminated as the voice of collective labor in the Peronist movement,
and there was no replacement (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 44). By 1987, the Renovation-led
group also disregarded the tercio system by using a direct election system, which
essentially removed labor’s hold on power and placed it with pro-Peronist base level
units (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 44). The relationship between the PJ and organized labor was
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fundamentally transformed as organized labor was placed in a “subordinate position”
(Epstein, 1992, p. 142).
The 1989 election of Peronist president Carlos Menem marked the greatest
transformation of the Peronist Party structure, with two distinct changes. First, the party
removed the most substantial vestiges of union power in the Peronist Party. Second, it
developed and fostered a clientelistic relationship with supporters. Peronists effectively
dominated labor unions by the end of Alfonsín’s term, and they renovated the very
structure of internal party functions to reduce the union’s future power under Menem’s
rule. The country itself was undergoing a process of deindustrialization and
deunionization (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 45), and Menem pursued a neoliberal policy agenda
in general. Torre speaks of the implications of this transition for the Peronist Party and
Menem’s policy implementation in no uncertain terms:
The decentralization of collective bargaining, the privatization of those veritable
trade union fiefdoms – the obras sociales – the abrogation of indemnity payments,
shop floor rights, even accident insurance, and finally talk of the ending of
industrial unionism altogether, mean collectively the demise of Peronist trade
unionism as it has existed for half a century (Torre, 1998, p. 134).
With these changing economic and social conditions, Peronists built support from outside
of their working class base, extended the party’s appeal, and drew in middle class voters
(Levitsky, 2001a, p. 45). They developed a more clientelistic structure with the urban
poor and utilized base units to create a patronage-based system for maintaining power
(Levitsky, 2001a, p. 45). Under Menem, neoliberal policies undermined labor unions as
a group and caused hardship for citizens. This hardship created an opening for Peronists
to consolidate support, especially with the poor, through clientelist rewards.
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President Menem’s implementation of a neoliberal framework for dealing with
the country’s economic problems opposed the interests of labor organizations. Workers
were forced to accept these Menemist policies, given declining working class power in
the neoliberal era (Epstein, 1992, p. 142). In 1991, the president’s neoliberal policies
eventually resulted in the emergence of a splinter labor organization, the Central de
Trabajadores de la Argentina (Argentine Worker’s Central Union – CTA) breaking away
from the largest labor organization, the CGT. Menem lost much of his labor support
when the CTA opposed neoliberal policy implementation (Palomino, 2000, pp. 130-131).
This shift can be seen as a break between some organized labor and the Peronist Party,
but a simultaneous break with the party’s working class constituents never occurred, due
to patronage-based rewards.
Menem’s policy may have broken some of organized labor’s support, but he made
other gains that offset this action. Dense social networks in the Peronist Party had always
existed, but these expanded and became more clientelistic during the Menem era, which
extended the party’s capacity for base mobilization. In explaining this phenomenon,
Levitsky describes this party structure in the Menem era and its ability to prevent protest:
Not only did the PJ's vast infrastructure of UBs, unions, soup kitchens, clubs, and
informal social networks yield vast human and organisational resources for
campaigns, but it also provided channels for patronage distribution, policy
implementation, social and cultural contact and (albeit with less frequency)
political participation and demand-making. For example, during the 1989-1990
hyperinflationary crisis, tens of thousands of party activists worked to dampen
working and lower class protest in response to the hyperinflationary crisis and the
government's austerity measures. This was done through persuasion, the physical
expulsion of leftist activists from their neighbourhoods, and a variety of
neighbourhood-based emergency social welfare measures (2001b, p. 51-52).
In addition, Menem’s administration provided additional resources to Peronist-controlled
municipalities, instead of UCR areas (Lodola, 2005, p. 532). In sum, Menem
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implemented harsh economic policies but used machine politics and base-level support to
maintain power in light of austerity efforts.
These clientelist networks began in the Menem era and continued into the
opposition presidency of De la Rúa and the present day. The Peronists once again drew
their support from base units, while launching opposition in the congress. Various new
social actors also emerged during the Menem presidency, with more diffuse ties to
Peronism. Specifically, the 1996 privatization of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales
(YPF), the state petroleum company, created a new repertoire of mobilization.
Roadblocks became a common form of protest, as newly unemployed individuals
demanded government negotiation (Wolff, 2007, p. 6). In the face of rising
unemployment and increasing austerity concerns, these roadblocks mobilized individuals,
named piqueteros (picketers). A labor expert notes that Menem’s presidency resulted in
this complex set of changes (M. Gasparri, personal interview, 2010). These policies
broke organized labor by splintering CTA as a new organization and instigating antiMenemista currents in the CGT (M. Gasparri, personal interview, 2010). In addition,
Menem’s actions provoked the emergence of the piquete (M. Gasparri, personal
interview, 2010). The piquetero movement gained strength in the late 1990’s and
became more structured in response to De la Rúa’s administration. Whereas Menem had
targeted his own base with distribution of goods, De la Rúa increased distribution to areas
with protests in order to minimize piquetero unrest (Lodola, 2005, p. 529-530). In
addition, the roots of the piquetero movement were solidly connected to the Peronist
structure. Wolffe describes a key piquetero group – the Corriente Clasista and
Combativa (CCC), “Although its leadership is dominated by a Maoist party, the CCC
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thus remains strategically pragmatic and programmatically diffuse – in accordance with
its largely Peronist social base” (Wolffe, 2007, p. 16). These organizations sprang forth
organically, but their members still identified with the Peronist Party.
Additionally, the Peronist Party maintained personalized ties that created
clientelist networks, and they have been especially visible between punteros (local PJ
party brokers) with local villa (slum) members (Auyero 2000). These linkages permeated
to the lowest level as individuals contacted local Peronist punteros to gain medicine,
goods, and information and provided repayment through political support, which
reinforced solidarity and support (Auyero, 2000). The personal nature of this relationship
reduced the somewhat negative aspects of clientelism, as Auyero explains, “Once the
empirical focus of the analysis is not only relations but experiences, it can be seen that
clientelist problem solving involves constructing personalized ties, an imagined
solidaristic community, and a protective and predictable network that buffers the harsh
everyday reality of the slum” (2000, p. 70). Thus, a vast personalized network was
created between organizations, neighborhood associations, and church groups, which all
linked to the Peronist power structure. This loose coalition eventually brought down the
De la Rúa government, as discussed later in this chapter. The Peronist Party’s
relationship to society continued to evolve afterwards. There have been no more
presidential failures – all the presidents after 2002 have been Peronists – and these
developments suggest that the new Peronist linkages may have helped the party acquire
and maintain its power.
Peronist Néstor Kirchner was elected in 2003, and effectively took control of the
party and its clientelist networks and cemented ties with other social movement groups.
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Etchemendy and Garay explain, “Top-down, uncontested leadership of the PJ machine
provided a predictable base for governing and support, while the construction of linkages
with social actors – including social movements and traditional labor union –
underpinned Kirchner’s left-wing policies” (2011, p. 286). Kirchner effectively courted
the support of unemployed workers’ organizations, garnering rallies and support for the
president (Etchemendy and Garay, 2011, p. 296-287). He also rebuilt relationships with
the CGT by providing friendly officials and policies, without reestablishing a stronghold
for the CGT in the Peronist Party structure (Etchemendy and Garay, 2011, p. 287). The
Kirchner government saw an expansion of Peronist support as well as an increase in the
network capacity of the organization. In addition, the inherent weakness of the opposition
has led to continued Peronist presidential victories (Levitsky and Murillo, 2008, p. 1819). The strength of the Peronist Party persists, and the opposition, specifically the UCR,
fails to provide a true alternative for voters (Levitsky and Murillo, 2008, p. 18).
In Buenos Aires today, the Peronists have greater presence in the comunas of the
city, while other parties rely upon strategic placement in the areas of strong support. This
support has cemented power in the hands of the Peronists and true opposition, at the
national level, seems unlikely from other parties. The 2007 election of Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner has had an impact on the Peronist Party, and the 2010 death of her
husband/ex-president Néstor has increased the divisiveness within Peronism itself. The
Kirchners effectively consolidated power within the Peronist Party, but the death of
Néstor has decidedly weakened the president’s position. Whereas no opposition from
outside the party appears likely, concerns over the future of Peronism lie within the party,
as different groups vie for the control of these extensive power networks.
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This evolution of Peronism over time provides a solid base for understanding the
transformation of Argentine politics over the past 50 years. I will next discuss specific
instances of Argentine presidential failure. While looking at the specific instances of
failure, I first describe how the various factors from the previous chapter played into
presidential instability. Then, I identify how the broader dynamics of party/society
relations just described took shape in these particular challenges.

Alfonsín - The Conditions for Challenge
The 1983 return to democracy in Argentina was a heralded event as the military
transitioned power to the country’s democratically elected President Alfonsín, the leader
of the Unión Cívica Radical. Alfonsín garnered 51.8% of the vote (initial popular vote),
while his party won 39.1% of the Senate and a majority of the Chamber of Deputies seat
(Llanos, 2010, p. 58). During his campaign, he famously offered the slogan, “Democracy
will grant us food, education, and health,” to the newly democratic country (Pucciarelli,
2001, p. 40). The success of the electoral process promised a different era for Argentina
– without military dictatorship – but newly inaugurated Alfonsín faced immediate
problems with issues of civilian rule, economic crisis, and democratization. As the
quantitative study of Chapter 2 also suggested, even a solid majority vote did not protect
him from the reality of a new democracy that was more complicated than the hopeful
adages of his campaign.
The previous military government had acquired extensive debt, and Alfonsín’s
administration was torn between trying to meet campaign promises, assuage social
tensions, and meet international creditors’ demands. Early on, the administration
attempted to resolve internal economic issues by increasing salaries and deceasing
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interest rates, but these policies only exacerbated inflationary problems (Peralta Ramos,
1992, p. 101). When Alfonsín initially attempted to alleviate the country’s debt, he
pursued an industrial restructuring effort that would reduce tariffs and drive exports
(Peralta Ramos, 1992, p. 101). The strongest industry critics remained largely opposed to
the proposed changes (Peralta Ramos, 1992, p. 101).
Despite initial efforts, the Alfonsín administration found itself in a difficult
situation after two years in office (Dornbusch and de Pablo, 1990, p. 106). In 1985, the
government implemented a heterodox economic program, the Austral Plan, which
avoided simply accepting market-oriented reform. The plan’s goal was to address the
troubling hyperinflation rates that were hurting the Argentine economy, a key concern for
the administration as midterm election loomed (Dornbusch and de Pablo, 1990, p. 106).
The Austral Plan took a complicated approach, including implementing “wage-priceexchange rate controls,” which are based on different aspects of economic theory
(Dornbusch and de Pablo, 1990, p. 106). The plan created import duties, implemented a
wage-price freeze, imposed a new currency, as well as a variety of other measures
(Dornbusch and de Pablo, 1990, p. 106-107). In general, it can be viewed as a mixture,
taking into account specific social measures and avoiding truly painful austerity measures
(Llanos, 2010, p. 58). Alfonsín would not have been seen as a true neoliberal in his
policy decisions because he attempted to find this mixed alternative (neoliberal reform).
The plan’s implementation proved to be a mild success and resulted in a brief
pause in Argentina’s inflationary growth. The UCR were rewarded with success in the
1985 midterm election (Llanos, 2010, p. 59). Despite the one-year respite for the
Argentine economy, inflation began to rise again by mid-1986 (Dornbusch and de Pablo,

71

1990, p. 107-108). Table 4 shows the inflation data during this time period
(data.worldbank.org). GDP fluctuated during this time period, but the economy did not
suffer from the stringent coding requirements of prolonged recession because there were
no two years of negative growth over Alfonsín’s term.
Table 4.
Inflation – GDP Deflator
Inflation
1983
382.35
1984
606.74
1985
625.80
1986
74.463
1987
127.09
1988
388.49
1989
3057.63

Alfonsín had an absolute majority of the lower house for his party, with 51% of
the seats, at the beginning of his term (http://www.observatorioelectoral.org/) (majority
legislative support). In the Senate, the UCR had 39% of the seats
(http://www.observatorioelectoral.org/). This strength would diminish near the end of his
term. The UCR was punished by losses in the 1987 election, and Alfonsín began to feel
the burden of diminished legislative support. Although the UCR was still the largest
party in the lower house, they lost their absolute majority and held only 44% of the seats
(http://www.observatorioelectoral.org/). More importantly, the UCR lost nearly all of the
governorships they possessed (Llanos, 2010, p. 59).
In regards to executive wrongdoing, Alfonsín was not scandalous. On the
contrary, Alfonsín bore the mantel of democratic renewal and openly opposed antidemocratic values. Alfonsín had fought against the military dictatorship and had
trumpeted the return to democracy. If anything, it was this commitment to democratic
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fair play that would diminish Alfonsín’s power over the course of his term. The president
fought throughout his term to enhance institutional rules in the country, which diminished
his ability to woo support from the traditional seats of power. Civil protest of various
kinds persisted throughout Alfonsín’s term, but the occurrence of general strikes
(discussed in detail below) played a key role in his political demise. The inability of
Alfonsín to court labor power, due, in part, to his democracy-promotion efforts, resulted
in extensive labor opposition.

Alfonsín - The Fall
Alfonsín faced many challenges in his administration that put him at risk for
failure, given the results of the quantitative survival analysis of the last chapter. The
country suffered from a myriad of economic issues, from low growth to hyperinflation.
Alfonsín was largely unable to address these issues, despite various policy efforts.
Likewise, Alfonsín experienced decreasing legislative support over the course of his
term, in part because of the economic ineffectiveness of his administration. Inflation was
shown to be statistically significant in explaining when presidential failure occurs.
However, the combination of legislative opposition and civil protest directly influenced
Alfonsín’s inability to complete his term in office. Below, I will demonstrate how the
Peronist Party’s mobilizing capacity, through the party’s relationship with labor unions,
was able to take advantage of these causal conditions to serve as the causal mechanism of
presidential removal. The UCR Majority Leader of the lower house under Alfonsín has
described the unbreakable links between the PJ and organized labor, noting that “the
labor movement is the spinal column of their [PJ’s] political system” (Jaroslavsky, 1996,
p. 74). The Peronist Party was able to effectively mobilize this “spinal column” in
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opposition to a Radical president, given the presence of economic hardship and
diminishing legislative support even though Alfonsín was not personally involved in
scandals.
The Peronist Party of 1983 was weak, as evidenced by its electoral defeat and
difficult relationship with organized labor. For Alfonsín, this appeared to present an
opportunity for the UCR that had not previously existed: the possibility to court
organized labor. Alfonsín attempted to work with trade unions and build bridges into the
working class, which had previously been unachievable for his party. Despite initial
goodwill, the president made key decisions in opposition to trade union leaders’ interests,
which created intense hostility with these groups during his term. The Director of the
Estudios Históricos del Instituto Arturo Jauretche (Historical Studies of the Arturo
Jauretche Institute) of the CGT identified two specific legal projects that were
instrumental in turning the CGT against Alfonsín and reinforcing its ties with the
Peronists (M. Gasparri, personal interview, 2010). First, the president pursued the socalled Mucci Law (Ley Mucci) in 1984. This law possessed various components of union
reorganization, such as altering representation on election boards, requiring governmental
supervision of elections, and ensuring direct, secret, and compulsory voting rules. Both
Peronists and labor leaders viewed the proposal as an attack on organized labor, and the
Peronist Party and labor forces coalesced against it. The Peronists pieced together
enough support in the Senate to vote down the effort (Epstein, 1992, pp. 128-129).
Alfonsín’s actions effectively unified Peronist and union interests against the Radical
government while demonstrating his party’s weaknesses (Epstein, 1992, pp. 129-130).
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Second, the president implemented law 23.071 in 1984. This law created
elections within trade unions. Alfonsín hoped to widen his appeal to the interests of
union base support by reducing the hold of traditional union bosses, increasing the
democratic nature of these institutions, and allowing for the possible rise of UCR support.
The plan ultimately backfired on the president because he created enemies of old union
leaders. Alfonsín’s decision was poorly calculated in another way because the union base
was more tightly linked to the Peronist Party than were the leaders. The base soon
elected more extreme leaders, who were voted into trade union positions in the new
elections. The president’s efforts to democratize the unions actually diminished the
possibility for a UCR-union alliance (Taiana, 1988, p. 17). Taiana writes of this, noting,
The result reaffirmed the hegemony of Peronism in the union organizations.
Despite the defeat in the national elections, the internal crisis, the loss of
membership in industrial associations, and the growth of service associations,
Peronism demonstrated its validity among unionized workers, making the UCR’s
efforts fail to shape their own associational base, shifting the union base from the
electoral majority achieved in 1983 (1988, p. 16-17).
Jaroslavsky, the UCR Majority Leader during Alfonsín’s presidency, later concurred in
the critique of his party’s efforts, describing how the government call for labor
reorganization was perceived as being “in line with the Cabildo” and in opposition to the
“line of the balcony of the Casa Rosada” (1996, p. 72). This classic description charges
that the order was perceived as a top-down power move, not one of the people. This
action pushed labor groups closer to Peronism and further from the UCR, but it
comments on the larger problem of the UCR being unable to obtain labor support. The
president’s efforts to pursue a relationship with the unions were thwarted by his desire for
democratic institutions, including in unions. Even though this was an opportunity to gain
UCR support in the unions, it failed.
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While Alfonsín’s efforts distanced his party from the unions, the Peronists
effectively reasserted their dominance, and the transformation of the Peronist Party
effectively eliminated independent union leadership might. Alfonsín was unequivocally
unable to woo organized labor during his first few years in office, while the Peronist
Party spent this time consolidating and exerting its control as well as taking advantage of
the Radical administration’s blunders. In the previous section, I discussed ways in which
the Peronists exploited the divisions among the unions to their own benefit. The PJ was
able to draw power away from the union old guard, and utilize the resulting mobilizing
capacity to their benefit. Alfonsín’s administration faced 13 general strikes, as organized
labor confronted the government on policy choices (M. Gasparri, personal interview,
2010). When Ubaldini became the secretary general of CGT in 1986, confrontation
increased even more, with 4 general strikes in 1986, 3 in 1987 and 3 in 1988 (Epstein,
1992, p. 135-136). A UCR analyst linked the general strikes with the Peronist Party
itself, citing them as a form of “systematic opposition” and noting, “The form of political
debate they adopted was that of striking” (C. Canievsky, personal interview, 2010).
Alfonsín faced difficult problems over the course of his term, but PJ opposition, linked
with labor mobilization, was the nail in his coffin.
The 1987 midterm election marked a critical change in power dynamics between
the Peronists, Radicals, and union leaders. By this time, Alfonsín’s party had lost societal
support, and the Peronists had reestablished dominance over the unions. Organized labor
threw its support behind Peronist candidates and openly expressed their commitment to
Peronism (Epstein, 1992, p. 140). Peronism successfully reframed itself and gained
surprising electoral victories by the Renovation portion of the PJ in 1987 (Cavarozzi and
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Grossi, 1992, p. 194). The election results created various consequences for the
relationships between the parties and unions as well. The UCR loss of control of the
Chamber of Deputies squelched the idea of compromise between the UCR and the PJ,
and “this led to the end of the government’s attempt at power sharing with the more
conciliatory portion of the Peronist trade unionists” (Epstein, 1992, p. 140). In addition,
newly-reelected Peronist governor Carlos Menem began reinforcing his ties with the
labor unions, especially the traditional seats of union power, as he prepared himself for
his presidential candidacy (Cavarozzi and Grossi, 1992, p. 195-196).
The country faced a new bout of hyperinflation in 1989 as the country geared up
for a presidential election. The economic minister resigned, which gained the approval of
the UCR presidential candidate Angeloz (Llanos, 2010, p. 60). The unions largely
supported the PJ in the campaign cycle. The CGT developed a “Proposal for a Platform
of National Liberation” that outlined the union’s program in support of the Menem
presidency. This proposal discussed the organization’s political platform for the
upcoming years. More than that, it uniquely tied the CGT back to the Peronist Party and
provided support for a change to a Peronist presidency:
This attitude is signaling, first, the complete identification of the labor union
movement with the principles of the movement founded by Gen. Juan Domingo
Peron. Second, the calling of his men to assume, with the force of their presence,
the responsibility that they hold in a government run by justicialismo.” (Bold in
original text) (Noticias Gremiales, 1989, p. 2)
The dramatic upswing that occurred in inflation before the elections only increased the
likelihood of a Peronist victory (Epstein, 1992, p. 140).
On May 14, 1989, the UCR lost the presidential election, Menem was named
president elect, and Alfonsín faced an increasingly difficult political, economic, and
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social predicament over the unusually long six-month period before Menem would be
inaugurated in December. From the point of view of the UCR, the strikes were the result
of partisan opposition, as the labor unions and the Peronists created opposition that
Alfonsín could not overcome (C. Canievsky, personal interview, 2010). Looting and
protests had broken out in Rosario and Buenos Aires by the end of May 1989. Various
cities in the country experienced protest and collective action. Some citizens participated
in peaceful cacerolazos and marchas del ollazo, in which individuals gathered together
and beat pots in opposition to poverty conditions in the community. Others participated
in more dramatic saqueos (lootings) and riots that targeted supermarkets and local stores.
The Peronists were able to use their links with labor as a call for street opposition during
Alfonsín’s presidency. Ultimately, these calls culminated in riots and looting by the end
of his term. Describing the fall of Alfonsín, a Radical analyst noted how the Peronists
headed the opposition and worked to prevent progress throughout Alfonsín’s term, and
the relationship between the labor unions and the Peronists served as additional
opposition to the president (C. Canievsky, personal interview, 2010).
In the final negotiations between Menem and Alfonsín, the two had already
discussed moving the transition to December 10. Then, another meeting occurred in
which the CGT and other labor organizations pushed Menem to seek even an earlier
resignation date. Alfonsín described this in his memoir, “The Union Liaison Association
(Mesa de Enlace Sindical), which Luis Barrionuevo organized, expressed its willingness
that the CGT convene a general strike and a demonstration in support of this demand [an
immediate advancement in the handover of power]” (p. 2004, 152). Alfonsín fell to the
pressure and confirmed his early resignation by June 12, 1989 after developing a

78

compromise agreement between the Peronists and the Radicals. He resigned early,
granting power to his Peronist successor. The Peronist Party, and its links to organized
labor, created an atmosphere that left Alfonsín unable to govern. The general climate of
mass, organized labor opposition to Alfonsín and the Radicals was clearly a PJ creation.
Although struggles between organized labor and the Peronists existed, they jointly
exerted their dominance over time and effectively obstructed a non-Peronist president.
With the advent of the Menem presidency, hyperinflation was finally placed under
control with the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, including the
Convertibility Plan, which pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar.

De la Rúa - The Conditions for Challenge
The Peronist Carlos Menem served as Argentina’s president for two terms, and a
major restructuring of the Peronist Party occurred over the course of his presidency, as
discussed earlier. Clientelist networks replaced the focus on organized labor, and the
party transformed itself in the face of neoliberal reform. Menem had altered the
constitution in 1994 to allow himself a second term, but was unable to run for a third.
Menem lost popularity over his terms, and opposition cemented against him through the
creation of an alliance between the UCR and the newly created party coalition Frente
País Solidario (FREPASO). Fernando de la Rúa won the 1999 presidential election with
48.5% of the initial popular vote (http://www.observatorioelectoral.org/). De la Rúa was
president on the ticket, and FREPASO leader Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez was vicepresident.
Much like Alfonsín, De la Rúa began his term with economic and institutional
concerns at the forefront. Menem had implemented a Convertibility Plan that pegged the
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peso’s value as equal to the US dollar. That constraint on monetary policy tamed
inflation, but led to increasing recession and debt. As De la Rúa entered office, inflation
was low and remained that way throughout his term, as seen in Table 5
(data.worldbank.org). De la Rúa did face prolonged recession in 2001, with growth rates
being negative over the first two years of his term.
Table 5.
Inflation – GDP Deflator
Inflation
1999
-1.83
2000
1.04
2001
-1.10

These past policies that effectively controlled inflation strongly limited the
president’s policy options. In addition, economic slowness was a hurdle in the wake of
the Menem presidency. In regards to neoliberal reform, De la Rúa maintained many of
the neoliberal tendencies of the Menem terms. He continued the Convertibility Plan but
proposed changes to some other policies that were increasingly identified as undesirable
(Llanos, 2010, p. 62). Eventually, De la Rúa brought Domingo Cavallo, Menem’s
economic minister, back into the Cabinet in an attempt to avert economic disaster
(Malamud, Forthcoming, p. 4). Cavallo’s participation prolonged the ensuing
convertibility crisis.
De la Rúa had a difficult time interacting with his allies and his opponents in the
government. The president had won the coalition’s open primary by utilizing his party’s
administrative capacity, which the newly-created FREPASO could not match (Schamis,
2002, p. 87). As a result, FREPASO resentment towards their coalition partner began
immediately (Schamis, 2002, p. 87). Whereas the initial presidential vote had been high,
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the president saw a lessening in power over time. The coalition may have succeeded in
developing a winning campaign, but they were less able to share governance (Llanos,
2010, p. 62). FREPASO leaders found themselves locked out of power within their own
alliance, creating resentfulness and division in the coalition (Schamis, 2002, p. 87). De la
Rúa tended to isolate himself, which only worsened the situation (Llanos, 2010, p. 63).
A corruption scandal emerged in which Senators received bribes for passing an
administration-friendly reform bill. De la Rúa sheltered complicit legislators, which led
to his implication in executive wrongdoing. Vice President Álvarez stepped down in the
wake of this scandal when “de la Rúa refused to sack officials accused of funneling cash
to legislators to win support for a controversial labor reform bill approved in April”
(Bloomberg BusinessWeek, October 29, 2000). The Alianza suffered a severe blow as
this buttressed the divisions between the UCR and FREPASO. More than that, the
Alianza had campaigned against Menemist corruption, and the coalition faced backlash in
light of its own scandal (Llanos, 2010, p. 63).
Coming into office, the Alianza had 47% of the seats in the lower house
(http://www.observatorioelectoral.org) (majority legislative support). The midterm
elections of 2001 placed greater pressure on the faltering Alianza, when they only held
34% (http://www.observatorioelectoral.org). The coalition began to face hostile
opposition from the Peronist Party and weakening support from FREPASO. With an
impossible economic setting and a poorly-handled political situation, De la Rúa faced a
perfect storm, which was matched consistently with Peronist obstruction. The Alianza
lost support while Peronists in Congress increased their opposition. President De la
Rúa’s political maneuvering proved largely ineffective, and his personal style alienated
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FREPASO and UCR support because he chose to insulate himself with close friends. As
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) threatened to withhold additional loans that were
necessary to keep the convertibility policy in place, political tensions and citizen fears
grew.

De la Rúa - The Fall
As with Alfonsín, De la Rúa’s fall presents a variety of the factors that were found
to be risk factors in the survival model. Minority legislative support, executive
wrongdoing, and prolonged recession were all identified as statistically significant. Even
though he was not personally involved in the scandal, he covered for a governing
coalition that was undermined by it. This perfect storm put De la Rúa at risk for failure.
However, the more important issue of Peronist opposition with strong mobilizing
capacity explains how the president was forced from office. The following discussion
will demonstrate the role of the Peronist Party in orchestrating the widespread street
opposition to the De la Rúa administration.
The Peronists effectively obstructed the Alianza in governance. They became
increasingly “combative” after the mid-term elections (Llanos, 2010, p. 64), and by midDecember, “…the Peronists used their majority in both congressional chambers to extend
the ordinary parliamentary sessions (in order to prevent de la Rúa from governing alone
during the summer) and to revoke the special faculties that Congress had extended to
Minister Cavallo eight months before” (Llanos, 2010, p. 65).
While the Peronists opposed the Alianza in the legislature, they mobilized base
units against De la Rúa’s government as well. All sides acknowledge the Peronists’
mobilizing capacity, but definitively identifying how the Peronists mobilized their base is
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difficult. The Peronist Party has never admitted to some grand conspiratorial
organization of protest activities, but a local Peronist activist acknowledged that
communication between various groups, organizations and other political parties
occurred. The goal of these meetings among these actors was to identify solutions to the
persistent problems that De la Rúa could not address (De Sario, personal interview,
2010). Other researchers have heard similar finely parsed statements from Peronist
politicians and local leaders about the party’s relationship to the looting and protests that
eventually drove De la Rúa to resign (Auyero, 2000; Auyero and Moran, 2007).
Likewise, the CGT hosted its seventh strike against De la Rúa on December 13, 2001,
which further threatened De la Rúa’s hold on power (Clarín, 12/13/01). This
combination of diffuse street opposition and concrete labor strikes heightened the
swirling chaos, although the involvement of the Peronists in organizing it is difficult to
pinpoint from their statements.
In contrast, the UCR sees clear Peronist responsibility for organizing the
conspiracy that forced its party leaders from office. The coordinator of the UCR’s
Institute of Public Policy for the Province of Buenos Aires stated with complete certainty
(“sin duda”) the presence of Peronist leaders in orchestrating the protest and looting
events in December of 2001 (C. Canievsky, personal interview, 2010). When questioned,
Canievsky asserts “All of it was organized.” He explains that Peronist leaders
orchestrated events, beginning with the looting and protesting in Rosario, and gathered
marginal sectors of society to create civil unrest that would destabilize the already
precarious De la Rúa government (C. Canievsky, personal interview, 2010). Alfonsín
describes these events in his book Memoria Política, and he notes the role of the Peronist
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vice-governor, explaining, “The deputy governor of the province of Santa Fe, Antonio
Vanrell (later indicted for corruption), knew very well what was happening, because
various groups associated with him had structured a very disciplined force in the slums,
through the work of carapintadas and provincial security” (2004, p. 147). Others agree
with this Radical perspective. The Secretary General of a local Partido Socialista
(Socialist Party) comuna generally agreed, saying, “When the PJ is not governing, there
can be no governing” (G. Traba, personal interview, 2010). He then acknowledged the
underlying assumption that the Peronists use their capacity to challenge opposition
presidents by any possible means (G. Traba, personal interview, 2010). When further
questioned about how to prove the Peronist’s role in driving De la Rúa from office, he
admonished me as an investigator and laughingly explained that the Peronists did not
leave a trail of their actions, and that this was not an episode of the television show “The
X Files” (G. Traba, personal interview, 2010). Although interviews provided no
confessions by PJ activists that they triggered lootings, the street-based opposition
created by the Peronist Party spun into a broader mobilization, at a minimum.
Whatever political figures say, the presence of Peronist organizational capacity
was visible at the base level in some ways in the 2001 collective food riots. The normal
channels by which food reached clients had broken down, given the economic crisis and
the non-Peronist president. Various brokers were clearly present at looting incidents and
recruited participants, with authorization or “tacit approval” from their Peronist patrons
(Auyero and Moran, 2007, p. 1357). The mobilizing capacity of the Peronist Party is
visible in the organization of looting activities, with flyers and word of mouth. Citing a
specific example, Auyero and Moran explain, “These flyers were distributed by members
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of the then-oppositional Peronist Party, some of them local officials, others well-known
grassroots leaders” (2007, p. 1351). Moreover, the brokers’ presence was reported in
newspaper accounts of many lootings (Auyero and Moran, 2007, p. 1351). These facts
support the argument that party brokers were instrumental figures in the collective
violence that emerged at the end of De la Rúa’s presidency.
Through these key pieces of information a more compelling story is told. First,
Peronists became obstructionist to the Alianza government and prevented it from
accomplishing any goals. This antagonized the administration, but it also heightened
public sentiment against the government’s lack of efficacy. This obstruction and
economic crisis created an intense situation by mid-December. Second, even Peronists
acknowledged the communication between the party and other civil society groups in
these protest-ridden days. De Sario, a Peronist party militant during the time, described
the party efforts to identify problems and work together to provide solutions for
Argentine citizens, acknowledging the base level communication that occurred between
local organizations (G. De Sario, personal interview, 2010). Third, other political parties
viewed the Peronist role as essential in the protests and riots. Fourth, other scholars have
shown the presence of Peronist organization and coordination in the looting and rioting of
the worst portions of 2001. Overall, these facts, taken together provide some
understanding of how the Peronists organized their base units to further oppose the De la
Rúa administration.
These riots and protests shattered the country in December 2001. Citizens
rejected the president, as well as all other political leaders in their chants of “Que se
vayan todos” (kick them all out). Protesters crowded the streets in front of the Casa
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Rosada and across the nation, banging pots in opposition. Tensions heightened when
looting broke out in various cities. Clarín describes the events of that day, noting, “The
resignation of Fernando de la Rúa surprised no one” (Clarín, December 21, 2001). The
article continues to discuss the tragic death of 25 and the wounding of 400 citizens
(Clarín, December 21, 2001). The combination of constant protest, legislative
opposition, destructive looting, and working class strikes proved too much for the
president. On December 20, De la Rúa announced his own resignation in response to the
resignation of key ministers and dramatic scenes of street protests in the Plaza de Mayo.
The Peronist mobilizing capacity succeeded in creating mass protests, and the failure of a
president gained international attention.

Rodríguez Saá – The Fall
De la Rúa’s fall did not ensure an immediate return to presidential stability.
Intraparty disputes prevailed, and the country transitioned through several presidents in
the course of a month. This investigation focuses only on the failure of Adolfo Rodríguez
Saá because he received a vote from the legislature to serve as president and the failure
occurred in the wake of the De la Rúa debacle. Other presidents in this timespan were
simply interim officeholders until the legislature could vote for a president to serve until
future elections were called. The Rodríguez Saá presidency is an interesting case of
failure because he was, himself, a Peronist. Despite this party affiliation, Rodríguez Saá
fell to the same Peronist opposition as De la Rúa and failed to complete his term in office.
As such, his experience suggests either that Peronists might have lost control of protesters
or that Rodríguez Saá’s betrayal of Peronist leaders placed him at the heart of an intra-
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party dispute. Support for this second argument is demonstrated in the events that led to
his failure.
Rodríguez Saá became president when he was voted into office by the legislature,
receiving only the votes of the Peronist bloc (Malamud, Forthcoming, p. 11). His support
from the Peronist bloc was based on his commitment to handing over power promptly.
Fourteen Peronist governors originally met in San Luis province to discuss the
presidential succession, and they split into two factions. After key meetings, the largest
faction agreed to the presidency of Rodríguez Saá (a governor and member of the smaller
faction), if he committed to calling elections in 2002 (Malamud, Forthcoming, 11).
After inauguration, Rodríguez Saá committed a variety of policy errors in less
than two weeks, including defaulting on the debt and appointing unpopular ministers.
Hostility still raged in the street regarding these financial issues. Alone, these factors
might have been enough to push him from office. However, Rodríguez Saá brought on
his own quicker demise when he pursued his own interest in completing De la Rúa’s
term, instead of fulfilling the promises to his party to hand over power. He created
enemies of the Peronist governors and legislators who had placed him in office
(Malamud, Forthcoming, 11). His financial missteps, along with Peronist hostility, led to
additional street protests, riots, and his subsequent resignation. The withdrawal of
Peronist governor support was matched with protest against Rodríguez Saá, resulting in
his subsequent resignation (Pérez-Liñán, 2007, pp. 180-181).
With Rodríguez Saá’s departure, the presidency returned to the head of the Senate
Ramon Puerta, who resigned from the Senate to avoid retaking the presidency. In order of
succession, the presidency then fell to the lower house’s Majority Leader, Eduardo

87

Camaño. He was able to leave office when a second legislative vote chose Eduardo
Duhalde. Duhalde was a Senator at the time and had been the previous governor of
Buenos Aires province. This vote crossed party lines, included Peronist, FREPASO, and
UCR support, and empowered Duhalde to serve out De la Rúa’s term. He received not
only the presidency, but he was provided the rest of De la Rúa’s term.
Duhalde’s success at gaining the presidency is the clearest indicator of Peronist
power. This is evident in the words of party outsiders, as a Socialist Party leader noted,
“Rodríguez Saá fell because he was outside the liking of the others [Peronists]. The one
who needed to be president was Duhalde” (G. Traba, personal interview, 2010, Italics
added). The CGT had originally favored Rodríguez Saá over Duhalde, and in his fall, a
CGT expert acknowledged that the regional support for Rodríguez Saá could not be
matched by the support Duhalde held within Buenos Aires (M. Gasparri, personal
interview, 2010). In other words, Rodríguez Saá could not oppose other Peronists’
power.
The fall of Rodríguez Saá is problematic and difficult to understand at best, as the
whole episode happened so quickly. I simply address this presidency because some
aspects of the case support the theory, even though a Peronist is removed from office. It
appears as though the mobilizing capacity of the Peronist Party was able to take down
this Peronist leader because street protest and legislative opposition coalesced when he
fell out of party leaders’ good graces. In this case, protest mobilization could have been
aggravated by betrayed governors. However, there are other potential hypotheses that
cannot be disproven. Peronists might have lost control of the mobilization efforts and
been unable to protect Rodríguez Saá. Perhaps Duhalde sought to pursue his own agenda
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and used his power with the piqueteros to maintain opposition to Rodríguez Saá. At the
very least, Rodríguez Saá’s fall shows some support for an argument that opposition from
his own party was matched with social mobilization, bringing his presidency to a quick
end.

Conclusion
A Communist Party official provided a stylized history of Argentine presidential
failure, saying, “When there is a big crisis, the UCR governs. Following the depth of the
crisis, the Peronists return. This is the history of Argentina. The Radicals are always
playing ‘hot potato’” (J. Kreyness, personal interview, 2010). The PJ takes advantage of
the UCR’s inability to resolve enormous problems in order to return to office and
increase their party’s political might. Repeatedly the UCR is caught holding the “hot
potato” of economic crisis, matched with political instability. This portrayal of Argentine
political history largely fits the statistical analysis of presidential failure, and is discussed
extensively in this case study of Argentine presidential failures. The UCR faces
conditions that are debilitating for presidents, which are exacerbated by the Peronist
opposition that uses them to mobilize support among its allies in society.
Like other failed presidents in the cross-national analysis, Argentina’s Alfonsín
and De la Rúa faced economic crisis and diminishing partisan support in the legislature.
Alfonsín struggled with hyperinflationary conditions and lost his lower house absolute
majority after midterm elections. Likewise, De la Rúa carried out untenable economic
policies upon inauguration and had his coalition fall around him. However, Alfonsín is
nearly unique in the cross-national dataset of fallen presidents in having no personal taint
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of corruption, although De la Rúa was coded for his involvement in a bribery scandal.
Both faced unusually large and persistent civil society mobilizations that – critically –
were joined by partisan allies in the PJ who both supported their protests and were able to
use their legislative positions to block effective governing. Strikes coordinated by the PJ
and CGT against Alfonsín made him unable to maintain order. Social mobilization, with
diverse citizen manifestations, drove de la Rúa from office. In both cases, the Peronists
obstructed legislative activities while promoting street based opposition.
The mobilization capacity of the Peronist Party is the essential explanation of how
repeated presidential failure occurs in Argentina. However, this mobilization capacity
differs over time. The Peronist linkages to traditional labor explained how Alfonsín
faced street opposition. Years later, the diffuse clientelist network fostered by Menem
was used to challenge De la Rúa. Finally, the fall of Peronist president Rodríguez Sáa
shows how a divided Peronist Party may challenge one of their own. Rodríguez Sáa
lacked full support from PJ, specifically the governors, faced the same activated base as
De la Rúa, and met the same demise.
In regard to future predictors of presidential failure in Argentina, the changing
climate of political parties may dislodge the firm hold the PJ has on labor groups and
neighborhood organizations. The fractures within the Peronist Party may allow for
opposition to emerge that might challenge current President Cristina Kirchner. However,
this change has yet to be fully realized. As it stands, the continued connection that the PJ
creates with its grassroots supporters stands as a natural threat against any other party
successfully completing a presidential mandate. This capacity to oppose presidents is a
top-down method of failure, as the legislative party builds street opposition to match its
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political behavior and ambitions. The deeply embedded nature of the Peronist Party
explains how this process moves from positions of power into the streets.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ECUADORIAN PRESIDENTIAL INSTABILITY14

The large presence of indigenous peoples defines Ecuador culturally and
historically. Whereas Argentine politics can be characterized by the persistent strength of
the Peronist Party and its subsequent clientelist tendencies, Ecuadorian politics has
maintained elitist traditions and featured historic exclusion of indigenous citizens from
the political sphere. Ecuador, an Andean country, has a large indigenous population that
has stood outside the traditional channels of power historically. This exclusion has made
social movements instrumental to political life because they provide a voice to otherwise
disregarded citizens. Social movements have increased indigenous organization and
participation over the past decades, and this shift is evident in Ecuadorian politics, from
political parties to institutions. Ecuador rewrote its constitution in 2008, and the
preamble of the document celebrates the importance of the Pacha Mama (Mother Earth).
This wording points explicitly to the inclusion of indigenous culture in creating new
institutional norms. It stands as a testament to the growing influence of the indigenous
movement, which was a driving force in the constitutional rewriting process.
Growth in social movement strength, specifically that of indigenous
organizations, has evolved over time, and this analysis intends to track that evolution and
its effect on presidential instability. Social movements, along with their capacity to
mobilize opposition, allow for the repeated occurrence of presidential failure in Ecuador.
Ecuadorian presidential failure moves from strong organizations towards politicians,
which differs inherently from the Peronist-powered opposition in Argentina. These civil
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society organizations are organizing structures for protest and presidential opposition,
pushing for legislative action in the face of widespread social unrest. First, I assess how
the indigenous movement grew, transformed over time, and finally, influenced the
likelihood of failure. The indigenous movement in Ecuador consists of several
organizations and distinct points of view, and this analysis does not intend to reduce it to
a solitary voice. While acknowledging the multifaceted nature of indigenous
mobilization, this study will focus on the largest organization, as it is most important in
regards to political influence. Second, I conduct process-tracing of the instances of
presidential failure by drawing from news and interview sources. Specifically, I access
news sources from Diario Hoy, El Universo, and Latin American Weekly Report and use
various secondary sources to verify this information. I also draw upon fieldwork and
interviews in Ecuador to explain the causes of presidential failure. I will show how the
ability of indigenous actors to build street and legislative opposition is instrumental to
presidential failure in two cases. Indigenous organizations do not have a monopoly on
such capacity, and the most recent case of failure shows how other groups drive failure,
even though indigenous groups were still involved.

Indigenous Groups’ Historical Foundation
Ecuador clearly has a large indigenous population, but identifying the exact
proportion of Ecuadorians that are indigenous is, in itself, a difficult task. The 2001
census has a low estimate of 6.6%, whereas an indigenous organization places it at
around 45% (Zamosc, 2007, p. 8; Becker, 2011b, p. 3). Most of the indigenous
population is in the highland and Amazonian regions of the country, with considerably
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smaller numbers in the coastal region. Additionally, many indigenous people have
moved to Quito and other urban areas in recent years (Van Cott, 2005, p. 101).
The social and political exclusion of the indigenous population has been a
consistent theme of Ecuadorian history, with indigenous peoples facing poverty and poor
social conditions up until the present day. During various historical periods, indigenous
groups formed to support specific goals or advocate for distinct policies. A rise in
indigenous organizations occurred in 1979 with the return to democracy, encouraged, in
some areas, by agrarian reform that was passed under the military dictatorship in the
1970’s (Zamosc, 2007, p. 9). Van Cott pointed to influence by the Catholic Church and
other groups in the 1970’s that increased the presence of leaders and organizational
capacity (Van Cott, 2005, p. 103-104). In 1986, various organizations finally coalesced
under an overarching organization, CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities
- Confederacion de nacionalidades indigenas del Ecuador), when delegates from 9
different nationalities met together (Becker, 2011b, p. 8). CONAIE was made up of
several indigenous organizations, representing different groups from the highlands
(Ecuarunari), the Amazon (CONFENIAE), and the coastal region (COICE) (Becker,
2011b, p. 8-9). These distinct currents influence the organization to this day. At its
inception, CONAIE focused on a variety of issues, including land gains, education
programs, discrimination and representation, economic development, health, as well as
acknowledgment of indigenous identity concerns, like language and medicinal issues
(Becker, 2011b, p. 9; Zamosc, 2007, p. 9). This umbrella organization emerged as the
largest funnel for indigenous concerns and quickly began asserting its strength. Other
organizations, including FENOCIN (La Confederación Nacional de Organazaciones
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Campesinas, Indígenas, y Negras) and FEINE (Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas
Evangélicos) exist as well (Becker, 2011b, p. 16-17). However, CONAIE stands as the
central indigenous organization in Ecuador and is a key facet to understanding social
mobilization in Ecuador.
After emerging in 1986, CONAIE began to channel indigenous discontent. The
organization focused attention on indigenous concerns, including plurinationality,
bilingual education, and agrarian land reform. Despite the growing strength of
indigenous organizations in the pursuit of these policies, the government failed to
adequately address indigenous issues (Becker, 2011b, p. 25). This struggle culminated in
1990 with a call for uprising, known as the levantamiento indígena de Inti Raymi – the
indigenous uprising of Inti Raymi (an indigenous festival). Leaders of CONAIE initiated
protests and roadblocks, which spread from the highlands in a decentralized manner
(Becker, 2011b, p. 25). These protest activities established negotiations with policy
makers, but they were broken off several times. Despite months of activity, the material
achievements of the uprising remain questionable (Becker, 2011b, p. 34). This uprising
serves two purposes for this case analysis. First, it demonstrates where the political
power of CONAIE lies – in engaging in non-traditional political action by mobilizing
mass protests. Second, the uprising defined the true emergence of indigenous voices in
mainstream Ecuadorian political life (Becker, 2011b, p. 32). Reflecting on the events of
1990, the president of Ecuarunari, Delfín Tenesaca, notes, “Before, they did not treat us
like human beings, and therefore we were struggling for the recognition of
plurinationality, which had not yet been applied in the country” (Diario Hoy, June 15,
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2010). This statement by an indigenous leader depicts the shift that resulted from this
event, as the protest itself gave indigenous people a place in Ecuadorian politics.
Two other protest efforts exemplify indigenous social movement strength in
Ecuador – The Caminata (March) and the Mobilization for Life (Movilización por la
Vida). In the Caminata, an Amazonian indigenous organization pursued greater
collective rights and autonomy for indigenous communities (Becker, 2011b, p. 34). The
lack of response, combined with governmental hostility, resulted in a march from Puyo to
Quito (Becker, 2011b), a 13-day trek from the lowlands into the Andes that was
performed by 5,000 protesters (Sawyer, 1997, p. 66). The march had been coordinated
by a lowland group, the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (Organización de
Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza – OPIP), but CONAIE and CONFENIAE provided support
(Sawyer, 1997, p. 68). This event captured the imagination of Ecuadorians, with urban
Quiteños applauding the participants due to the hardship of the trek and the national
imagery utilized by the groups (Sawyer, 1997, p. 66). Although they did not achieve all
their goals, these protesters left Quito victorious, as 1,115,175 hectares received
communal titling (Sawyer, 1997, p. 67). The other event, the Mobilization for Life,
occurred in 1994 as indigenous groups came together to oppose a proposed law that
would allow the government to sell or mortgage communal lands (Becker, 2011b, p. 36).
Different groups established roadblocks for 10 days of intensive, large-scale mobilization
(Becker, 2011b, p. 37). The Mobilization for Life did not alter policies, but it fostered
coalitions between indigenous organizations (Becker, 2011b, p. 37). These three events,
the levantamiento, the Caminata, and the Mobilization for Life, are central to scholar
acknowledgement of the “strength” of Ecuadorian indigenous movements, when
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compared to other South American countries (Becker, 2011b, p. 37). Despite the
inability to substantially change policy, in most if not all of these cases, these three events
show the roots of indigenous organizing in Ecuador (Becker, 2011b, p. 37). They depict
the utilization of protest as a mechanism to garner political attention, along with the
foundation for the organizational capacity that these groups have maintained over time.
The power and strength of CONAIE to use social mobilization to drive for
political change is unique. As with almost any grassroots movement, the problem lies in
catalyzing collective action, but CONAIE has relied heavily on indigenous communities
to draw out protesters. The communal nature of decision-making among Otavalo
indigenous communities is well documented (Korovkin, 2001), and it is this communal
decision-making among various indigenous communities that CONAIE relies upon for its
support. CONAIE calls upon communities to participate in mobilization efforts, and,
after a communal decision is reached, that decision is applicable to all community
members with various social enforcement mechanisms (Zamosc, 2007, p. 15). Zamosc
explains how this heightens CONAIE’s mobilizing capacity: “Thus, joining in a
mobilization is always the result of a decision of the community, which exerts its
influence to make sure that the members join in the roadblocks and rallies. The secret of
CONAIE’s power, then, lies in its ability to harness the resources for collective action
that exist in the Indian communities” (Zamosc, 2007, p. 16). In other words, CONAIE’s
organizational structure allows for decentralized support, but strong enforcement once
decisions are made. The collective nature of indigenous community decision-making
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explains why CONAIE have been so successful at protest mobilization, providing it with
enviably high participation in mass events15.
Indigenous organizations utilized these non-traditional methods of participation as
a matter of course, but there was greater ambiguity as to the role that indigenous
mobilization would play in political parties themselves. Through the early 1980’s,
indigenous organizations allied with Democratic Left (ID), PSE, Popular Democratic
Movement (MPD), and other leftist parties, as well as Democracia Popular, a center-right
one (Van Cott, 2005, p. 104). Until 1996, only one party, ID, listed indigenous autonomy
as a facet of its political platform (Van Cott, 2005, p. 105). Overall, relationships with
political parties were not highly beneficial to the indigenous cause. Indigenous citizens
oftentimes voted for leftist parties, lowering parties’ incentives to target indigenous
concerns (Van Cott, 2005, p. 105). More than that, alliances did not help indigenous
organizations because they felt mestizo leaders ignored them and parties used them for
their own designs (Van Cott, 2005, p. 105). These relationships exemplified the classic
inequality present within Ecuadorian society, as indigenous organizations, supported by
membership, failed to gain influence over their numerically weaker allies.
CONAIE could easily have been an indigenous movement that lacked broader
support, but other economic and social factors increased its visibility. CONAIE emerged
as a viable alternative, as labor movements were disintegrating in the wake of neoliberal
reform and established parties faced weakening support (Sánchez López and Freidenberg,
1998, p. 71). In 1990, CONAIE adopted a policy to refrain from electoral participation,
noting systemic flaws in Ecuadorian democracy (Becker, 2011b, p. 43). Over time,
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Survey analysis in Chapter Five identifies a significant relationship between indigenous identity and
protest participation. In addition, organizational affiliation is also significant.
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indigenous organizations grew divided regarding this policy, and many activists
questioned the utility of these actions. This division epitomizes the continued dispute
between regional subgroups of CONAIE, as CONAIE leaders opposed the viewpoints of
various smaller indigenous organizations within its body (Becker, 2011b, p. 44). In 1995,
the Amazonian organization, CONFENIAE, created an indigenous movement
Pachakutik, in opposition to the anti-political mandate from highland-led CONAIE.
They also formed a coalition with a broad-based social and labor movement, Movimiento
de Ciudadanos por un Nuevo País (New Country – NP) (Van Cott, 2005, p. 121). As a
consequence, CONAIE finally formed its own political movement, called Pluranational
Unity (Unidad Plurinacional) (Becker, 2011b, p. 45). The two indigenous political
movements merged and maintained their coalition with Nuevo País in 1996, forming the
Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational Unity (MUPP-NP), which is generally referred to
as Pachakutik (Becker, 2011b, p. 45; Van Cott, 2005, p. 121). Although reluctant to enter
into the political arrangement, CONAIE emerged as the strongest member of this
alliance. In describing this relationship, the former Vice President of CONAIE, Miguel
Guatemal, explains that “Pachakutik is an arm of CONAIE. It is not another organization
or other movement. It was born from CONAIE” (M. Guatemal, personal interview,
2009).
The multi-faceted alliance, the Coordinador de Movimientos Sociales
(Coordinator of Social Movements), created in 1995, created a backbone of support for
the Pachakutik (Becker, 2011b, p. 46). This alliance linked CONAIE, labor unions, and
other social movements together with this electoral movement (Andolina, 2003, p. 730).
Alliances with CONAIE are widespread, as the organization works with various
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indigenous groups and social movements, including women, labor, agricultural, and other
organizations (M. Guatemal, personal interview, 2009). These alliances, support, and
linkages are instrumental in understanding the future of Ecuadorian politics.
Since the emergence of CONAIE and other indigenous organizations, the strength
of these groups has waxed and waned, with increased strength during Bucaram and
Mahuad’s administration, as they opposed neoliberal reform. These changes will be
further discussed in this chapter. After Bucaram’s failure, the indigenous movement
successfully achieved constitutional change that acknowledged many indigenous rights,
including collective land rights (Andolina, 2003, p. 747-748). However, in the wake of
the Gutiérrez failure, CONAIE and Pachakutik faced declining strength as many
Pachakutik politicians were viewed skeptically for participating in the Gutiérrez
administration (Zamosc, 2007, p. 22). CONAIE faced internal upheaval as opposition to
Gutiérrez exacerbated the divides between the various organizations that make up the
umbrella organization as well as other indigenous organizations (Zamosc, 2007, p. 15).
As a result, a distancing occurred between CONAIE and Pachakutik, as the organization
attempted to regain support. CONAIE reasserted its ability to coordinate social
mobilization, opposing various neoliberal issues, including free trade agreements
(Becker, 2011b, p. 95). This time period demonstrated that CONAIE maintained the key
source of the indigenous movement’s power. Although Pachakutik struggled politically,
CONAIE reestablished itself as a voice for indigenous concerns, wielding its mass-based
power (Becker, 2011b, p. 95).
Despite this, indigenous organizations have achieved considerable gains since
then. The Correa administration heeded the call for a constituent assembly, with many
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indigenous goals being included in the constitutional rewrite. Plurinationality was
acknowledged, but the social movements engaged in debates regarding what these terms
meant and how the government would implement them (Becker, 2011a). More than that,
many indigenous politicians joined Correa’s party, pursuing greater voice in the rewriting
process while diminishing Pachakutik’s strength (Becker, 2011a, p.50). Since this
rewriting, Correa has consolidated his, and his party’s, power following his re-election.
Correa acknowledged the importance of indigenous rights, but may have a different
perspective than CONAIE and other organizations intended (Trujillo, 2010, p. 21). This
has created greater tension between the government and indigenous organizations.
Pachakutik has stood against Correa’s decisions that pursue economic development over
environmental protections, but they failed to provide a viable alternative to the president
(Trujillo, 2010, p. 19). Pachakutik has been seeking stronger ties with other political
parties, like MPD (Trujillo, 2010, p. 18), but the power that was once exerted by social
movements has been overtaken to some degree by Correa’s infectious populist style.
This condensed historical account demonstrates the sources of strength
indigenous of social movements in Ecuador, as these groups built strong communal
support before taking on electoral participation. As we will see, this strength translated
into the ability to remove presidents, repeatedly.

Cases of Presidential Failure in Ecuador
When asked about presidential instability in Ecuador, ex-president Lucio
Gutiérrez describes the causes of presidential failure by noting non-traditional actors,
saying, “There is a lack of political maturity among Ecuadorian political actors,” and as a
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result mobilizations against presidents were able to take advantage of poor economic
decisions by the government (L. Gutiérrez, personal interview, 2009). These statements
get at the heart of presidential failure in Ecuador. For this immature democracy, the path
of failure moves from strong organizations towards politicians, which will be
demonstrated through the following cases of failure. The following sections depict three
instances of presidential failure – the cases of Presidents Bucaram, Mahuad, and
Gutiérrez. Their failures show the role of these social movements in cementing
opposition, building relationships, and challenging presidents. Additionally, I look at one
challenge against President Correa as an instance in which the possibility of presidential
failure could have occured but did not. Each case is unique, but all demonstrate the role
of social movements in driving presidential failure.
The quantitative chapter presents various risk factors for failure, and these
presidents share many of the same conditions. Their specific failures will be discussed in
detail, but these similarities can be discussed briefly. Given the institutional design of
Ecuadorian politics, all of the presidents are at risk from institutional factors. Presidents
Bucaram, Mahuad, Gutiérrez, and Correa16 (first term) received less than a majority of
the first round initial popular vote. All of the presidents had legislative minority status
for their party as well (minority legislative support). These conditions place Ecuadorian
presidents in a weakened position. To be fair, every president since the return to
democracy has faced these same institutional constraints, whether failed or not.
Presidents Bucaram, Mahuad, and Gutiérrez were all identified as complicit in executive
wrongdoing and facing extensive social protest. Although each faced economic hurdles,
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Correa did receive a majority in the first round for his 2009 and 2013 re-elections (Psephos
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/).
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they did not face any of the fears identified in the quantitative analysis. Inflation with
GDP deflator never rose over 11% for any of the years of these presidents’ terms, and no
year was coded positively for prolonged recession. On the other hand, each did pursue
some aspect of neoliberal reform over the course of his presidency. These risk factors
appear for each of the Ecuadorian presidents, but the following discussion will show the
instrumental nature of civil protest and minority legislative support in driving failure.

A Crazy Man
In 1996, President Abdalá Bucaram was elected with 54% of the vote. He
originally only received 26% of the initial popular vote, losing the first round of voting to
Jaime Nebot, a wealthy statesman (http://www.observatorioelectoral.org). An outsider to
the traditional Quito elite, Bucaram was from Guayaquil, the coastal economic center of
the country. This distinction may appear unimportant, but the implications of this
dynamic explain many of the obstacles that the president quickly faced. Initially,
Bucaram received intense media scrutiny, as various outlets and elites criticized the
president’s style as “flamboyant” (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 26). The president also
antagonized opposition leaders instead of seeking compromise within the government,
heightening discontent with his leadership style (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 26). As PerézLiñán notes, these critiques arguably stemmed from the class attitudes of the Quito elite
(Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 26). These issues became conflated to challenge presidential
authority, as de la Torre describes:
For the first time in the history of the country, the most prestigious newspapers
and television news shows opposed a president. They questioned his unorthodox
and flamboyant style, his authoritarian appropriation of the people’s will, and the
impossibility of having dialogues in which different opinions could be voiced.
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Journalists were at the forefront of a democratic opposition to Bucaram when they
denounced corruption and rejected his mass entertainment-based antipolitics.
Their democratic challenges coexisted with upper-class prejudices that saw
Bucaram as the incarnation of mass popular culture and as a shame to the
country’s civility (de la Torre 1999, p. 566).
His personal style, matched with regional divides, explains many of the complaints of
Bucaram’s indecorous behavior and provides a foundation for the immediate problems
the president faced.17
In addition to the more superficial concerns about Bucaram’s style, there were
more serious questions regarding his ability to govern. His administration was plagued by
corruption allegations after serving less than three months in office. The administration
faced repeated scandals in the forms of ministerial misconduct, opposition strong-arming,
and customs and public official corruption (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 25-26). By 1997, the
US Ambassador publicly criticized the nepotistic, corrupt practices of the administration
(Andolina, 2003, p. 731; Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 26). Also contributing to civil and
political unrest, Bucaram’s government faced problems in economic policy
implementation. Although he ran on a populist, anti-oligarchy agenda (de la Torre, 1999,
p. 560), Bucaram slowly moved toward neoliberal economic policies (neoliberal reform),
as well as proposing a “convertibility” plan based on Argentina’s model (Peréz-Liñán,
2007, p. 25-27). This mixture of populist rhetoric with neoliberal concessions heightened
the power of the opposition because Bucaram’s waffling between the two positions
continued until his approval ratings were sufficiently low to prevent support for the
subsequent harsh economic policies (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 25-27). These three features
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Examples of Bucaram’s “flamboyant” political style include “mocking” his political opponents (PerézLiñán, 2007, p. 26). He eschewed more formal apparel for jeans (de la Torre, 1999, p. 561). He used song
and dance to gain public attention and support (de la Torre, 1999, p. 561). Perhaps most famously,
Bucaram recorded an album, El Loco que Ama (“the crazy one who loves”) (de la Torre, 1999, p. 565).
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– personal gaffes, administrative corruption, and unpopular neoliberal policy
implementation – coalesced for the Bucaram government within six months in the form
of media outrage, citizen protest, and legislative opposition. It was these last two
components, protest and legislative opposition, that led to his removal.
Protests were organized by various indigenous organizations and social
movements by fall of 1996, and elite opposition shortly followed (Andolina, 2003, p.
731). This opposition only increased by January 1997, and US Ambassador Leslie
Alexander officially criticized the government on January 29, which Peréz-Liñán
suggests to be “tacit support for the antigovernment movement” (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p.
27). A combination of social movements, indigenous organizations, and trade unions
formed the “Patriotic Front” which planned a large protest and general strike to be held
on February 5, 1997 (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 27). Although the actual attendance figures
are questionable, the evocative image of two million Ecuadorans filling the streets of
Quito characterizes all descriptions of Bucaram’s last days in office (Peréz-Liñán, 2007,
p. 27). A news report notes that protesters chanted, “Sucre by sucre, we are saving a
heap, to buy the resignation of the crazy thief18” (Diario Hoy, February 6, 1997). Public
outcry continued for Bucaram’s removal from office, and Congress called for an
emergency session. Bucaram was charged with mental incapacity, which lacked any true
diagnosis or support, and he was removed from office by a simple majority vote, instead
of the supermajority needed for an impeachment (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, pp. 27-28).
Bucaram eventually fled the country to avoid corruption charges, residing in exile in
Panama (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 28).

18

In Spanish this chant is more lyrical, saying: “de sucre en sucre hagamos un montón para comprar la
renuncia del loco ladrón.”
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The activities of indigenous organizations were crucial to Bucaram’s failure. The
marching protesters were largely convened by CONAIE and labor unions (Peréz-Liñán,
2007, p. 27). CONAIE’s former Vice-President, Miguel Guatemal, describes the
organization’s role, saying, “We did a national uprising, for all the country,” and then
explains how the organization cut off production to the city of Quito, eliminating the food
supply that came from indigenous communities, which pushed citizens to oppose the
government (M. Guatemal, personal interview, 2009). He notes that this left the
government with a simple decision, “The city had to support the organization, and the
government had to accept the proposals. If the government did not accept the proposals,
then it had to leave” (M. Guatemal, personal interview, 2009). When asked if the
CONAIE were in contact with Pachakutik during these types of struggle, Guatemal notes
that Pachakutik members are subject to the communal decision-making of CONAIE, and
in each case of failure, they were in dialogue (M. Guatemal, personal interview, 2009).
While these protests were occurring in the streets, negotiations to remove
Bucaram were occurring in the legislature. On the day of his removal, Pachakutik
members were making suggestions at around 11:00 A.M. as to who should be the new
president, even though the vote against Bucaram did not occur until many hours later
(Diario Hoy, February 7, 1997). The Pachakutik ultimately acted strategically, and these
negotiations resulted in their party exchanging support for Fabián Alarcón, the legislative
leader, for the later constituent assembly (Becker, 2011b, p. 57). In addition, Diario Hoy
notes the presence of the CMS (Coordinator of Social Movements), leading protest
activities and occupying the Metropolitan Cathedral of Quito (Diario Hoy, February 6,
1997). The CMS can be viewed as another link between indigenous organizations,
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protesters, labor unions, and political parties. When viewed through the framework of a
bottom-up struggle, the linkages between these organizations define the outcome.
CONAIE and CMS promoted large-scale protests, creating that mythic description of
protesters in the city. Linked by organizational capacity, legislative opposition was
determining the manner in which to most efficiently remove president Bucaram.

A Questionable Coup
The subsequent elected president, Jamil Mahuad, faced the same problem in
completing his term in office, even though he was removed through different
mechanisms. The Mahuad failure shows the most explicit presence of communication
between social movements and governmental organizations, largely the military, but
political parties as well. Elected and inaugurated in 1998, Mahuad stepped into office in
the midst of severe economic crisis and immediately faced corruption allegations. Rapid
closing of banks, high rates of unemployment, increasing recession, and IMF reform
pressures characterized this time period. Zamosc explains how declining oil prices,
matched with climate-related problems in shrimp and banana exportation, prevented
loans from being paid, led to devastating bank closures, and created immense capital
flight (Zamosc, 2007, p. 12). Although Mahuad fought to preserve support from his
party, the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), he was left in an “untenable” position, as the
IMF pushed its conditions in stabilization policies (Zamosc, 2007, p. 12). In an attempt
to resolve these problems, Mahuad instituted banking freezes, and, during his last days,
proposed the country’s dollarization. The dollarization plan was resisted by indigenous
groups, as well as urban workers, who would be hit hard by the currency change (Becker,
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2011b, p. 67-68). Mahuad’s inability to resist the pressure from various political and
economic sectors, while facing an increasing hostile citizenry, created a perfect storm for
his subsequent challenge.
Mahuad faced repeated protests in 1998 and 1999, but his dollarization proposal
sparked intense unrest with large street protests, consisting largely of indigenous
organizations and military factions, along with union and middle-class supporters. On
January 21, 2000 these indigenous and military groups took over the Congress building.
After extending their takeover to the Supreme Court and the Presidential Palace, Mahuad
was forced to flee, and Lucio Gutiérrez, a junior-ranking military officer, and Antonio
Vargas, the president of CONAIE, announced the creation of a triumvirate, called the
National Salvation Front (Beck and Mijeski, 2001, pp. 1-2). Retrospectively, Gutiérrez
cites the “ethical” and “political” nature of the effort and highlights the role of the
military, noting, “We acted in defense of the people (pueblo)” (L. Gutiérrez, personal
interview, 2009). Before assuming any responsibility, Gutiérrez was quickly replaced by
a higher ranking general and defense minister (Becker, 2011b, p. 68). The junta that
came into power consisted of the military’s General Mendoza, a former Supreme Court
Justice, and CONAIE-president Vargas, thereby taking into account the key actors in the
presidential challenge (Beck and Mijeski, 2001, pp. 1-2). Becker notes that Mendoza
immediately resigned from the junta, forcing its collapse in the light of international
pressure (2011b, p. 68). The time period was characterized by hectic negotiations
between national and international actors, and eventually indigenous leaders called for
the suspension of protest activities (Zamosc, 2007, p. 13).
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The importance of indigenous organizations in Mahuad’s failure is explicit. The
large protests against Mahuad that opposed dollarization were organized and carried out
by CONAIE. Days before the removal, CONAIE had called for a levantamiento
(uprising) (Lucero, 2001). Over 10,000 protesters arrived in Quito, and they were aided
by military personnel, who helped make bridges to cross barbed wire (Lucero, 2001, p.
63). As with the previous presidential failure, Pachakutik acquired political might from
this process. The party was victorious in gaining provincial and municipal seats in the
May 2000 election (Becker, 2011b, p. 71). When questioning a Pachakutik leader about
the party’s role in all of these failures, he expresses the party’s involvement in each,
noting, “When we are not listened to, when we are not understood in regards to
diversity...because of this, the mobilizations of the indigenous sector and the
plurnacionality and the campesinos has lived, and we have participated actively in all
[mobilizations]” (J. Guamán, personal interview, 2009). More than that, this depicts the
bottom-up nature of presidential failure in Ecuador, even as CONAIE pursued linkages
with other groups, in this case – the military – to achieve their goals. The linking of
indigenous organizations and military personnel may appear odd, but various scholars
have noted that CONAIE formed relationships with lower-level colonels, which explains
why some of their interests fell in line (Lucero, 2001, p. 65-66; Becker, 2011b, p. 69).
These military personnel would not have been from elite families and may have been
influenced by the recent leftist victory of Chavez in Venezuela (Lucero, 2001, p. 65). In
sum, the unification of these two groups was beneficial in achieving their aims.
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A Deserter
The next failure is the weakest example of how civil society relationships set the
stage for presidential challenge, although it does provide some support due to CONAIE’s
involvement. The next elected president and previous coup participant Lucio Gutiérrez
also failed to complete his term in office. Gutiérrez came to office in 2002 after founding
his own political party, the Partido Socialista Patriotica (PSP), and forming an alliance
with the Pachakutik Party. These two parties joined forces after Pachakutik decided not
to run their own candidate. With Gutiérrez receiving much of the indigenous support, the
Pachakutik-PSP alliance appeared logical, especially in the wake of Mahuad’s ousting
(Becker, 2011b, p. 79). Pachakutik received four ministerial positions from the alliance
(Becker, 2011b, p. 84). Despite his early support, Gutiérrez shortly faced problems
within his administration, from corruption and embezzlement allegations to unpopular
policy implementation. Whereas he had fostered the image of a populist, grassroots
leader in the aftermath of Mahuad’s fall, Gutiérrez transitioned towards business-friendly,
neoliberal policies and favored IMF-supportive business leaders over Pachakutik
compatriots for ministerial positions (Zamosc, 2007, p. 14). As a result, he implemented
unpopular economic policies in order to assuage IMF pressure, among other reasons.
Starting in April 2003, various indigenous groups, with initial defector
Ecuarunari, broke their alliance with Gutiérrez (Becker, 2011b, p. 86). Gutiérrez made
some concessions to other organizations, but CONAIE and Pachakutik officially broke
with the administration in August 2003 (Becker, 2011b, p. 87). Gutiérrez tried to
maintain power by fostering his alliances with Amazonian indigenous groups and other
political parties, specifically the PSC (Zamosc, 2007, p. 14). However, these disputes
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came to a head as Gutiérrez faced impeachment charges for bribing legislators and
exchanging PSC party support for assurance of exiled President Bucaram’s return.
Although he avoided impeachment, Gutiérrez followed this event by reorganizing the
Supreme Court to eliminate charges against ex-President Bucaram (Zamosc, 2007, p. 15).
This combination of weakened alliances, personal corruption, and dictatorial power grabs
resulted in intense citizen outrage.
This growing discontent resulted in large-scale protests in the streets of Quito in
April 2005. These protests were characterized by the appearance of what Gutiérrez
called “forajidos” (outlaws) who protested in opposition of the government (Bruneau,
2006, p. 4). Gutiérrez called for a state of emergency after more than a week of protest.
As protesters disobeyed the president’s order, General Aguas of the military refused to
enforce the state of emergency. On April 20, 2005, a special session of Congress
removed the president from office by voting that he had “abandoned his post” (Bruneau,
2006, p. 5). Immediately thereafter, Admiral Víctor Hugo Rosero, the head of the
Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, withdrew all support from the president “to
receive the will of the people” (El Universo, April 20, 2005). President Gutiérrez refused
to resign in the midst of protest and was eventually helicoptered off of the presidential
mansion while protesters swarmed outside. With a warrant issued for his arrest,
Gutiérrez fled the country, and presidential power transferred to the vice president
(Bruneau, 2006, p. 5).
The power of indigenous organizations was broken by this presidency because,
early on, they had entered into alliance with the government. Even after CONAIE and
Pachakutik withdrew their support, CONFENIAE, the Amazonian indigenous
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organization, and other organizations refused to separate from the government. CONAIE
called for protests in February and June of 2004, but various groups refused to answer
CONAIE’s pleas. Gutiérrez had successfully built an alliance with the indigenous
movement and then neutralized its ability to threaten him (Zamosc, 2007, p. 15). The
protests that finally devastated Gutiérrez stemmed largely from his need to make new
alliance partners, trading political favors to gain new political allies. Protesters took to
the streets in opposition, but CONAIE and other indigenous organizations were late to
take part in the protest activities (Zamosc, 2007, p. 15). Although many scholars see this
as a sign of weakness on the part of CONAIE, the previous Vice President of CONAIE
tells a different story. Guatemal still describes CONAIE as having played an
instrumental role in these protests. He explains that the betrayal of Gutiérrez by
Pachakutik ministers led to eventual CONAIE resistance. More than that, CONAIE acted
in tandem with other social movements in Quito that would drive Gutiérrez from office.
He explains, “In that case, what we did was meet with all the social sectors, giving birth
to the forajidos of Quito…We met together and led a march on Quito” (M. Guatemal,
personal interview, 2009). Despite this assertion, it cannot be understated that other
groups and parties acted, with ID explicitly participating in the mobilizations (J. Pérez,
personal interview, 2009). Likewise FENOCIN (La Confederación Nacional de
Organazaciones Campesinas, Indígenas, y Negras) participated in all the removals of
presidents (P. Quimiamba, personal interview, 2009). CONAIE attempted to reframe
itself in the wake of the Gutiérrez failure. CONAIE distanced itself from several
Pachakutik politicians who had served under the Gutiérrez administration (Pallares, 2003,
p. 25). Overall, the Gutiérrez failure shows again the importance of protest and civil
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society organizations linked with political opposition, but also suggests that the
indigenous organizations themselves had changed, and their role had become more
complex.
The Opposite of Failure?
In spite of these most recently elected presidents that failed to complete their
terms in office, the current Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa successfully completed a
first term and was re-elected in 2009 (and again in 2013). Emerging as a candidate in the
2006 election, Correa founded the Alianza País political party, which espoused a leftist
political agenda. During the election, Correa proposed a constituent assembly to rewrite
the country’s constitution, and he followed through with that proposition after winning
the election and stepping into office, despite the fact that he had to engage in a protracted
conflict with Congress to achieve the reform. The newly written constitution required an
additional election for the presidency and legislature, and, in 2009, Correa was re-elected
in the first round of voting.
Despite his success in completing one term and winning re-election, Correa has
faced numerous problems within his presidency. First, he has repeatedly encountered
conflict and filed lawsuits against Ecuadorian media, claiming libelous actions by
journalists and news sources. Second, he has faced declining support from indigenous
organizations. These organizations had originally supported his presidency, with many
Pachakutik party members running for office as members of Alianza País. However,
increased criticism of his land and water policies has resulted in protest activities from
these groups (LAWR, 29 March 2012, WR-12-13). Third, Correa has already proposed
and passed 10 changes to the newly-created constitution in a 2011 referendum vote.
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Although these alterations received citizen support, questions have arisen as to whether
these changes increase presidential power for the worse. In sum, Correa has achieved
success in a manner that recent Ecuadorian presidents have not – in the form of continued
popular support and winning re-election.
Despite his ability to navigate around the issue of presidential failure, Correa did
face a presidential challenge on September 30, 2010. After the proposal of a new public
service law that arguably reduced bonuses and altered promotion guidelines,
approximately 800 police occupied their Quito headquarters, Regimiento Quito 1, while
100 police and air force personnel blocked the Quito airport (Latin American Weekly
Report (LAWR), 14 October 2010, WR-10-41). President Correa attempted to negotiate
with Quito police at their main barracks, but, after hours of discussion, the dispute led to
tear gas explosions (LAWR, 07 October 2010, WR-10-40). Correa was removed to a
nearby hospital by his security personnel, due to concerns of asphyxiation and damage to
the president’s knee (Diario Hoy, October 3, 2010). Rebellious police factions refused to
allow him to leave (LAWR, 07 October 2010, WR-10-40).
From this position, he declared a state of emergency, claimed an attempted coup
d’etat was in process, and affirmed that he would leave “either as a president or a corpse”
(LAWR, 07 October 2010, WR-10-40). In support of Correa, General Ernesto González,
head of the Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, declared that the military was
still subordinate to the president and called on rebellious police, as well as civil society
and military factions, to subside (Latin American Security & Strategic Review (LASSR),
September 2010). Loyal military and police forces engaged with rebels in front of the
hospital, and supporters gathered behind a wall of tear gas. The OAS made a statement
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in opposition to “any attempt to alter democratic institutionality in Ecuador” (LASSR,
September 2010). The United Nations and Unasur (Union of South American Nations)
also denounced the event (LAWR, 07 October 2010, WR-10-40). Correa was eventually
extracted by an elite army and police force and immediately replaced all high-ranking
police personnel. During this event, civilian support lay largely with the president, and
the president later blamed opposition forces’ role, specifically that of Lucio Gutiérrez, in
the aftermath of the conflict.
Correa’s situation is different from the other presidents on several fronts. First,
Correa engaged with the police, moving to their headquarters when he addressed the
issue of dissension. Second, military, legislative, and popular support remained with him,
even though some police and military factions opposed him. This presidential challenge
lacks most, if not all, of the facets of previous instances of presidential failure, as mass
outpouring of support welcomed Correa. The president has also used this event as a
celebration, creating national unity around his success at thwarting coup-like intentions.

Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the influence of social movements on presidential
failure. Indigenous organizations have led challenges to presidents. More than that,
other social movements emulated the efforts of indigenous groups and pushed for
Gutiérrez’s ouster when indigenous groups lacked sufficient organizational capacity.
Unlike the Argentine case, this is a story about bottom-up presidential opposition, as
leaders are challenged from below, for good cause. CONAIE views its power as residing
in the community, which even a Pachakutik leader acknowledges, “We believe that the
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construction of power is from below, not from above” (J. Guamán, personal interview,
2009).
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CHAPTER FIVE: INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS OF
PROTEST PARTICIPATION

As demonstrated in earlier chapters, social protest has been instrumental for
understanding the early removal and resignation of South American presidents in the
years after transitions to democratic politics. News reports describe citizens taking to the
streets in opposition to elected presidents, from Ecuador to Bolivia to Argentina. In
Ecuador, reporters describe the 2005 removal of President Lucio Gutiérrez, the third
elected president to be removed from office consecutively:
Hours after the president said he would not resign, at least 30,000 people tried to
march to the presidential palace in the capital's largest demonstration yet against
the country's leadership, demanding that Gutiérrez leave office….The military,
which under the state of emergency was charged with maintaining public order,
was not visible on the streets as thousands of people disobeyed the decree and
staged a peaceful demonstration, punctuated by honking horns and shouts of
“Lucio Out!” and “Democracy yes, dictatorship no!” (NotiSur, Ecuador: Congress
Removes President Lucio Gutiérrez, 4/22/2005).
Moreover, citizens have staged massive social protests when they demanded the removal
of Argentine President Fernando de la Rúa and Bolivian President Gonzalo (Goní)
Sánchez de Lozada, among others.
With the previous analyses of presidential failure assessing the cross-national and
country-level causes, this turns to the question of individual-level determinants of protest
participation: why do individual citizens take to the streets as a unified front? I analyze
results from two surveys in countries with repeated instances of presidential failure to
identify whether individual demographics, organizational linkages, or political attitudes
increase the likelihood of protest involvement. One survey was administered shortly
after the 2005 failure of Ecuadorian President Gutiérrez, the last of three elected
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presidents to be forced out of office before the end of their terms (excluding current
President Correa). The second survey asked Argentines about their protest activities
around the 1989 failure of Argentine President Alfonsín, the first Argentine president to
suffer from this phenomenon. I evaluate whether existing explanations of contentious
behavior, focused on social linkages and individual characteristics, can explain protest in
these contexts. Following a hunch inspired by the Argentine and Ecuadorian cases, I ask
whether participation in civil society organizations increases the likelihood that
individuals will participate in protest, and if so, which kinds of organizations are
associated with greater protest. I also test whether political attitudes and beliefs promote
individual participation in mass protests. Finally, I control for whether demographic
factors contribute to protest, including indigenous identification. Using multivariate logit
analysis, this chapter identifies what factors contribute to individual protest participation
in countries with repeated presidential failure19.
This study adapts other scholars’ measures, mostly used to analyze developed
countries, to understand protest in Argentina and Ecuador. Many scholars have looked
only at mass mobilization in the United States (Schussman and Soule, 2005; Somma,
2009; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995) or other advanced industrial democracies
(Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst, 2005) to assess reasons for protest participation.
Scholars who have investigated this phenomenon in countries with varying levels of
democracy find that protesting citizens have different demographics and attitudes
depending on whether they live in high and low level democracies. Norris finds that
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This chapter looks specifically at the causes of protest in Ecuador and Argentina, due to their repeated
presidential failures. These restrictions in the analysis limit the empirical conclusions that can be drawn by
this study, and additional investigation is needed to include other years and countries.
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protest is most common in consolidated democracies and wealthier countries (Norris,
2002, p. 198). Klesner looks at four Latin American countries and finds that individuals
in Chile and Argentina met the participation expectations of other consolidated
democracies while Mexico and Peru did not (Klesner, 2007, p. 29). By comparing the
reasons that Argentine and Ecuadorian citizens protest, I hope to identify the
commonalities in citizen protest participation between these two countries with repeated
presidential failure. This chapter will attempt to mirror previous studies to achieve some
degree of external validity, but I recognize (and expect) that Argentina and Ecuador may
be different20. Protest participation will be assessed through analysis of different types of
variables, lying within the following three standard categories: 1) demographic
availability, 2) organizational linkages, and 3) political attitudes.

Demographic Availability
Biographical features, from race and age to income and education, influence the
probability of protest participation. These are the personal characteristics of individuals
that increase or decrease the likelihood that a person will brave the risk of participating in
protest activities. Norris emphasizes “that social and demographic inequalities – based
on educational qualifications, socioeconomic status, gender, and age – lead to inequalities
in other civic assets, such as skills, knowledge, experience, time, and money” (Norris,
2002, p. 88). I incorporate these common demographic variables, as well as some others
that have proven significant in the literature, including age, gender, education, and
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Although this study draws from other scholars on protest in various countries, I only compare the
countries of Ecuador and Argentina. I am asking specifically, what drives protest in countries with
repeated presidential failure. I examine years directly after failure to try to capture this effectively. Future
study may involve analysis of more countries in the wake of failure.

119

income, and ethnicity (specifically indigenous background). In sum, demographic
availability assesses which personal characteristics reduce constraints on individual
participation, allowing individuals to commit time and assume risk.
Existing literature has produced contradictory findings even on these simple
demographic variables. For instance, Norris finds the relationship between protest
participation and age to be curvilinear, with the young and the old being less likely to
have participated in a single protest act in their lifetime (Norris, 2002, p. 202). When
looking at protest in the past 12 months, Schussman and Soule find that younger
individuals are more likely to report protest (Schussman and Soule, 2006, p. 1089), which
is supported by McAdam (1992). These differences may result from the wording of the
question because, over their lifetime, older citizens simply face more opportunity to
participate. However, if the question is looking at participation in the past year, older
citizens may be less willing to take to the streets than younger citizens. The questions in
my surveys ask respondents if they have ever protested, making older citizens more likely
to respond affirmatively. For this reason, I argue that, given the wording of the question,
the older an individual, the greater the likelihood that they have participated in protest.
H1b: The older an individual, the higher the likelihood that the individual
participated in acts of social contention (authorized demonstrations, unauthorized
demonstrations, blocking traffic, participating in looting, or occupying land,
buildings or factories).
In some works, scholars have argued that male citizens are more likely to take
risks in protest activities, and that, although women do participate politically, protests in
the streets are generally perceived as a more male-dominated forum for political
expression. From an American perspective, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady find that even
though men participate more than women in a variety of ways, there is no statistical
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difference in protest participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995, p. 256).
Similarly, Klesner finds that gender is not significant in explaining participation in
boycotts, demonstrations, strikes, or occupations in four Latin American countries or in
Argentina specifically (Klesner, 2007, p. 24). On the other hand, Norris notes that there
is a slight gender gap across 80 countries, with men more likely to acknowledge that they
had protested at some point in their lives (Norris, 2002, p. 201).
With these findings in mind, I still expect that male citizens may participate at
higher rates in Ecuador and Argentina. Even through Klesner (2007) finds that Argentine
women are protesting at statistically the same rate as men in 2001, my investigation looks
at 1991 in this country, immediately after the return to democracy. For that reason, I
expect that women will still be at a statistically lower rate of protest participation, which
supports Klesner’s findings for Peru and Mexico (2007). Moreover, I expect that women
in Ecuador should also have this lower rate due to the lower levels of democracy and the
historic exclusion of women in that country. For Ecuador, women’s movements
mobilized and emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Lind, 2005, p. 4). Nonetheless,
I expect that there will still be a slight gender gap by 2002 when asking women about
their protest participation throughout their lives.
H2b: Males are more likely to have participated in social contention.
I expect to find a relationship between protest participation and the demographic
characteristics of income and education. First, the greater an individual’s education level,
the more likely he or she may be to protest. While demographic characteristics can
constrain an individual’s behavior, increased education is a resource that contributes to
participation, as seen in Brady, Schlozman, and Verba (1999, p. 158). Aside from being
a simple resource, education also provides valuable civic skills and affects views of civic
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responsibility (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995, p. 280; Klesner, 2007, p. 10).
Regardless of reason, I assume that increased education will be matched with protest
participation. Much of the literature links socioeconomic status with this idea as well.
Not only should richer people be less constrained in their participation, but they should
have more resources and civic skills needed to participate (Klesner, 2007, p. 10; Verba,
Schlozman, Brady, and Nie, 1993, pp. 466-467). Traditionally, the literature has shown
this relationship over and over again. Based on these arguments, this study will also
investigate if richer citizens are more likely to protest due to civic skills and resource
availability.
H3b: The higher an individual’s education level, the higher the likelihood that the
individual participated in acts of social contention.
H4b: The better an individual’s personal economic situation, the greater the
likelihood that the individual participated in acts of social contention.
Like other arguments about protest participation, the role of race/ethnicity must be
accounted for in the model because group exclusion can drive individuals to seek
improved conditions, especially through contentious political acts. In the literature on
American protest, scholars have analyzed protest participation between different
race/ethnic groups, specifically Anglo-Americans, African Americans, and Latinos. For
example, Verba, Scholzman, and Brady show that African Americans have higher rates
of protest participation, stemming from the historical importance of protest in the
American civil rights movement (1995, p. 235). This differentiation within American
protest participation between a privileged majority group and an underprivileged minority
group is not mirrored globally, but an examination of race/ethnicity in this analysis is still
necessary.
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Indigenous citizens, as part of a previously underrepresented group, may also be
more prone to act contentiously, especially since protest has been one of the tools for
previously excluded groups. However, demographics alone may not explain indigenous
participation. Ecuador’s large umbrella indigenous group, CONAIE, is able to mobilize
its own members as well as other indigenous individuals, due to the unique nature of
social capital in the indigenous community, as described in the previous chapter. Zamosc
explains, “The general point is that the Ecuadorian Indian Movement operates as a
network of networks, whose activities can be analyzed as a process of accumulation,
concentration, and deployment of the social capital embedded in its grassroots
community structures” (Zamosc, 2007, p. 17). More than that, it allows for collective
decision-making that influences its members. The Ecuadorian Indian Movement is able
to push its members into the street, and may gain support from some non-members
through its distinctive coalition-building ability. For this reason, indigenous
identification, in itself, may lead individuals to protest against a president. In addition, an
organizational membership variable will also be included to catch citizens who
participate in indigenous organization. The following hypothesis takes into account the
role that ethnicity may play in explaining individual participation in collective action,
regardless of indigenous organization membership.
H5b: Individuals who self-identify as indigenous are more likely to have
participated in acts of social contention.

Organizational Linkages
Organizational linkages have been seen as supporting political participation and
contentious politics in particular because they influence the likelihood of individual
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involvement. Putnam has argued that dense networks increase citizen participation by
building social capital through heightened interpersonal trust, making organizations a key
component for democracy (2000). Applying these arguments about social capital to
protest participation, Brady, Schlozman, and Verba argue that individuals will gain the
necessary civic skills from these organizations to participate in politics (1995, p. 273).
Similarly, Klesner takes into account nonpolitical voluntarism in explaining protest
participation as well (Klesner, 2007, p. 15). Moreover, relationships increase trust,
especially when faced with risky behavior, like protesting. Mara Loveman argues that
individuals who were linked with the Catholic Church were more likely to participate in
collective actions against military dictatorships in the Southern Cone because those
individuals had already developed networks of trust with others (Loveman, 1998, pp.
516-517). Although Loveman describes collective action under extreme high-risk
situations, we should see a similar occurrence in protest against presidents. Specifically,
Almeida contends that unions and indigenous organizations were instrumental to protest
against neoliberalism, which may support the arguments of this dissertation (Almeida,
2007). As the previous chapter noted the importance of organizations in mobilizing
civilians against presidents, this is a key variable in this analysis. In addition, voluntary
organizations create an opportunity for recruitment, provide civic skills, increase
interpersonal trust, and decrease individual risks. The following hypothesis addresses this
relationship and will be evaluated with information about three kinds of organizational
participation.
H6b: If an individual participates in a voluntary organization, such as a union,
political party or civil society organization, the individual will be more likely to
have participated in acts of social contention.
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Although I will be evaluating if political party participation in general influences
protest involvement, I expect that individuals specifically linked to opposition parties
may be even more prone to protest against a sitting president. For example, Pérez-Liñán
and Pallares note the combined problems that Gutiérrez faced, with both social protests
and congressional actions simultaneously against him (Pallares, 2006; Pérez-Liñán,
2007). Moreover, opposition party members are more likely to be in disagreement with
the actual policies undertaken by an opposition party president, making them more likely
to participate in any anti-government activity. For these various reasons, I expect to see
that individuals who are linked to opposition political parties will be more likely to take
to the streets.
H7b: Individual identification with an opposition party increases the likelihood
that the individual participated in acts of social contention.

Political Attitudes
Finally, all scholars note that some individuals have an inclination for political
participation, which extends to protest involvement. They acknowledge that some
individuals may be more interested and more receptive to political involvement (e.g.,
Norris, 2002). This should also occur in these specific instances of protest activity, and I
evaluate if these political attitudes matter in order to effectively assess what other factors
determine participation in social protests. Individuals with greater interest in politics may
be more likely to participate because they have more information about changing policy.
They may be more knowledgeable about the location and timing of protest activities,
which will increase the likelihood of their participation.
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H8b: The greater the interest an individual has in politics, the greater the likelihood
that the individual participated in acts of social contention.
The issue of trust in the government is a slightly more complicated variable, but I
choose to place it under the category of political attitudes as well. Greater cynicism and
governmental distrust should push individuals into the street. In instances of scandal and
corruption, distrustful citizens will be more inclined to believe the criticism of the media.
Although some scholars have combined analysis of social trust with organizational
affiliations, based on the concept of social capital, I will be dividing the two variables for
this study. Letki finds that the concepts of social capital and trust are not necessarily
linked (Letki, 2004, p. 666), despite the arguments of scholars like Putnam (2000). For
this reason, I consider political trust to be a personal attribute for an individual.
H9b: The less confidence an individual has in the government, the greater the
likelihood that the individual participated in acts of social contention
Finally, individuals who feel that they can understand politics and that the
government will respond to their demands have been labeled by previous scholars as
politically efficacious (Balch, 1974; Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). A citizen is
internally efficacious if the person believes that he/she can understand politics enough to
participate (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990, p. 190). External efficacy is witnessed
through the belief that government will respond to citizens (Craig, Neimi, and Silver,
1990, p. 190). Due to the questions asked by the surveys, the Ecuadorian analysis
measures internal political efficacy while the Argentine one looks at external. For
Ecuador, a question asked if citizens felt that politics were too difficult for them to
understand. The analysis for Ecuador assumes that those citizens with less internal
efficacy would be less likely to participate. A question in the Argentine survey asked if
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individuals felt that the government was responsive to citizen demands. Citizens who felt
higher external efficacy would be more likely to participate. Therefore, this necessarily
analysis uses different measures for efficacy, internal or external, respectively, due to
data limitations. The same relationship should exist because less (internally or
externally) efficacious citizens should be less involved in general and less likely to take
to the streets. I have included the following hypothesis to account for political efficacy of
individual citizens.
H10b: If an individual feels incapable of understanding politics or affecting
political change, the lower the likelihood that the individual participated in acts of
social contention

Empirical Analysis
To recap, I examine the individual determinants of social protest by assessing
three families of explanations, the demographic, organizational, and attitudinal factors
that drive individuals to protest. The analysis utilizes two data sources, the
Latinobarómetro (2005) dataset and the World Values Survey (1990) dataset, during a
year after a presidential failure to assess how individuals responded to questions about
protest activities. Latinobarómetro conducted interviews during August of 2005 in
Ecuador, directly after the fall of Lucio Gutiérrez in April 2005. A dichotomous variable
has been created for whether or not respondents claimed to have ever participated in
some form of contentious politics. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if participants
have blocked roads, participated in authorized or unauthorized protest activities, occupied
lands or buildings, or participated in looting. The World Values Survey was conducted
from February to April 1991 in Argentina, after the July 1989 fall of President Raúl
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Alfonsín. This variable was coded as 1 if an individual participated in boycotts,
authorized protest, illegal strikes, or building occupations.
It should be noted that these variables, in both surveys, do not take into account
whether protests were directly targeted at driving presidents from office. Instead, this
analysis uses respondents’ answers to questions about protest participation in general,
attempting to catch individuals who participated. Given the timing of the surveys, we can
assume that individuals would be more likely to respond positively if they had
participated in the recent anti-presidential demonstrations because they would have been
closer in memory. However, I cannot guarantee that the response is specifically referring
to protest in the previous year or against the president. Despite this limitation, previous
quantitative analysis, like in my earlier survival analysis, has shown that protest, even
when not directed at the president’s removal, places pressure on the president to leave
office, and so any protest is relevant to failed presidencies. In addition individual-level
logit analysis allows us to learn whether citizens protest in Ecuador and Argentina for
reasons that are somehow different from those we expect to motivate citizens to protest in
other countries, as well as whether Ecuador and Argentina differ from each other.
I have selected these instances of presidential failure in Ecuador and Argentina for
specific reasons. Both countries have faced repeated presidential failure since the return
to democracy. Moreover, they present an interesting analysis because they differ from
each other on an array of features, from economic to political conditions. Finally, these
surveys occur directly after two instances of presidential failure that differ from each
other in a theoretically interesting manner. Gutiérrez was the third consecutively elected
president removed from office before the end of his term in Ecuador. Mass street protests
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pushed him from office, as he was forced to leave the presidential mansion by helicopter
after facing increasing claims of corruption and overreach of presidential authority. On
the other hand, Alfonsín was the first Argentine president since the return to democracy
and the first to be removed from office. As discussed earlier, he handed over power near
the end of his term to president-elect Menem when rioting and looting broke out. In this
manner, the two countries present varying backdrops for presidential failure, and these
two instances present unique situations. Gutiérrez is one in a long line of presidents
plagued by corruption and incompetence in Ecuador. He faced a street challenge that
forced him to flee the country. Meanwhile, Alfonsín stood as the hopeful return to
democracy for Argentines but was unable to solve its economic woes and the social
problems that resulted. By comparing these two very different instances of failure, this
analysis will identify the commonalities that potentially exist between protest
participants.
The surveys in both cases provided sufficient information on the demographic
variables that are likely to be associated with propensity to protest. Age was coded as a
continuous variable21. A dummy variable for gender was created, which coded female
respondents as a 1. Education levels were listed as continuous variables, with each
increase in the score corresponding to a single year increase in school attendance.
Respondents were coded as 1 for indigenous background if their mother tongue was
listed as “indigenous.” This variable is only present in the Ecuadorian analysis.
Individuals were listed as poor economic status if they responded to a question about
their actual family economic situation as “bad” or “very bad” for Ecuador. For
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The log of age was also used, with no different outcomes.

129

Argentina, it was based on their placement in an unskilled labor class, as compared to
high, middle, and skilled labor.
In regard to organizational linkages, respondents were coded 1 for three different
organizational memberships: labor union, political party, and civil society organizations.
Civil society organizations coding accounts for participation in any organization from
religious to human rights groups. Union and political party memberships were coded 1 if
the respondent claimed membership in these groups. For Argentina, political party
membership was not included in the survey, but a variable was included for membership
in local political groups, and this was utilized in its place for that analysis. To assess
opposition party affiliation in Ecuador (data was not available for Argentina), survey
participants are asked for which party they would vote in upcoming elections. If
participants responded Partido Social Cristiano, Izquierda Democrática, Democracia
Popular, or Pachakutik, they were coded as a 1 for challenging party identification
because these were the parties that originally opposed to, or that subsequently abandoned,
President Lucio Gutiérrez. It can be assumed that respondents who favored these parties
would also have been more prone to criticize Gutiérrez’s government.
Finally, I used three different questions in the survey to assess individual attitudes
and values towards politics. For Ecuador, respondents were coded as a 1 for “high trust”
if they claimed to have “much” or “some” trust in the government. For Argentina, a
proxy was used by looking at their trust in the parliament. For both countries, political
interest was coded as 1 if a respondent answered they had “much” or “some” interest in
politics. If respondents claimed that politics were not complicated for them to
understand, they were coded as 1 for high internal efficacy for Ecuador. For Argentina, it
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was coded as 1 if they felt that they were able to effect political change, a measure of
external efficacy.

Ecuador 2005
The 2005 Ecuadorian survey analysis suggests the importance of several
demographic features and many organizational variables. The model is significant, but it
has limited explanatory power as indicated by its low pseudo R-squared figure of 0.10.
In looking at how demographic features affect protest participation, male respondents
were more likely to participate in protest activities. Also, more educated respondents
were more likely to take to the streets in protest activities, as we would expect based on
the protest literature. Finally, indigenous identification increased the likelihood that
individuals had protested at some point in their life. Conversely, age and socioeconomic
status had no impact on protest involvement.
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Table 6.
Determinants of Ecuadorian Protest Participation: Logistic Regression
Independent Variable

Odds Ratio

Coefficient (Standard Error)

Demographic Availability
Age
Gender (Female = 1)
Low Socioeconomic Status
Education
Indigenous Mother Tongue

1.01
0.63**
1.36
1.09***
3.39**

0.009 (0.006)
-0.455 (0.183)
0.305 (0.209)
0.085 (0.024)
1.220 (0.523)

Organizational Linkages
Union Membership
Political Party Membership
Civil Society Organization Membership
Challenging Party Identification

3.64**
5.70**
2.74***
1.30

1.292 (0.514)
1.741 (0.829)
1.008 (0.186)
0.260 (0.259)

Political Attitudes
High Governmental Trust
High Political Interest
High Political Efficacy (Internal)

0.61*
0.98
1.06

-0.502 (0.278)
-0.020 (0.231)
0.062 (0.181)

Constant
N
LR Chi2
Pseudo R2

---

-3.160 (0.427)

1078
91.01***
0.097

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01
I find that organizational linkages effect protest involvement; political party,
union, and civil society organization membership all increase the likelihood that an
individual will protest, at a p<0.05 or p<0.01 level (civil society organization
membership). Surprisingly, linkage to an opposition party (controlling for party
membership in general) is not significant. This finding does support the arguments
regarding the importance of social capital in protest involvement, showing, once again,
that organizational activity is a vehicle for participation in other forms. Of the personal
attribute variables, only governmental trust shows to be significant. Political interest and
efficacy are not significant.
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Argentina 1991
The Argentine results present a more limited understanding of protest, as some
data simply was not available from this time period and this model shows a similarly low
pseudo R-squared figure of 0.11. For demographic availability, only female and socialeconomic status is significant, with women and lower class individuals being less likely
to protest. Age is insignificant in this analysis. Organizational connections appear to be
important in understanding presidential failure once again, as civil society organization
and union membership are both significant. This is exactly the result that I expect, given
the importance of union opposition to Alfonsín. Participation in a local political group
was not significant in explaining protest participation. Finally, political attitudes that
affected protest involvement differed from the Ecuadorian study as well, with political
interest and efficacy being significant. Political trust was not significant.
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Table 7.
Determinants of Argentinean Protest Participation: Logistic Regression
Independent Variables

Odds Ratio

Coefficient (Standard Error)

Demographic Availability
Age
Gender (Female = 1)
Poor Economic Status

1.00
0.48***
0.12**

Organizational Linkages
Union Membership
Local Political Group Membership
Civil Society Organization Membership

5.48**
0.23
1.47*

1.703 (0.639)
-1.487 (1.062)
0.383 (0.207)

Political Attitudes
High Parliamentary Trust
High Political Interest
High Political Efficacy (External)

1.26
2.42***
1.46**

0.231 (0.238)
0.885 (0.188)
0.383 (0.188)

--911
87.45***
0.11

-1.777 (0.297)

Constant
N
LR Chi2
Pseudo R2

-0.002 (0.006)
-0.725 (0.192)
-2.114 (0.725)

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01

Discussion
The findings of this study further previous understandings of presidential failure
by identifying some of the factors that move individuals to protest in Argentina and
Ecuador. While survey respondents were not asked about their protests against
presidents in particular, the fact that the surveys were held shortly after large protests
contributed to presidential failure suggests that the responses offer insights into the
origins of those protest movements. In both countries, organizational links were most
important in moving people to the street, supporting findings from other surveys in Latin
America and beyond the region. The demographic and attitudinal variables show much
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more mixed results. Many of these were not statistically significant, and those that were,
were different for the two cases. They also often contradicted global patterns.
The most compelling findings for this study lie in the social network variables,
with almost all organizational variables significant in explaining protest activism.
Memberships in unions and political parties increase the likelihood that a citizen will
protest. Moreover, participation in religious, arts, sports, and other organizations also
correlate with contentious political activities. Many of these relationships lie in the idea
that participation in any organization provides a venue for involvement, supporting
inclusion in other political activities. More than that, it supports the arguments of
previous chapters that mobilizing structures build opposition from their base to challenge
presidents. For Argentina, the importance of union linkages is most important, which
supports earlier arguments regarding union influence in Alfonsín’s failure. Overall, these
organizational variables demonstrate how mobilizing actors can be witnessed at the
individual level. Membership with civil society organizations were instrumental in
building protest against presidents in Ecuador and Argentina, and this individual level
analysis shows how mobilizing structures extend their power to push citizens into the
street.
In addition, other authors have presented accounts that suggest that organizations
can also influence participation through the development of civil skills and increase in
interpersonal trust. Putnam has made strong arguments about the importance of civil
society organizations for politics, and this study demonstrates that dense networks
increase political participation (2000). Moreover, this study supports the work of
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scholars, like Mara Loveman, by showing that individuals are more likely to engage in
contentious politics when they are connected to organizations (1998).
The only network variables that were not significant were that of challenging
party identification in Ecuador and local party participation in Argentina. Although these
findings are not significant, the problem may lie in other issues. Party identification is
not strong in Ecuador in general. Moreover, this may not be a good indicator in this
situation because Gutiérrez was abandoned by his original supporters, so there may have
been little variance between members from various parties. Additionally, local party
participation may not work in Argentina because it is simply a poor indicator. All in all,
organizational participation appears to be quite important for explaining protest
participation.
In comparing Ecuador and Argentina to each other, I have identified some
demographic availability variables that increase the likelihood that individuals will
protest. Men are more likely to protest than female citizens in both countries; women are
correspondingly less likely to engage in contentious politics. While this result holds in
both, global studies have found that gender does not play a significant role in explaining
protest participation. This difference between my finding and global studies is probably
explained by country-specific features of these time periods. Argentina had recently
returned to democracy during the time of the survey there, and, as supported by Klesner
(2007), this might explain the gender gap. Ecuador has shown early exclusion of women
in political participation, which may explain why women protest at lower rates.
On other demographic variables, there are interesting differences between these
two cases. In Ecuador, the more educated a citizen, the more likely he/she is to protest.
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This finding seems consistent with what we should expect to find, given the literature on
the topic. Without the presence of an education variable in the Argentina dataset, we
cannot say if education has an effect on protest in that country. However, in Argentina, if
a person is from the upper class, likelihood of protest involvement increases. These two
demographic variables, which are interrelated, demonstrate how important resources can
be in protest participation. Individuals who have education and wealth are more likely to
be aware of political issues. Also, they may feel the need to engage with government
when economic and political conditions are not to their liking. Moreover, they will have
the resources and availability to join in mass mobilization.
Finally, the importance of indigenous politics in Ecuador stands out in this
analysis, as indigenous background is significant in explaining protest participation. Not
only does linkage to an organization affect involvement, but indigenous identification, in
itself, increases the likelihood of participation. This finding may result, as in American
studies, from protest being used as a tool by a historically underrepresented minority
group (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). It also appears that the Ecuadorian
indigenous movement does, as Zamosc (2007) and I argue, have the capacity to mobilize
the indigenous community beyond its membership. This combination of minority group
behavior and the mobilizing ability of CONAIE creates an important component in
explaining indigenous protest participation in Ecuador. Argentina does not have
substantial ethnic variation of a kind usually linked to the prevalence of protest and other
political participation, and questions about ethnic identity were not included in the
survey.
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Finally, the importance of political attitudes differs between Argentina and
Ecuador in explaining presidential failure. In Ecuador, the only variable that was
significant was governmental trust. This could show how, by 2005, problems with
repeated governmental corruption had influenced the manner in which people thought
about the government. People who were less trusting would have been more likely to
protest. In contrast, in 1991 Argentina, political interest was a significant variable.
Individuals who were interested in politics, who were more aware of what was going on
with the Alfonsín government, were more likely to take to the streets. Moreover, those
who felt that they could effect change were more likely to contribute in Argentina.
Perhaps the difference in looking at external and internal efficacy explains the difference
in the findings for these countries, as a feeling that a government will not respond to a
citizen’s demands may push citizens into the street more effectively. Comparatively,
these findings reflect strongly on the experience of the two countries and the specific
circumstances of these time periods. Individuals in Ecuador, plagued by corruption, had
less governmental trust, while political interest and empowerment drove Argentines into
the streets.
It should be noted that the Ecuadorian and Argentinian models only show a
pseudo R-squared value of 0.10 and 0.11, respectively. In other words, the variables are
explaining roughly 10% or 11% of protest participation in these models. The inclusion of
other variables may benefit this investigation and account for additional protest, but both
models are statistically significant, which allows us to be confident that I am explaining
some individual determinants of protest participation in these instances of presidential
failure. Despite these low R-squared values, the models tell us how different factors
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influence citizens. Therefore, I can say that these variables are significant in explaining
protest participation in these countries, but there are additional explanatory variables that
need to be taken into account in future analyses.
Table 8.
Predicted Probabilities
Independent Variable

Ecuador (01)

Argentina (01)

Demographic Availability
Age
Gender (Female = 1)
Low Socioeconomic Status
Education
Indigenous Mother Tongue

0.0008
-0.0532
0.0379
0.0055
0.2086

0.0002
-0.0844
-0.1383
-----

Organizational Linkages
Union Membership
Political Party Membership
Civil Society Organization Membership
Challenging Party Identification

0.2253
0.3348
0.1403
0.0328

0.3210
-0.1013
0.0477
---

Political Attitudes
High Governmental Trust
High Political Interest
High Political Efficacy

-0.0515
-0.0024
0.0073

0.0282
0.1151
0.0458

Bolded figures are statistically significant.
In looking at these variables, we can examine the predicted probabilities to
identify what variables are the most influential in explaining protest participation. The
predicted probabilities show the influence of a variable as it moves from 0 to 1 (absence
versus presence, for dichotomous variables), while all other variables are held at their
means. This allows comparison of the importance of variables in determining protest
participation for this logit analysis. For example, the Ecuadorian case shows that the
importance of organizational linkages is large. As all organizational variables are
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dummies, being a member of a political party increases the likelihood of protest
participation by 33%, all other variables being held at their mean. Similarly, union
membership and civil society membership boosts the likelihood of protesting by 23% and
14%, respectively. This demonstrates the immense role of mobilizing linkages in
determining protest participation in the Ecuadorian case. In regards to the other
significant variables, identification as indigenous has the next strongest influence and
raises the chance of protest participation by 20%. Being a man augments the likelihood of
participation by 5%, and as education moves from 0 to 1 (one additional year of
schooling), there is less than a 1% increase in protesting. Finally, people who are
distrustful of the government have a 5% greater likelihood of protesting, when holding all
other variables at their mean.
In the Argentinean case, we see that union membership is the most influential
variable, and that membership in a union increases the chance of protesting by 32%.
Given the history of the CGT and other unions in the history of Argentina and
specifically in opposing Alfonsín, this finding confirms the impact of this specific
mobilizing structure. Unlike in Ecuador, civil society organizational membership only
leads to a 5% increase in protest participation, which although important, shows a marked
difference between the two countries. Moreover, political interest is more important in
determining participation in Argentina, with interested individuals having an 11%
increase in the likelihood of protest. With efficacy, there is only a 5% increase. Women
were 8% less likely to protest, with all variables being held at their means. Finally, lower
class individuals were 13% less likely to protest, which supports arguments that resources
matter in participation.
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In looking at these predicted probabilities, the greatest impact again stems from
organizational linkages. Ecuador shows the importance of a variety of different links
while Argentina highlights the role of union membership in protest activities. Even
though organizational linkages are important in explaining Ecuadorian participation,
indigenous identification, in itself, dramatically affects the likelihood of protest. Gender
is important, showing that a discrepancy still exists in the ways that men and women
choose to participate politically in these countries. The limited scope of the Argentinean
case presents some problems for interpretation and comparison, but these significant
variables still provide us with some understanding of protest in Argentina.

Conclusion
This chapter examines the individual factors that push individuals into the street –
a key contribution to the work on social protest and to the literature on presidential
failure. It allows us to see what features characterize protest participants in Ecuador and
Argentina. By and large, I find that the most typical protester is male. In Argentina, he is
educated, wealthy, or both. In Ecuador, he is indigenous. Moreover, he has some
personal political attitudes that prompt him to choose protest as a manner to participate in
the political process, although they differ between the two countries. Finally, he is
connected to his society. He is not a solitary angry citizen. Instead, he participates in his
community in a variety of organizations, be they civil society groups, unions, or political
parties. These features, arguably, explain what type of person is taking to the street in
Ecuador and Argentina. Most protesters probably do not display all of these
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characteristics, but this analysis gives us some insight into the driving features of protest
participation.
The most interesting characteristic of the protesters in both country samples is that
they were more often connected to some mobilizing structure. Union, political party, and
civil society organization memberships were influential. Although we cannot say that
opposition party membership affects protest participation, in general, organizational
membership is important across the board. These findings parallel the arguments by
Hochstetler that organizations and political parties led street mobilizations against
presidents (2006). They also support the causal story of this dissertation. Citizens are not
rising up against presidents because of individual grievances; they are moving into the
streets collectively. As noted in other chapters of this dissertation, the importance of
mobilizing actors becomes clear in this individual-level analysis. Citizens are members
of these organizations, and political actors foster mobilization against presidents.
When presidents fall, citizens must oppose them. There is a transition from a
large portion of the citizenry voting affirmatively for the candidate to a large portion of
the citizenry accepting his/her resignation or removal. This analysis looks at the
individual determinants of protest participation in order to identify what drives some
citizens, often the leading edge of more widespread political opposition, to go into the
streets. In other words, the mobilizing capacity of other groups explains why some
citizens participate in challenging presidents, helping to explain presidential failure.
Future analysis may be performed that relates the studies of this chapter with other
countries to improve our understanding of protest participation.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

The goal of this dissertation has been to explain what causes presidential failure in
South America. I examined this issue from a multi-level approach in order to identify the
importance of various factors at different levels of analysis. From a cross-national
perspective, I have shown what puts presidents at risk of failure through statistical
analysis. Then, I have demonstrated how mobilizing structures like political parties and
civil society organizations impact presidential stability, explaining why some countries
have faced repeated failure. Through case history analyses, I showed the consistent
importance of how these parties’ and organizations’ ability to challenge a president, from
both the street and the legislature, influenced the likelihood of presidential failure.
Finally, I noted how the relationships between citizens and these organizations support
this argument at the individual level.
I identified those factors that increase the risk of failure for presidents across the
South American regime with a cross-national statistical analysis. This assessment
expanded on previous research by focusing on economic variables and utilizing duration
analysis. The analysis identified the significance of minority legislative support, social
protest, inflation, prolonged recession, and presidential wrongdoing in explaining South
American presidential failure. It highlighted those factors that explain regional trends in
presidential failure, providing support for the later chapters by noting the importance of
social protest and legislative opposition in the model.
An analysis of repeated presidential failure in Argentina revealed the importance
of the existence of a political actor with the ability to call for social and legislative
opposition. The linkages between the Peronist Party and other social groups made it
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possible for challenges to opposition presidents to occur. In the case of Alfonsín, the
party mobilized opposition through its labor organization. Likewise, De la Rúa’s fall was
matched by protest mobilized by diverse social groups. The clientelistic networks of the
Peronist Party made this possible. Finally, the fall of Rodríguez Sáa demonstrated the
power of Peronist elites to take down one of their own when he sought to extend his
mandate. In sum, the Peronist Party showed how a political actor with mobilizing power
has the ability to lead challenges against presidents, accounting for the repeated
presidential failures in Argentina.
Whereas Argentina paints a picture of top-down mobilization to remove
presidents, Ecuador showed how social movements are capable of challenging presidents
from the bottom up. The ability of indigenous organizations, specifically CONAIE, to
build social and legislative opposition explained the issue of repeated presidential failure
there. In the failure of Bucaram, the ability of CONAIE to mobilize opposition was clear.
Mahuad’s failure showed an even greater role for this organization, extending into the
overthrow of the president. The failure of Gutiérrez showed a smaller role for these
groups, although the indigenous movements did carry out some mobilization. Moreover,
statistical analysis shows the significance of indigenous participation in survey responses
taken directly after this failure.
Finally, individual protest participation showed how these relationships exist at
the citizen level. Demographic factors and attitudes showed why some people are more
likely to participate in protest. More than that, individuals’ relationships to civil society
organizations were highlighted, demonstrating the importance of these political actors in
pushing for protest activities. For Ecuador, the importance of civil society organizations
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and indigenous identity emerged, supporting the other evidence of the role of indigenous
organizations in mobilizing opposition. During Alfonsín’s failure, Argentina showed the
importance of labor unions in mobilizing opposition, which reappeared in the individual
surveys. These two findings affirmed the role of organizational capacity in mobilizing
base level opposition, supporting the arguments of the previous chapters regarding the
capacity of certain political actors to oppose presidents.
In conclusion, I will draw parallels to larger questions regarding the issue of
presidential failure. I begin by addressing a few scope conditions in this argument. The
importance of key actors with mobilizing capacity has been demonstrated, and this
feature suggests that while presidents may fall in other countries, presidential failures
may be less likely in countries that lack such mobilizing capacity.
Whereas this mobilizing capacity may be a requirement for presidential failure,
the declining influence of the military may as well. Scope conditions for this argument
require the absence of military intervention, as well as some adherence to democratic
norms. If countries still face pressure from the military, then those forces may be the first
to step in during moments of crisis. This may reduce presidential failure and increase the
likelihood of presidential coups. Various scholars note the role of the military in
explaining democratic breakdowns, and Cheibub (2007) explicitly points to the
relationships between the military and presidential regimes. Although Cheibub notes that
this relationship has changed for Latin America as a whole, it does not mean that other
countries might not face military intervention. Breakdown may continue in countries that
do not face Western hemisphere pressure for democratic norm adherence.
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The Future of Failure
The story of presidential failure is one of linked social protest and legislative
opposition, and the mobilizing capacity of key actors drives its occurrence. This
relationship and these mobilizing structures appear to be on the decline. Protest in Latin
America, and the world, has begun to change. Civil society, and the linkages it creates in
society, is changing due to economic, social, and technological factors. Protests
stemming from partisan and organizational bases appear to be diminishing. Instead, new
protests emerge from social media, have few organizational bases, and have a diffuse
support structure. If social protest is a key component to presidential failure, what does
this mean for the future of presidential instability in South America? Are they likely to
continue to be an important part of South American politics?
The prevalence of presidential failure in the past has been noted, with nearly a
quarter of elected presidents failing to complete their terms in office from 1978 and 2005
(Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009). Despite this past frequency, the occurrence of
presidential failure appears to be trailing off, including in Ecuador and Argentina.
Ecuador, the unlucky repeat offender of this study, has seen its most recent president
complete his term in office and receive subsequent reelection. Likewise, Argentina has
demonstrated presidential stability with the repeated elections of the Kirchners. This may
seem unsurprising given the importance of the Peronist Party in explaining Argentine
failure, but it coincides with a regional trend towards executive stability. These and other
presidents’ ability to complete their terms in office bodes well for South American
governance in general. The most recent instance of failure – President Lugo – occurred
in Paraguay, the last country to return to democracy in the third wave. Perhaps the issue
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of presidential failure is merely a hiccup in the process of democratization for these
countries because the phenomenon is a diminishing threat to democratic governance and
South America seems to face a lower risk of failure.
This lowered risk, visible in the completion of presidential terms, counters
observable ongoing protest challenges to presidents across the region. Take, for instance,
the opposition to President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. In April 2013, thousands of
Argentineans took to the streets to protest the president, citing various acts of corruption
and economic transgressions committed by the administration. Fernández had engaged in
a struggle with Clarín, a media conglomerate that loudly opposed the president. The
Clarín dispute, along with mounting inflation and serious concerns about crime, drove
citizens into the street to oppose the president. The protest plans were largely
coordinated through Facebook, Twitter, and other social networking sites (The Guardian,
April 19, 2013). The peaceful resolution of this large-scale protest event flies in the face
of what one might expect, especially given the findings of this study’s quantitative
analysis. Fernández faced many of the factors identified in survival modeling as
explanatory for presidential failure, and yet she did not fall. In fact, her response to
teeming protesters in April was to send various contemptuous tweets while she continued
her travels to Venezuela for a presidential inauguration (The Guardian, April 19, 2013).
Other South American countries have faced this type of continued opposition to
presidents. The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, countered intense protests in 2013
as tens of thousands of citizens demanded changes in education, transportation, and other
social services, especially in light of the upcoming World Cup and Olympic Games
(BBCNews, June 18, 2013). Even journalists noted the impressive nature of these
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protests, comparing them to previous instances of presidential failure, noting, “The
demonstrations are Brazil's largest since 1992, when people took to the streets to demand
the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello” (BBCNews, June 18, 2013).
Protests were held and yet the president remained in office without a serious challenge to
her authority. In fact, she noted that the protests were signs of the strength of Brazilian
democracy, as youthful exuberance and mobilization were importance for a responsive
citizenry (BBCNews, June 18, 2013).
Does this mean that the era of presidential failure is over? Are presidents now
facing opposition but not falling? This dissertation has argued that the key to presidential
failure truly lies in the mobilizing capacity of organizations. These political parties and
indigenous groups have the organizing skill to get citizens into the streets, but they also
have a structural component that directs sentiment and focuses pressure. The current
presidential opposition appears to be essentially different from the past. Whether the
bottom-up story of Ecuadorian protest or the top-down coordination of Argentine
Peronists, the structural capacity of key actors allowed for pressure to be placed on
presidents, from the street and matched with elite involvement. The more spontaneous,
mass-based appeals of recent protest have lacked this key feature. Protesters in Brazil
made partisan actors leave their demonstrations, in fact, although civil society
organizations were allowed to stay and wave their organizational banners.
The importance of social networking websites and other technology in
coordinating recent challenges to presidents is clear. The ongoing instability in the
Middle East, beginning with the “Arab Spring,” demonstrates the ability of “successful”
protests to emerge from social networking websites. Likewise, the use of text messages
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allowed for the coordination of intense protest, which led to the eventual impeachment of
President Estrada in the Philippines (Shirky, 2011). Initially, congressional allies were
reluctant to follow through with impeachment, but were convinced by the impromptu
protest of a million citizens in Manila (Shirky, 2011). These successful stories of
leadership transition are generally promoted in discussions of social media and protest.
Despite these “success stories,” other tales narrate how protest fails to remove
leaders, with specific instances in Belarus, Iran, and Thailand (Shirky, 2011). Shirky
even acknowledges that social media amplifies other civil society support, making it
possible for change to occur (Shirky, 2011). There are a few positive cases of mass
protest driving leadership transition. Most stories of unorganized protest do not lead to
dramatic change, but instead enhance ongoing relationships in the public sphere. These
stories appear to be more similar to the events occurring in South America, where
protesters use social networking websites and other technologies to organize an event, but
ultimately fail to achieve any true challenge to governments. The long-term effects of
these protests are still unknown.
Although individuals are obviously coordinating the efforts, there is no structural
foundation behind the efforts, no linkages between individuals and pressure groups, and
no elite involvement that relays messages between the base and the president. In other
words, the extemporaneous nature of these more recent protests highlights protest
capacity, while neglecting the importance of organizing structure. Protest, by itself, does
not drive presidential failure. Instead, the mobilizing capacity created by linked actors
pushes presidents from office. As seen in the Argentine case, the Peronist links to civil
society drive non-Peronist presidents from office. These new cases of opposition present
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protest capacity without organization structure due to the role of social networking
websites and other technology. They allow for organization in opposition to presidents,
without ensuring that focused structural foundations exist. The inability of these recent
protests to substantially challenge South American presidents clearly shows the
importance of the mobilizing actor in driving presidents from office. Could these protests
result in presidential failure? Decidedly so. However, it seems more evident that a shift
has occurred in South America. Opposition to presidents has risen largely from less
structured sectors, through for example, electronic social networking systems. The new
organizing of social movements, with its dispersed nature, has altered the way in which
presidents are challenged. These protests have been largely unable to disrupt presidential
power in any country.
This focus on dispersed mass based protests is not the only reason for declining
presidential failure. Presidents have becoming more effective at coopting base support.
As previously mentioned, President Correa of Ecuador has faced various disputes over
the course of his term. His relationship with indigenous organizations has diminished
over time, and various protest efforts have been unable to substantially influence his
policy choices. For instance, hundreds of protesters in March of 2012 opposed copper
mining contracts that were granted to Chinese companies (BBCNews, March 8, 2012).
The leaders of the march, largely from CONAIE, noted various goals, including greater
adherence to the Ecuadorian Constitution in regards to environmental concerns (El
Comercio, March 14, 2012). President Correa has expanded controversial economic
plans and met environmental and/or indigenous opposition. Even with protests against
him, Correa has faced no substantial challenge from the streets.
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In this case, President Correa has effectively coopted the sources of earlier
organizational capacity. Correa removed much of CONAIE’s base of power by building
support amongst the indigenous population of the country. In the recent protests against
him, Correa’s administration sent extensive resources to the communities with protests,
as well as other rural areas, to thwart opposition (El Comercio, March 16, 2012).
Indigenous protest participation is rooted in collective choice, and Correa’s actions were
designed to eliminate his opposition. Correa’s ability to coopt this organization’s base
has allowed for his continued power.
These two features, extemporaneous rather than organized social protest and cooptation of the social bases of opposition groups, have resulted in the decline of
presidential failure. Extemporaneous social protest creates less effective opposition to
presidents. Likewise, the cooptation of groups’ social bases reduces the likelihood of
true challenges to their remaining in office. If these trends continue, which is likely,
presidents in South America should face a brighter future for term completion.
Additionally, we should (and do) see this occurring in other countries. The Arab Spring
resulted in executive transition, but the lack of formally organized actors may be one of
the keys as to why the grievances of countries have not been effectively channeled or
resolved. Recent protest has been ineffective in targeting presidents in South America,
but future mobilization may result in executive transition if it is overwhelmingly intense,
as in the Arab Spring. However, in the absence of a mobilizing actor – that is an
organization or party able to direct the scope, intensity, and nature of protest activity –
even widespread protest may not interfere with presidential term completion.
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South American democracy may have greater term completion in the future
because new technologies and shifts in power may allow presidents to overcome
challenges. Term completion does not equate to stability, and this outcome may be
detrimental to South American governance. In fact, these results do not depict an
example of the type of “democracy” one would like to see. If taken at its worse, South
American citizens may be more active and less acknowledged in their demands.
Presidents may complete their terms in office (except for extreme cases), but they may be
less responsive to what citizens want. Dishearteningly, South Americans will not be
alone, as citizens in other countries appear to share the same (or even worse) fate.
Whereas mobilizing capacity was one scope condition for this analysis, the
decline of military power was another. South America may face a future of uncoordinated
protest, unresponsive presidents, and disregarded citizens, but the alternative may be
worse. A variety of reasons may explain the shift away from democratic breakdown in
South America, including Western hemispheric norm adherence and post-authoritarian
civil-military power changes. Although outside the scope of this project, the likelihood
of military intervention appears lower for South American countries than in previous
decades, especially given the rise in presidential failure. This cannot be said for the rest
of the world. Recent conflicts in Egypt and Syria have demonstrated a greater reliance on
military might to ensure executive stability. South America may face a decline in
democratic responsiveness, but, as long as the military does not step in, democracy will
be maintained. Cases from other regions demonstrate greater fears for the future of
democracy. If military power is used to quash protest activities and reduce leadership
accountability, then democracy will be even more limited.
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Research Conclusions
The advent of this dissertation project was one of hope. The story of presidential
failure appeared to resolve many of the traditional issues of presidential democracy in
South America. Presidential failure reduced the rigidity of presidential regimes, while
simultaneously eliminating the fear of military coups. It allowed for transition in
moments of extreme presidential unpopularity, while guaranteeing that democracy
prevailed. Presidential failure appears, on its face, to be a story about victories by the
underdog. The political elite’s hands had been wrenched free of power by social groups
and opposition parties. South American democracy appeared to be responding to citizen
demands, in a dramatic manner that had not been seen before.
Yet, all of these expectations have culminated in a milieu of doubt. Many cases
of presidential failure stem from traditional sources of power – like the Peronist Party –
attempting to thwart opposition groups. Other cases – like that of Mahuad – show a
president being removed for sound reasons, and yet the subsequent failure of Gutiérrez
demonstrates that long term change has not been achieved. The future appears even
darker for government responsiveness. Shifts in technology and society have reduced the
ability of citizens to pressure governmental change. Presidents have learned to insulate
themselves more effectively from opposition demands. This diminishes the likelihood
that presidential failure will continue in the future. More than that, countries that have
not seen a reduction in military influence in politics may face greater oppression, as
uncoordinated protests meet military might.
Overall, this project has demonstrated the path by which presidential failure has
evolved. The causes of presidential failure are clear, and undoubtedly, some presidents
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will be removed from office in the future. The trend of presidential failure appears to be
changing. This phenomenon, brought about by the third wave of democratization,
occurred when military strength had been diminished by changing global norms. New
voices were heard, but long term changes in government responsiveness to citizens
appear unlikely.
This multi-method analysis identifies the causes of presidential failure, carrying
the importance of specific factors through cross-national, national, and individual
assessments. This investigation has elucidated the manner in which repeated presidential
failure occurs, assessing countries with persistent presidential instability to trace the
process of failure and enhance knowledge about this phenomenon. Overall, this
dissertation has attempted to resolve previous limitations in previous studies of
presidential failure. By looking at this issue from multiple levels of analysis, this project
demonstrated the importance of key political actors using their mobilization skills to
oppose presidents.
Presidential failure still may serve as a cautionary tale for South American
governmental stability. The declining nature of the phenomenon may be positive,
assuming the goal of governance is term completion. However, if South American
countries are pursuing stronger democracy, the larger worry is that a disheartening
transition may be emerging in the region, as individuals lack relationships to key
organizing structures. The historic conditions that have formulated political life have
been declining over the past few decades. Additional investigations that analyze civil
society and the changing nature of modern organization are needed. Presidential failure
appears to be a time limited phenomenon, but the problem appears to be a symptom of
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unresponsive governance. That disease does not appear to have been resolved. Future
analysis is needed to identify how to ensure citizen voices are heard in this new era of
South American democracy.
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Appendix A
Correlation Matrix

Neoliberalism
Inflation
Recession
Scandal
Protest
Majority
Pop.Vote

Neoliberal

Inflation

Recession

Scandal

Protest

Majority

-0.1172
-0.1802
0.2914
0.1453
0.1146
0.0387

0.2992
-0.0821
0.0016
-0.0712
-0.0599

-0.0696
-0.0326
-0.1310
-0.0198

0.0202
0.1427
0.2750

0.0112
-0.0881

0.4418
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